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Abstract: A number of ways of taxonomizing human learning have been proposed. We examine the evidence for one such proposal,
namely, that there exist independent explicit and implicit learning systems. This combines two further distinctions, (1) between
learning that takes place with versus without concurrent awareness, and (2) between learning that involves the encoding of instances
(or fragments) versus the induction of abstract rules or hypotheses. Implicit learning is assumed to involve unconscious rule learning.
We examine the evidence for implicit learning derived from subliminal learning, conditioning, artificial grammar learning,
instrumental learning, and reaction times in sequence learning. We conclude that unconscious learning has not been satisfactorily
established in any of these areas. The assumption that learning in some of these tasks (e.g., artificial grammar learning) is
predominantly based on rule abstraction is questionable. When subjects cannot report the "implicitly learned" rules that govern
stimulus selection, this is often because their knowledge consists of instances or fragments of the training stimuli rather than rules. In
contrast to the distinction between conscious and unconscious learning, the distinction between instance and rule learning is a sound
and meaningful way of taxonomizing human learning. We discuss various computational models of these two forms of learning.
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1. Introduction
A classic issue faced by researchers attempting to under-
stand the basic laws of learning is whether there is more
than one basic learning mechanism. Can all the phenom-
ena of learning be accommodated by a unitary mecha-
nism, or do we need to posit the existence of independent
and dissociable human learning systems? In this target
article we consider some of the experimental evidence -
much of it very recent - that has addressed this issue.
We will consider two dimensions on which it has been
suggested that functionally distinct learning systems dif-
fer. The first dimension concerns the role of awareness
during learning. Many authors (e.g., Hayes & Broadbent
1988; Lewicki et al. 1987; Reber 1989a) have argued that
in addition to having a learning system whose functioning
is accompanied by concurrent awareness of what is being
learned, humans have a quite separate system that oper-
ates independently of awareness. The second dimension,
which turns out to be closely related to the first, concerns
the content of learning. Distinct learning systems encode
very different sorts of information; one system induces
rules (e.g., Lea & Simon 1979; Nosofsky et al. 1989),
whereas a second system memorizes instances (e.g.,
Brooks 1978; Medin & Schaffer 1978).
We believe it is important to evaluate the current
evidence for and against the multiple-systems view for at
least two reasons. First, each of the separate systems that
has been hypothesized has tended to encourage re-
searchers to develop a set of explanatory constructs that
are unique to that system and that allow its characteristic
phenomena to be explained. A drawback, however, is that
experimental results are often interpreted exclusively in
terms of these restricted concepts, with no consideration
of whether they might also be understood (and possibly
better understood) in terms of more general principles.
The second and perhaps more pressing reason for
evaluating the evidence for dissociable learning systems
is that there has been considerable interest, over the last
few years, in whether there exist dissociable memory
systems (for reviews, see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork
1988; Schacter 1987; 1989; Squire 1992). The mounting
positive evidence comes from a variety of sources. For
example, amnesic patients have been shown to be dra-
matically impaired on certain direct tests of memory, such
as free recall, but less impaired or even unimpaired on
indirect tests of memory, such as motor skills (see Squire
1992). Although dissociations between performance on
direct and indirect tests do not force us to conclude that
there are dissociable memory systems (e.g., Jacoby &
Kelley 1991; Roediger 1990), some researchers have ar-
gued at length that the experimental results, together
with current understanding of brain functioning, strongly
imply the existence of separable underlying systems
(e.g., Schacter 1989; Squire 1992).
Few would argue that learning and memory can be
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studied independently. On the contrary, the possible
characteristics of dissociable learning systems should be
considered in research on the issue of dissociable memory
systems and vice versa. Indeed, if there really are disso-
ciable memory systems, it seems very likely that there are
also dissociable learning systems that supply them with
information. Yet, as several authors have noted (e.g.,
Berry & Dienes 1991; Reber 1989a), research on learning
and on memory has tended to proceed independently. We
hope to help memory researchers in their attempts to
understand information storage and retrieval by examin-
ing carefully the question of whether distinct learning
systems exist and by analyzing the properties of the
learning mechanisms that acquire information.
1.1. Proposed distinctions between types of learning
Distinctions between different types of learning have
been common in psychology for many years. One such
distinction is between declarative and procedural learn-
ing, that is, between the acquisition of factual knowledge
and the acquisition of skills, respectively (e.g., Cohen &
Squire 1980; Morris 1984; Winograd 1975). Other distinc-
tions include the acquisition of "habits" versus "memo-
ries" (Mishkin et al. 1984) and "taxon" versus "locale"
learning (O'Keefe & Nadel 1978). Of course, if indepen-
dent memory systems require independent learning
mechanisms, then many more distinctions might be
needed. For instance, we might require separate learning
systems to feed semantic and episodic memory stores
(Neely 1989; Tulving 1983; see also multiple book review:
BBS 7(2) 1984).
Of these distinctions, the one between declarative and
procedural learning has probably attracted the most at-
tention, with a variety of empirical phenomena being
interpreted in that framework. For example, Cohen and
Squire (1980) suggested that amnesics have normal or
near-normal procedural learning but impaired declarative
learning, a theoretical notion that has been widely taken
up by other researchers in the amnesia field. This distinc-
tion has in recent years been largely eclipsed, however,
by the alternative distinction between "explicit" and "im-
plicit" learning. (Note that some authors have replaced
the original declarative/procedural distinction with the
terms "declarative" and "nondeclarative" [e.g., Shim-
amura & Squire 1989; Squire 1992].) The main reason for
the shift in terminology and emphasis toward the terms
"explicit" and "implicit" is dissatisfaction with the original
terminology, the term "procedural" apparently being too
narrow to encompass the relevant learning effects. For
example, the learning that is preserved in amnesia is not
always of a procedural nature: it includes a variety of
priming effects involving, for instance, the ability to
complete word steins (Graf et al. 1984) and an increase in
the likelihood of judging a nonfamous name famous as a
result of prior exposure (e.g., Squire & McKee 1992).
The term "implicit learning" was first coined by Reber
(1967), who is responsible for much of the recent interest
in the issue of distinct learning systems (see Reber 1989a
for a review). Different authors have used a variety of
definitions to capture the fine detail of the explicit/
implicit learning distinction (see Mathews et al. 1989, for
examples), but the key factor is the idea that implicit
learning occurs without concurrent awareness of what is
being learned and represents a separate system from the
one that operates in more typical learning situations,
where learning does proceed with concurrent awareness
(i.e., explicitly). At the same time, it is clear that many
authors have been concerned with the possibility that
different learning tasks might give rise to different kinds
of knowledge (e.g., Mathews et al. 1989; Reber 1989a;
Vokey & Brooks 1992), one kind abstract or rule based and
the other based on separate fragments or instances. For
Reber, implicit learning is not only unconscious but also'
involves the acquisition of abstract information.
The paradigm case is language learning, where people
are assumed to be able implicitly to learn abstract gram-
matical rules. Few nonlinguists are aware of or are able to
articulate the grammatical rules supposed to underlie
their linguistic performance, so it makes sense to imagine
that those rules are acquired, if at all, without ever being
directly represented in consciousness. The rules are ab-
stract in the sense that they apply equally to any linguistic
tokens, including novel ones, that come from the appro-
priate syntactic categories.
Because the aware/unaware and rules/instances di-
mensions are logically distinct, we believe that they must
be treated independently, in this target article we accord-
ingly review evidence for these two dimensions sepa-
rately. In what follows, we reserve the term "unconscious
learning" for learning without awareness, regardless of
what sort of knowledge is being acquired. At the same
time, we use the terms "rule learning" and "instance
learning" to refer to the acquisition of abstract and frag-
mentary knowledge, respectively, regardless of whether
such learning is conscious.
Most of the article is devoted to whether unconscious
learning is indeed supported by empirical evidence. In
section 2 we survey a wide range of learning paradigms,
from subliminal learning phenomena to Pavlovian condi-
tioning to artificial grammar learning and serial reaction-
time tasks. The stimuli and specific processes involved in
performing and learning each of these tasks differ widely
and may share some basic characteristics or may exhibit
some basic differences. Across these diverse paradigms
we find little actual support for unconscious rule induc-
tion (i.e., for implicit learning), or for the unconscious
learning of any other type of information. However, in
section 3 we do find evidence for a dissociation between a
rule-induction system and an instance-memorization sys-
tem; we review evidence for this dissociation obtained in
explicit, or conscious, learning tasks. Within each system,
the range of different processes and information is still
large, but they nevertheless seem to form two distinct
types: slow, effortful hypothesis testing on the one hand,
and fast, efficient memorization of instances and frag-
ments of instances on the other.
We concentrate throughout on data from normal sub-
jects. It is clear, however, that amnesic patients have
learning difficulties, and these difficulties have been
widely interpreted within the explicit/implicit framework
(e.g., Squire 1992). For our present purposes, the data
from such subjects are tangential, because the question of
awareness during learning has not been directly consid-
ered in amnesics (but see Knopman 1991). In section 4 we
comment briefly on the interpretation of learning data
from this population of subjects.
368 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1994) 17:3
Shanks & St. John: Dissociable learning systems
2. Can learning occur without awareness?
Proponents of the explicit/implicit distinction have ar-
gued that there are clear demonstrations of subjects'
ability to encode new information without being aware of
that information, and hence that awareness is the key
dimension on which separable learning systems differ.
The question of whether learning can occur without
awareness goes back many decades (e.g., Adams 1957;
Dulany 1961; Eriksen 1960; Krasner 1958; Thorndike &
Rock 1934). In addition to the recent work of Reber, which
we consider below, in the last five or six years there have
been a large number of sequence learning reaction time
studies that have adopted an interesting and novel tech-
nique for assessing the relationship between aware-
ness and learning. A substantial part of our review
concerns results obtained using this task. We also con-
sider evidence from a variety of conditioning proce-
dures. We begin with some comments on experimental
methodology.
2.1. The logic of dissociations
Almost all studies of unconscious learning have adopted a
very constrained version of the logic of dissociation.
Separate indices of learning and awareness are used in the
attempt to find circumstances in which exposure to a set of
stimuli leads to detectable learning unaccompanied by
any reliable degree of awareness. On the face of it, such an
approach could lead to unequivocal evidence of uncon-
scious learning, but researchers using similar logic to try
to establish the existence of unconscious perception have
noted several problems (e.g., Reingold & Merikle 1988).
What counts as a suitable test of awareness? Can we
discount the possibility that our index of awareness is
contaminated by unconscious information? Can we be
sure it is sufficiently sensitive to detect exhaustively all
conscious information? As we shall see, these are deep
problems, and researchers have adopted a variety of
strategies to try to circumvent them.
Firmer evidence for unconscious learning may emerge
from experiments based on alternatives to this particular
dissociation paradigm. To test unconscious perception,
for example, Reingold and Merikle (1988) have proposed
a new and interesting procedure, whereby one looks for
greater sensitivity to some variable in an indirect test in
which instructions make no reference to the variable as
compared with an otherwise identical direct test in which
the instructions do refer to the variable. Alternatively,
one could try to demonstrate the independence of two
learning systems by trying to establish qualitative differ-
ences between them (e.g., Merikle & Reingold 1992),
such that, for example, one system is affected in one way
by a variable, the other in the opposite way.
We know of only one study that has even come close to
establishing such qualitative differences; this case will
accordingly be considered in some detail. Hayes and
Broadbent (1988) began by postulating two independent
systems: an unconscious system that would slowly accu-
mulate information about predictive events in the envi-
ronment and a conscious system that would test hypoth-
eses. They further assumed that the conscious system
would be highly dependent on a limited-capacity working
memory system, and the unconscious system would be
independent of it. [See also Broadbent: "The Maltese
Cross" BBS 7(1) 1984.]
A rather straightforward prediction emerges from this
plausible model of the cognitive system. Because the
conscious learning mechanism relies on working memory,
there should be situations where learning is profoundly
affected by loading the working memory system with a
secondary task, such as generating random numbers. At
the same time, because the unconscious system does not
depend on working memory, other (implicit) learning
tasks should be unaffected by such a secondary task.
Indeed, Hayes and Broadbent went so far as to say that
unconscious learning might be facilitated by a secondary
task if it prevented the conscious system from exerting an
interfering influence on the unconscious system. The
importance of the Hayes and Broadbent study is that, in
accordance with their model, they appeared to have
found two learning tasks that differed in only a minor way,
one of which was inhibited and the other facilitated by a
secondary task.
In their experiments Hayes and Broadbent contrasted
performance in two versions of the computer "person"
task. On each trial, the subject entered an attitude (e.g.,
polite) into the computer, which then responded with its
attitude (e.g., unfriendly). The subject's task was to try to
get the computer to be friendly. If we designate the 12
possible attitudes - going from very unfriendly to loving -
with the numbers 1 . . . 12, then the computer's attitude
on each trial was a simple numerical function of the
subject's input. In one (No-Lag) condition, the computer's
attitude (O() on each trial was a function of the subject's
attitude (I,) on the same trial:
O, = I, - 2 + r (1)
where r is a random number (—1, 0, or l)and the attitudes
have the 12 numerical values mentioned above. In the
other (Lag) condition, I, was replaced by l,_u so that the
computer's attitude was determined by the subject's atti-
tude on the preceding trial:
O, = I,_; - 2 + r (2)
Performance was measured in terms of the number of
trials in which the subject's input was one that could
(given the random element) have produced a friendly
response from the computer person. Although learning
occurred in both groups, Hayes and Broadbent found that
subjects could give highly accurate verbal reports about
the No-Lag task, indicating that their learning had been
accompanied by awareness, whereas the verbal reports of
subjects in the Lag version were very poor. This result
encourages the view that learning in the No-Lag task can
be readily achieved by the explicit system, but that the
Lag task requires the implicit system. Thus we might
predict that a concurrent secondary task would have an
effect on learning in the No-Lag condition but not in the
Lag condition.
To test this, Hayes and Broadbent (1988) gave subjects a
block of learning trials using either Equation 1 (No-Lag
group) or Equation 2 (Lag group). After 30 trials in the No-
Lag condition and 50 trials in the Lag condition, perfor-
mance was approximately equated, and at this point
Hayes and Broadbent changed the rules by replacing the
- 2 in the equations with +2. They then presented a
further 30 (No-Lag group) or 50 (Lag group) relearning
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trials. Under single-task conditions (Experiment 1), per-
formance in the Lag condition was affected more detri-
mentally than in the No-Lag condition by this rule
change. In contrast, when subjects were required to
perform a concurrent secondary task (generating random
letters or digits; Experiments 2 and 3), a change in the
rule interfered more with performance in the No-Lag
than in the Lag task, exactly the opposite of the result
obtained when there was no secondary task. The results
conform to Hayes and Broadbent's theory - and hence to
their conception of separate implicit and explicit learning
systems - if we simply assume that the secondary task
occupied the conscious working memory system and
therefore interfered with the explicit system, whereas
removal of the working memory system allowed the im-
plicit system to operate without any interfering influence
from the explicit system.
Unfortunately, Green and Shanks (1993) were unable
to replicate Hayes and Broadbent's results. In the single-
task groups, Green and Shanks found that the introduc-
tion of the equation change had similar effects on perfor-
mance in the No-Lag and Lag groups, thus failing to
replicate Hayes and Broadbent's (Experiment 1) finding
that performance was more detrimentally affected in the
Lag condition. Under dual-task conditions the situation
was the same: performance was approximately equally
affected in the two groups. There was not the slightest
hint that performance in the Lag group was less affected
by the equation change, and hence Hayes and Broad-
bent's (Experiment 2 and 3) dual-task results were like-
wise not replicated. Green and Shanks suggest that Hayes
and Broadbent may have obtained the results they did
owing to the inappropriate inclusion of subjects who had
learned very little prior to the equation change.
Hayes and Broadbent's dissociation posed a genuine
problem for theories of learning relying on a single learn-
ing mechanism. Because the secondary task appeared to
have opposing effects on the two primary tasks, Hayes and
Broadbent's data seemed to support the claim that there
exist dissociable learning systems. Obviously, the fact that
their results could not be replicated undermines those
conclusions.
With the exception of Hayes and Broadbent's study,
implicit learning experiments have universally adopted
the dissociation logic of attempting to demonstrate learn-
ing in the absence of any detectable degree of awareness.
As we shall see, various methodological problems with
the dissociation procedure make it doubtful whether
unconscious learning has yet been established. It is worth
bearing in mind, however, that future experiments using
alternative methods may license stronger inferences con-
cerning the dissociability of learning systems. We now
begin our discussion of the empirical evidence.
2.2. Unconscious learning with subliminal stimuli
Most studies of unconscious learning have asked whether
people can learn about relationships between stimuli
without being aware of those relationships, but before
discussing the results of such studies we will briefly
consider evidence from experiments asking a more direct
question, Can people learn about stimuli when they are
unaware of the existence of these stimuli, that is, when
the stimuli are subliminal? A situation in which uncon-
scious learning would, on the face of it, be fairly straight-
forward to establish is one in which a subject is entirely
unaware that the critical stimulus in the learning phase is
present at all, yet still shows evidence of leaning some-
thing about that stimulus.
There have, of course, been a large number of experi-
ments in which subjects are presented with brief or low-
intensity stimuli intended to be below the threshold of
awareness and in which an attempt is made to measure
effects of such stimulation on subsequent behavior. We
ignore much of this literature, for two reasons: first, in
some cases such effects may be only tenuously related to
learning. For example, many subliminal activation exper-
iments ask whether the way a stimulus is interpreted may
be biased by a supposedly subliminal stimulus presented
a few hundred milliseconds previously • (e.g., Marcel
1983). It is doubtful, .however, that such biasing effects
would occur over longer intervals: instead, they are typ-
ically interpreted as examples of some sort of short-lived
facilitation. Needless to say, it is difficult to draw a sharp
line between perception and learning, but if unconscious
learning is to have any real significance, it must be
demonstrable over reasonable intervals of time (at the
very least seconds or minutes rather than milliseconds).
Second, many subliminal activation experiments that
do appear to show longer-lasting effects (e.g., Eich
1984) have already been the subject of extensive criticism
in this journal (see Holender 1986, and accompanying
commentaries). We have no wish to repeat arguments
made previously except to point out that in such experi-
ments it is extremely difficult to be confident that the
stimuli are indeed below the threshold of conscious per-
ception.
We accordingly focus in this section on studies that
avoid these problems. Andrade (in press), Bornstein
(1992), Ghoneim and Block (1992), Greenwald (1992), and
Schacter (1987) review a number of relevant studies
examining learning with subliminal stimuli. Although
there have been some positive results, a corresponding
number of negative findings leads us to suggest that
unconscious learning with subliminal stimuli has not yet
been conclusively demonstrated.
Subliminal stimuli may be presented to awake subjects
as auditory messages at extremely low intensity or in
some scrambled form, or as images presented for very
brief durations or embedded in other figures; alter-
natively, they may be presented to subjects during sleep
or anesthesia. There is a widespread popular belief in the
ability of such subliminal messages to condition attitudes
or preferences or otherwise to influence behavior. In-
deed, this belief is so powerful that the families of two
young men who died from self-inflicted gunshot wounds
sought more than $6 million in damages from the rock
group Judas Priest on the grounds that subliminal mes-
sages on one of the group's records had caused the men to
commit suicide (see Loftus & Klinger 1992). Recent
investigations, however, suggest that the concern is mis-
placed. Controlled experiments attempting to see
whether subliminal messages can influence behavior or
whether people can use self-help audiotapes as learning
aids have yielded exclusively negative results (British
Psychological Society 1992; Greenwald et al. 1991; Vokey
& Read 1985). It seems unlikely that unconscious learning
can occur in such situations.
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Several investigations of spared cognitive functions
under general anesthesia have obtained evidence of small
but reliable amounts of learning, but these are matched
by a comparable number of negative results (see An-
drade, in press; Ghoneim & Block, 1992, for reviews). If
the anesthetic has been adequately administered and
renders the patient entirely unconscious, then spared
learning must in turn be unconscious. A typical positive
result was reported by Jelicic et al. (1992). They gave
anesthetized patients repeated auditory presentations of
two words (e.g., yellow, green) from a semantic category.
Later, when the anesthetic had worn off, subjects were
asked in a priming test to generate members of those
categories. Subjects were significantly more likely to
produce the preexposed words than were control subjects
who had not been read the words during anesthesia. Thus
some information does seem to have been encoded while
the subjects were unconscious.
Another positive result was reported by Kihlstrom et
al. (1990). They gave anesthetized patients lists of strongly
associated cue-target word pairs, with each list being
presented about 67 times during the operation. Later,
when the anesthetic had worn off, subjects were given a
cued recall and a recognition memory test; in a third test,
they were read the cue words and had to say the first word
that came to mind. Although the recall and recognition
tests yielded no evidence of retention, on the generation
test subjects were more likely to produce target items to
preexposed cue words than to nonpreexposed cue words,
whether the test was relatively soon after the exposure
phase (median 87 min) or much later (median 14 days).
Thus, again, some degree of unconscious registration
seems to have occurred.
In contrast to this are the many negative results that
have been published. Some of these are particularly
revealing because they come from experiments using
procedures very similar to those of studies that have found
positive results. For example, Cork et al. (1992) failed to
replicate the Kihlstrom et al. (1990) results using a differ-
ent anesthetic but otherwise identical procedures. Fur-
thermore, despite the likelihood that sleep renders a
person less unconscious than general anesthesia, in a
well-controlled experiment Wood et al. (1992) were un-
able to obtain evidence of learning during sleep, again
with procedures similar to those used in the Kihlstrom et
al. (1990) study. Similarly, Ghoneim et al. (1992) found no
evidence of Pavlovian conditioning in anesthetized pa-
tients; they used experimental procedures that did reveal
conditioning in nonanesthetized subjects.
This pattern of results might simply indicate that learn-
ing under anesthesia is a genuine phenomenon, but that
relatively subtle methodological factors determine
whether a given study will or will not obtain evidence of
it. However, Andrade (in press) discusses a large number
of studies, including over 20 published reports of failures,
and is unable to find any clear factors that determine
whether learning will or will not occur. For example, it
does not seem to be especially related to the type of
stimuli used. More significantly, it remains an open possi-
bility that many positive results have been due to inade-
quately administered anesthetic that left some or all of the
patients at least partially conscious. It is worth noting that
in the Cork et al. (1992) study three subjects were ex-
cluded from the analysis because they had explicit mem-
ory of the study items! As Cork et al. say, "the extent to
which implicit expressions of memory are affected by
general anesthesia remains uncertain" (p. 897).
2.2.1. Conclusions. Experiments in which subjects are
presented with stimuli that they are likely to be unaware
of at the time of exposure yield some evidence of uncon-
scious learning, but this is offset by a substantial body of
negative evidence. At present, it would be premature to
conclude from the available studies that unconscious
learning is feasible.
2.3. Criteria for establishing unconscious learning with
supraliminal stimuli
In the rest of this section we focus on situations where the
stimuli are above the threshold for detection and identi-
fication. In such situations, subjects may be unaware of
the relationships between stimuli even though they are
aware of the stimuli themselves. Learning of inter-
stimulus relationships may therefore be unconscious.
We argue that just about all unconscious learning ex-
periments with supraliminal stimuli can be conceptually
reduced to the arrangement shown in Figure 1. The
figure illustrates an associative learning episode in which
subjects have the opportunity to learn that two events, A
and B, stand in a predictive relationship. Event A might
be a tone conditioned stimulus (CS) and event B a shock
unconditioned stimulus (US); the measure of learning
might be a galvanic skin response (GSR) at time t2 when
the CS is presented again. Or event A might be a feature
or set of features, event B might be a category, and the
measure of learning might be the probability of making
the category response at t2- We are interested in whether
subjects can learn the predictive relationship in the ab-
sence of concurrent awareness of that relationship. We
assume for the sake of simplicity that there is just one
learning trial.
Learning itself presumably takes place during or after
presentation of event B; we wish to ascertain the subject's
state of awareness during this learning episode. Unfor-
tunately, there are likely to be profound technical diffi-
culties in assessing awareness of a predictive relationship
at just the moment learning itself occurs. Apart from
anything else, asking subjects at time tt whether they are
aware of the relationship between stimuli A and B is likely
to direct their attention to that relationship. As an illustra-
tion, in a study by Baeyens et al. (1990a) that will be
discussed in more detail later, the proportion of A-B
relationships which the subjects appeared to be aware of
on a postconditioning recognition test increased from
18% to 77% when subjects also gave concurrent estimates
of awareness during the learning stage. Clearly, the con-
current index of awareness directed subjects' attention to
the relationship and affected the very entity it was de-
signed to measure.
Hence, we will usually have to settle for assessing
awareness after the target learning trial. At this time (t2 in
Fig. 1), suppose we present event A (a tone previously
paired with shock) and measure the GSR as well as asking
subjects whether they have any particular expectancy of
event B. If we obtain a GSR but no evidence of a conscious
expectancy of event B, we have obtained the crucial
finding that lies at the heart of all attempts to demonstrate
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B
Implicit measure
e.g., GSR, classification response, etc.
Learning
Time
Measure of conscious knowledge reveals:
(i) Awareness of study
episode
(ii) Awareness of A-B
relationship
(iii) No relevant awareness
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of events in experiments that investigate the role of awareness in the learning of predictive
relationships. Subjects witness a predictive relationship between stimuli A and B, with learning presumed to occur during the
interval marked tx. At some time later (f2) stimulus A is presented again. Performance at t2 is taken as an index of learning at tit
whereas a concurrent measure of awareness at t2 is used to infer the content of the subject's awareness at tv
implicit learning with supraliminal stimuli. For if subjects
have no expectancy of event B at t2, we have some basis for
inferring that they were not aware of the A-B relationship
at tv
This might seem to be a very strong inference, but we
believe such inferences will have to be accepted if uncon-
scious learning is to be established. It is unavoidably dif-
ficult to assess awareness concurrently with learning, so
one is forced to rely on some later test. Of course, we also
make a backward inference concerning learning itself: if
performance at time t2 is no better than we would expect
by chance, we often infer that learning did not occur at tt.
Conversely, if performance is better at t2 than we would
expect by chance, we conclude that learning did occur.
2.3.1. The relationship between unconscious learning
and implicit memory. The basic design shown in Figure 1
allows us to see the intimate relationship between uncon-
scious learning and implicit retrieval: demonstrations of
unconscious learning are a proper subset of the larger set
of demonstrations of implicit retrieval.
Implicit retrieval is defined as occurring when informa-
tion from some prior episode can be retrieved and can
hence influence current processing, but in the absence of
conscious recollection of that prior episode (e.g., Schacter
1987; we use the term "implicit retrieval" rather than the
more common term "implicit memory" to emphasize that
we are specifically considering what happens during the
retrieval process). Thus, implicit retrieval requires the
absence of a conscious reexperience of the study episode.
Now, lack of awareness of a contingency at t2 presumably
means the absence of any consciously recallable episodic
memory traces in which that contingency is embedded,
and hence any piece of evidence that allows us to infer
unconscious learning must also be an example of implicit
retrieval: this is case (iii) shown in Figure 1. The converse
does not hold, however; an example of implicit retrieval
does not necessarily represent evidence of unconscious
learning.
Suppose that a subject emits a GSR when presented at
test with a tone stimulus. There are three possible sce-
narios, shown in Figure 1:
1. The subject remembers the study episode, in which
case the GSR response does not count as an example of
implicit retrieval according to Schacter's (1987) definition.
Because remembering the episode entails remembering
the content of that episode (i.e., the A-B contingency),
the learning could not have been implicit either.
2. The subject does not remember the study episode,
but is aware - that is, has semantic knowledge - that this
tone predicts shock (cf. source amnesia). Although this
qualifies as a case of implicit retrieval, we would not infer
that learning itself had been unconscious, since at t2 the
subject is aware that A predicts B. (Note that this ignores
the possibility that subjects could have been unaware of
the A-B relationship at tx, but aware of it at t2, for
example, as a result of observing their own behavior.
Observation of a GSR in response to the tone might lead
the subject to believe that the tone must therefore predict
shock. How one might exclude this possibility is a difficult
question.)
3. The subject neither remembers the study episode
nor has conscious semantic knowledge of the A-B rela-
tionship. This final case again qualifies as implicit re-
trieval. More important, we now have evidence that is
relevant to unconscious learning, as lack of awareness of
the relationship at retrieval licenses the inference that
learning too took place without awareness.
Thus, in order for us to infer unconscious learning from
implicit retrieval, the subject must be unaware of the
relevant relationship that occurred in the study episode,
in addition to being unaware of the episode itself. In
summary, an unconscious learning experiment just is an
implicit retrieval experiment, but with the added compo-
nent of meeting this further condition. For researchers in
the field of implicit retrieval, all that is of interest is
whether the subject is unaware of the relevant study
episode, as in cases (ii) and (iii). But only case (iii) is
relevant to the question of unconscious learning; the
subject must also be unaware of the relationship that
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occurred in that episode. It is for this reason, we argue,
that much of the data obtained from amnesics is irrelevant
to the question of unconscious learning (see sect. 4).
2.3.2. Dissociation of task performance and verbal re-
ports. Within the dissociation paradigm (Reingold &
Merikle 1988), many studies have shown that subjects can
acquire information without being able to report it ver-
bally at a later time. Such findings have been taken as
support of the claim of unconscious learning. Suppose
that subjects are presented with some information at time
tj and that a subsequent performance test indicates they
have encoded this information. We argue that if the aim is
to establish what the subjects' state of awareness was at tu
examining the content of their verbal reports at t2 is
certainly not the only way to do this and may not be the
best one.
To illustrate this, note that the condition mentioned
above (that the backwards inference must be valid) can be
made more specific by dividing it into two further criteria.
The first concerns the match between the information
responsible for performance changes and the information
revealed by the test of awareness. We call this the Infor-
mation Criterion. The second criterion concerns the
sensitivity of the test for awareness. We call this the
Sensitivity Criterion.
Information Criterion: Before concluding that subjects
are unaware of the information that they have learned
and that is influencing their behavior, it must be pos-
sible to establish that the information the experimenter
is looking for in the awareness test is indeed the
information responsible for performance changes.
This criterion is intended to exclude situations such as the
following: suppose the experimenter sets up a task in
which performance can be improved if the subjects learn
information 7. Performance does indeed improve, and
subjects are apparently unaware at time t2 that they have
learned /. However, an adequate explanation of the im-
provement in performance is that subjects are not learn-
ing /, but 7*. By the experimenter's criteria, awareness of
7* would be disregarded as irrelevant, and so the experi-
menter would erroneously conclude that the subjects'
performance was under the control of some information
or knowledge of which they were unaware. The Informa-
tion Criterion is closely related to the notion of "corre-
lated hypotheses" introduced by Adams (1957) and Du-
lany (1961) and which will be discussed in section 2.6.1.
Our second criterion is far from new (e.g., Brewer
1974; Brody 1989; Dawson & Schell 1985; Ericsson &
Simon 1980; 1984; Eriksen 1960; Reingold & Merikle
1988). It is simply that tests of unconscious learning must
achieve an adequate level of sensitivity:
Sensitivity Criterion: To show that two dependent
variables (in this case, tests of conscious knowledge and
task performance) relate to dissociable underlying sys-
tems, we must be able to show that our test of aware-
ness is sensitive to all of the relevant conscious knowl-
edge.
Unless this criterion is met, the fact that subjects are able
to transmit more information in their task performance
than in a test of awareness may simply be due to the
greater sensitivity of the performance test to whatever
conscious information the subject has encoded. Let us
take as our null hypothesis the claim that there is a single
source of conscious knowledge that can manifest itself on
both the performance and the awareness test. If perfor-
mance is above chance, but there is no detectable aware-
ness, an immediate inference is that our test of awareness
is simply less sensitive than the performance test to the
available resource of conscious information. Or, to put it
another way, there is conscious knowledge that is not
being detected by the supposed test of awareness but is
contributing to task performance.
To rule out this possibility, we must have either (1) some
independent reason to believe that the test of awareness is
sensitive to all of the potentially relevant conscious infor-
mation, or (2) some reason to believe that the awareness
test is at least as sensitive as the performance test in terms
of its ability to detect relevant conscious information. The
first of these requires demonstrating that the awareness
test is exhaustive, something that Reingold and Merikle
(1988) have noted is likely to be very difficult to do. In
contrast, the second requirement can be met if we try to
make the performance and awareness tests as similar as
possible in terms of retrieval context, differing only in
terms of task instructions. If the instructions in the aware-
ness test encourage the subject to retrieve as much
conscious information as possible, and if the retrieval
contexts in the two tests are approximately matched, then
the Sensitivity Criterion may be met, because it is un-
likely that the performance test would elicit the retrieval
of more conscious information than the awareness test
when the latter has provided subjects with a stronger
motivation to do so. If we still obtain a dissociation
between performance and awareness under such circum-
stances, we will have good evidence of unconscious
learning.x
As an illustration of the application of these criteria,
consider a widely cited implicit learning study by Lewicki
et al. (1987). In the first phase, each trial consisted of the
presentation of a target item in one of the four quadrants
of a computer screen (which, for purposes of discussion,
we can designate as A, B, C, and D); the subjects' task was
simply to press a button corresponding to that quadrant as
quickly as possible. The basic idea of these experiments
can be simply stated: the choice of target location on each
trial was nonrandom, and the question was whether the
subjects would be able to detect this nonrandom ness.
Subjects were presented with sequences of seven tri-
als, with rules constructed so that target locations on the
seventh trial could be predicted from its locations on trials
1, 3, 4, and 6. On each of the first six trials, the digit 6
appeared on its own in one of the quadrants of the screen,
but on trial 7 (the "complex" trial), it was embedded in a
display containing 36 digits. Reaction time on the seventh
trial was the measure of interest. Again, the rules specify-
ing target location were deterministic: thus, if the target
appeared in locations C, A, D, and B on trials 1,3, 4, and 6
respectively, then on trial 7 the target would be in loca-
tion A.
In common with many other such results (which will be
reviewed in sect. 2.7 below), Lewicki etal. (1987, Experi-
ment 1) found that reaction times (RTs) on the target trials
decreased significantly across 4,608 complex trials. In
addition, RTs increased significantly when, toward the
end of the experiment, the rules were changed so that on
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the complex trials the target now appeared in the quad-
rant diagonally opposite where it had appeared previ-
ously. This latter finding rules out nonspecific factors as
the locus of the speedup effect. In a second experiment,
Lewicki et al. applied deterministic rules only on two out
of three sets of seven trials: on the remaining sets, target
location on trial 7 was random. Here, a change in the rules
only affected RTs in the sets that were rule determined
and not in those that were not.
Lewicki et al. found that none of their subjects came
even close to being able to report any of the rules. In fact
"none of the subjects were even able to correctly specify
which four out of six simple trials were the crucial ones"
(1987, p. 529). Thus we appear to have good evidence of a
dissociation between performance and reports. It is
highly doubtful, however, whether these results meet
either the Information or the Sensitivity Criterion. With
regard to the former, Lewicki et al. required subjects to
try to report "at least one pair of co-occurring elements
(i.e., a sequence of four target locations in simple trials
and the corresponding location of the target in the subse-
quent matrix-scanning [complex] trial)" (p. 528). Thus
subjects were classified as able to report something about
the sequence, and hence as aware, only if they were able
to specify a complete sequence of four simple trials and
one complex trial. The problem with this classification,
however, is that to show a speedup in RT, complete
knowledge of the sequences was not necessary.
Analysis of the sequences, for example, shows that even
the last simple trial on its own was informative about
target location on the seventh trial: if the target was in
quadrant A on trial 6, it was twice as likely to be in
quadrants A and D on trial 7 as in quadrants B or C. Trial 6
provided a great deal of information on its own about
target location on trial 7. Knowledge about trials 4 and 6
provided still more information about target location on
trial 7, but if the subjects could report this sort of regu-
larity, it would still not have counted as correct according
to Lewicki et al.'s criterion. It is true that knowledge of
the sequence across the four relevant simple trials pro-
vided absolute certainty about the seventh trial, but our
point is that considerable amounts of speedup in RT could
be attributable to fragmentary knowledge of "microrules"
that Lewicki et al. would not have counted as evidence of
awareness, even if the subjects could articulate them.
Turning to the Sensitivity Criterion, we may ask
whether the verbal report test is an adequate measure of
the subject's awareness in this procedure. We suggest that
it is not. First, we cannot be sure that the performance
and awareness tests are matched in terms of the conscious
information they pick up, because quite different re-
trieval contexts are provided for the two tests. In the case
of RTs, performance is elicited in a context where (1)
stimuli are presented on the computer screen, (2) re-
sponses are made on the keyboard, (3) a horizontal and a
vertical line appear on the screen dividing it into quad-
rants, (4) a response is made very soon after the preceding
response, and so on. All these cues are pertinent, in that
they were present during the learning phase (which is just
the RT task). In the case of verbal report, none of these
cues is present. Instead, the subject is required to re-
trieve the sequence rules from memory, without the aid of
any of the aforementioned cues.
Second, we have little reason to believe that the verbal
report test provides an exhaustive index of conscious
information, since there are other tests such as recogni-
tion that manifestly detect information left undetected by
verbal report tests. For example, Nelson (1978) compared
the sensitivity of recognition and verbal recall in the
following way. Suppose we have two memory tests, A and
B. Subjects learn a list of items and are then given test A.
Then, test B is applied only to those study items that test
A failed to detect. If test B detects any of these items, it is
said to be more sensitive than test A. It is important also to
apply the tests in the reverse order - test B, then test A -
and to fail to observe an increase in sensitivity. Using such
a procedure, Nelson showed that recognition tests can
detect items not detected by free recall tests, but the
converse was not true. Hence, recognition is a more
sensitive test than free recall, and the latter is therefore
not exhaustive.
Moreover, note that it is possible that subjects misin-
terpret free report questions to mean they should only
report rules. They might believe that fragmentary infor-
mation is not supposed to be reported. Many researchers
have attempted to avoid this problem by asking more and
more specific questions about what stimuli may begin or
end a sequence, and so on. Such questions are somewhat
better from a sensitivity standpoint because they are
more specific (and provide more cues), and may be better
from an informational standpoint if they ask about the
information that subjects actually learn.
In sum, we suggest that the Information and Sensitivity
Criteria are not met in Lewicki et al.'s (1987) experiment.
The default hypothesis - that there is only a single
resource of conscious information - may be correct, with
less of that knowledge being detected by the verbal report
test than by the RT task. There is no evidence that the
knowledge used to perform the RT task is any different or
is in any way acquired independently of the knowledge
that the subject's reports are based on. Verbal reports are
impoverished compared to task performance simply be-
cause less of the available information is retrieved in the
test of reportable knowledge. If the subject were given
enough retrieval cues, there is every reason to believe
that this knowledge could be brought to consciousness
and reported; it is simply that a normal test of verbal
report does not do this. Last, if sufficient cues could make
the information conscious, there is every reason to be-
lieve that it was conscious at the time of encoding.
It is important to note that we are not denying the
empirical fact that performance and verbal reports can be
dissociated. On the contrary, we acknowledge that there
have been numerous satisfactory demonstrations of this
(for example, in Lewicki et al.'s [1987] experiment), and
that this has interesting implications for applied psychol-
ogy. Subjects' performance indicates that they have
learned something, yet they are poor at articulating ver-
bally what they have learned. Instead, we are suggesting
that this dissociation is only very weak evidence for the
claim that the original learning was unconscious, and that
it provides no evidence at all for the functional dissocia-
tion of conscious and unconscious learning. Its status is
exactly the same as the difference that commonly
emerges between tests of recall and recognition. For the
same reason, amnesic patients' inability to recall informa-
tion that an earlier test shows they had learned (e.g.,
Nissen & Bullemer 1987) is not in its own right evidence
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of unconscious learning. Since we are claiming that a
dissociation between performance and verbal report is
not compelling evidence for unconscious learning, we
place special weight (below) on studies that have tried to
use more sensitive tests of awareness.
It is also important to recognize that our criteria do not
make unconscious learning undemonstrable. As Bowers
(1984) has noted, it is pointless to argue about a possible
unconscious process if one's criteria for its existence make
it a logical impossibility. But the Information Criterion
can readily be met in any study that establishes unequivo-
cally what it is that the subject is learning, and the
Sensitivity Criterion can be met by tests that adequately
reinstate the learning context or that attempt to be ex-
haustive with respect to conscious information. Indeed,
we will see in section 2.7 below that a replication of
Lewicki et al.'s experiment by Stadler (1989) met both of
these criteria by using an alternative test of awareness.
Furthermore, successful demonstrations of unconscious
perception have been possible in experiments that use
tests of awareness that meet these criteria (e.g., Merikle
& Reingold 1990). In sum, Lewicki et al.'s (1987) experi-
ments demonstrate the dangers of asking the wrong
questions and of ignoring substantial differences between
different types of test.
With these considerations in mind, we now turn to
other evidence for learning without awareness. In the
following sections, we focus on four areas of experimental
evidence: conditioning, artificial grammar learning, in-
strumental learning, and sequential pattern acquisition.
2.4. Awareness and conditioning
2.4.1. Pavlovian conditioning. We begin with a consider-
ation of whether classical or Pavlovian conditioned re-
sponses can be acquired in the absence of awareness of the
scheduled contingency of reinforcement. Since many
researchers regard conditioning as representing a rela-
tively primitive learning system (see Boakes 1989), it is
plausible to imagine that learning without awareness can
occur in this context. The conclusion from a huge number
of studies, however, is quite the opposite: there is no
compelling evidence for conditioning in human subjects
without awareness of the reinforcement contingency. This
conclusion was first reached in a classic review by Brewer
(1974), and more recent studies have not changed the
situation (see Boakes 1989; Dawson & Schell 1985, for
reviews). Such conclusions have not always been heeded,
however, because there are still claims in the literature to
the effect that conditioning can occur without awareness
(e.g., Musen et al. 1990, p. 1074) and is hence an instance
of implicit, unconscious learning.
There have been two general approaches to examining
the relationship between conditioning and awareness.
First, some studies have sought to ascertain whether
instructions to the subject concerning the nature of the
relationship between a cue and a reinforcer affect condi-
tioning as measured, for instance, by GSRs. The rationale
is that if conditioning is a relatively automatic form of
learning that can proceed independently of awareness,
then changes in the subjects' conscious beliefs ought to
have little effect on their behavior. Using this logic,
Grings et al. (1973), for example, presented subjects with
two conditioned stimuli (CSs), one of which (CS + ) was
followed by a shock unconditioned stimulus (US), and one
of which (CS—) was not. At the end of the training
stage, CS+ elicited a larger conditioned GSR than did
CS —. Prior to the second stage, subjects were correctly
told that the relationship between stimuli and shocks
would now be reversed, with shocks following CS— but
not CS + .
As has been observed in many other studies, these
instructions had a powerful effect on conditioned re-
sponding. Grings et al. found that their subjects re-
sponded on the first trial of the second stage to CS— but
not to CS + , indicating that their knowledge at least
partially controlled their responding. Significantly, the
response to CS + , a stimulus that had been paired several
times with shock, was no greater than the response to a
control stimulus that in the first stage had been presented
with uncorrelated USs. Similar results of verbal instruc-
tion have been obtained in experiments using phobic
stimuli such as pictures of snakes (Davey 1992), where it
was once thought that conditioned responding could
proceed independently of instructions (e.g., Hugdahl &
Ohman 1977).
Although such results are unsupportive of the notion
that conditioning can proceed without awareness, they do
not address the issue directly because awareness itself is
not examined. A recent experiment by Lovibond (1992)
exemplifies the approach of eliciting measures of aware-
ness concurrently with conditioned responses. Lovibond
presented subjects with two stimuli (slides depicting
flowers or mushrooms), one of which (the CS+) was
paired with shock while the other (CS-) was nonrein-
forced. Awareness of the relationship between the stimuli
and shock was measured in two ways. First, during the
learning phase subjects continually adjusted a pointer to
indicate their moment-by-moment expectation of shock
(note that asking for a rating of shock expectancy does not
specifically direct attention to the A-B relationship); and
second, at the end of the experiment they were given a
structured interview designed to assess their awareness.
It should be apparent how the design conforms to the
basic procedure depicted in Figure 1, except that there
are four learning trials. In Lovibond's experiments, each
of trials 2-4 in fact represents a new learning trial, an
assessment of whether learning occurred on the preced-
ing trial(s), and an assessment of the subject's awareness
on the preceding trial(s). The Information Criterion
should not raise particular problems here, because there
is little doubt that the information the subjects learn (the
contingency between the CS and US) corresponds with
what the awareness test asks them to report.
In each of the experiments, some subjects gave no
indication, on either of the tests of awareness, that they
associated A with shock to a greater extent than B.
Critically, these subjects also gave no hint of stronger
conditioned responding to A than to B. For subjects who
were aware of the conditioning contingencies, GSRs were
stronger to A than to B. Thus, on the basis of these results
we would have to conclude that learning about a CS-shock
relationship does not occur in the absence of awareness of
that relationship. It is also worth noting that Lovibond's
experimental design is well suited to demonstrating that
our criteria for implicit learning do not make it a logical
impossibility. If his results had been different - . some-
thing which is simply an empirical matter - the criteria
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would have been met and implicit learning could have
been firmly established.
Other studies have tried to mask the CS-US relation-
ship and again compare awareness and conditioning. The
results have been clear: so long as awareness is measured
by an immediate test, usually a recognition test, signifi-
cant conditioning only occurs in situations where the
subject is aware of the contingency (see Boakes 1989;
Dawson & Schell 1985). One recent experiment serves to
illustrate the typical result. Marinkovic et al. (1989) pre-
sented their subjects with a recognition memory task for
odors. On each trial, one odor was presented for 8 sec as a
"target," followed in succession by three further odors.
Subjects' primary task was to say which of the three was
the same as the target. One of the three recognition odors
was in fact either the CS+ or the CS- . If it was CS+, a
shock was presented at its offset; skin conductance was
measured as the conditioned response. The question of
interest was whether acquisition of GSRs could occur
without concurrent awareness of the contingency be-
tween the CS+ and the shock. Marinkovic et al. mea-
sured awareness with a test in which subjects were re-
quired to indicate their expectancy of the shock during
each odor on a 7-point scale. Because awareness was
measured during the CSs, this again represents a concur-
rent assessment of awareness, rather than a post hoc one.
The outcome was that differential conditioning to CS +
was only observed in subjects classified as aware, indicat-
ing that awareness is necessary for conditioning. In addi-
tion, Marinkovic et al. obtained some evidence that when
conditioned responding did occur, it only started after the
onset of awareness. In sum, results from conditioning
experiments appear to contradict the notion that this type
of learning can proceed without concurrent awareness.
For a variety of reasons, some researchers have ques-
tioned whether GSRs condition in the same way other
responses, such as the eyeblink or salivary reflexes, do.
Thus it is worth noting that correspondences between
awareness and conditioning seem to occur with other
response systems as well (e.g., for eyelid conditioning,
Baer & Fuhrer 1982).
The conclusion from these studies is clear, and con-
firms Brewer's (1974) earlier analysis: Pavlovian condi-
tioning, which is often cited as a fundamental form of
learning, does not seem to occur in the absence of aware-
ness of the reinforcement contingency.
2.4.2. Evaluative conditioning. Evaluative conditioning
refers to a form of learning that manifests itself in changes
in affective response to a stimulus (Martin & Levey 1978).
Specifically, it refers to the transfer of affect from a US to a
CS. Some authors (e.g., Baeyens et al. 1990a; Martin &
Levey 1987) have suggested that - unlike standard Pavlo-
vian conditioning - this form of learning can proceed in
the absence of awareness of the CS-US relationship. We
briefly review some of the relevant evidence.
Baeyens et al. (1990a) presented subjects with 10 repe-
titions of a CS-US pair of slides, in which the CS slide had
been previously evaluated by the subject as affectively
neutral and the US slide as either liked, neutral, or
disliked. Evaluative conditioning was observed in that on
a postconditioning test of affect, the CS slides became
affectively positive (liked) if they had been paired with a
liked US, negative (disliked) if they had been paired with
a disliked US, and they remained neutral if they had been
paired with another neutral stimulus.
As a test of awareness, at the end of the learning phase
Baeyens et al. showed the subjects each of the CS pictures
and asked them to identify which had been the relevant
US. If subjects failed to respond correctly they were then
asked whether the US had been liked, neutral, or dis-
liked. They were classified as "unaware" of the CS-US
relationship if they failed on both of these questions.
Evidence that evaluative conditioning occurred without
awareness emerged in the observation that conditioning
was the same for CS-US pairs, regardless of whether or
not the subject was aware of the relationship.
Of course, the test of awareness may have been an
insensitive one. Baeyens et al. accordingly tried to use a
more sensitive concurrent measure of awareness. One
group of subjects was required to indicate during the
4-sec interval between the onset of the CS and US slides
whether they expected a liked, neutral, or disliked US
stimulus on that trial. Subjects were classified as "un-
aware" if they failed to respond correctly on the final three
pairings of each stimulus combination. Unfortunately,
results from this group undermine the notion of uncon-
scious learning. As discussed in section 2.3, subjects
could accurately report most of the pairings, and for those
few they could not report, there was no significant evalua-
tive conditioning. Further, in another study, Baeyens et
al. (1992) found that groups of subjects given increasing
numbers of CS-US pairings showed an increase in both
the magnitude of evaluative conditioning and the level of
awareness as measured by a postconditioning test. In
sum, these studies of evaluative conditioning have failed
to show that it can occur unconsciously. (See Shanks &
Dickinson 1990, for further criticisms of this research.)
Although they are not usually classified as studies of
evaluative conditioning, Lewicki's (1986; Lewicki et al.,
1989) experiments on the learning of nonsalient contin-
gencies can be readily conceived as such. Lewicki pre-
sented subjects with photographs of people accompanied
by personality descriptions such as "kind" or "capable."
For some subjects all "kind" people had long hair and all
"capable' people had short hair, while for other subjects
the opposite was the case. Lewicki reported that on test
trials in which subjects had to affirm or disconfirm state-
ments classifying new people as either "kind" or "capa-
ble, " they responded "yes" more often when the descrip-
tion preserved the study-phase correlation than when it
broke the correlation. (They also consistently took longer
to answer "yes" when the correlation was preserved.)
Lewicki's (1986) subjects were apparently unaware of
the relationship between hair length and personality
description, because "not one subject mentioned haircut
or anything connected with hair" (p. 138) in a test of
verbally reportable knowledge. If we take the personality
description as being an evaluative response conditioned
to the cue of hair length, the results would again appear to
suggest unconscious evaluative learning. However, that
conclusion requires us to assume, without any supportive
evidence, that the Sensitivity Criterion has been met in
these studies. In addition, some of Lewicki's results have
proven hard to replicate (see de Houwer et al., in press;
Dulany & Poldrack 1991); so we must at this stage reserve
judgment on whether this form of learning indeed can
occur unconsciously.
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2.4.3. Conclusions. In experiments examining the rela-
tionship between learning and awareness in Pavlovian
conditioning, researchers have striven to meet the Sensi-
tivity Criterion by using multiple tests of awareness. The
Information Criterion does not raise particular problems,
because there is little doubt that the information the
subjects learn (the contingency between CS and US)
corresponds to what the awareness test asks them to
report. Thus these studies provide a reasonably good test
of the role of awareness in learning. The results we have
surveyed give little reason to believe that unconscious
learning can occur in these situations. For evaluative
conditioning the evidence is less clear-cut, but we have
few reservations in suggesting that unconscious evalua-
tive learning has not yet been adequately established.
2.5. Awareness In artificial grammar learning tasks
Studies of subjects learning artificial grammars present
the classic pattern of unconscious learning: subjects
clearly learn something about the input domain, but they
appear unable either to report the rules of the grammar or
to explain their performance. Such studies provide evi-
dence of unconscious learning if learning involves rule
induction. In this section we examine the evidence for
unconscious learning of artificial grammars and conclude
that memorization rather than rule induction is the prin-
cipal process involved; we conclude that evidence for
unconscious learning is weak. Later, in section 3.5, we
review several further studies that have examined con-
scious hypothesis testing in artificial grammar tasks.
In a prototypical experiment, Reber (1967) required
subjects to memorize either a series of letter strings
generated from a small finite-state grammar or a series of
strings generated at random (see Fig. 2). Subjects who
learned the rule-governed strings then performed a gram-
maticality test in which they were asked to accept novel
strings that fit the rules and reject novel strings that did
not. They categorized 79% of the 44 test strings correctly,
which is significantly above chance. Yet these subjects
were unable to report the rules they had apparently
learned and then used in the grammaticality task.
Reber's (e.g., 1967; 1989a) account of such grammar-
learning results, endorsed by many other investigators
since then, proposed that subjects use an unconscious, or
implicit, rule-induction mechanism. This mechanism
creates a knowledge-base of rules that may be used in a
grammaticality task but that is inaccessible to conscious
report. As with the other unconscious learning para-
digms, we believe that there is another way to interpret
the data. We can raise two questions. The first (the
Sensitivity Criterion) is whether retrospective verbal re-
port is sufficiently sensitive to test for conscious knowl-
edge of the rules. More sensitive measures of subjects'
knowledge, such as concurrent thinking-aloud protocols
and recognition tests might reveal marginal or uncertain
knowledge. The second question (the Information Crite-
rion) concerns what the subjects are learning from the
training strings. If subjects have learned something other
than rules, then asking them about rules may lead to
erroneous conclusions. On the other hand, if we ask the
subjects questions about what they did in fact learn, we
may get reasonable answers. It may be that usable knowl-
edge is always both consciously learned and consciously
(a)
END
START END
(b)
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VXM
MTTV
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VXVRXR
Figure 2. String generator and example strings, (a) Diagram
of a finite-state grammar. Strings are generated by selecting one
of the possible routes through the network, commencing at
"start" and continuing until one of the "end" symbols is reached.
(b) Several example strings generated by the grammar.
applied. The experimenter's job is to discern what informa-
tion subjects are aware of during training and whether that
information is used to perform the grammaticality task.
2.5.1. Types Of knowledge. The literature has identified
three types of knowledge that might be acquired by
subjects: rules, memory for whole strings, and knowledge
of the frequency and position of substrings, such as pairs
of letters. There are several problems with rules. First, it
is not really clear what a "rule" would be like: Is it a
rewrite rule or a transition graph? How complex can it be,
and how many are there? Second, such rules would be
very difficult for any but very sophisticated subjects to
articulate even if they did explicitly acquire them. Third,
it is not clear what sort of mechanism is capable of
acquiring such rules, particularly since it must ex hypoth-
esi operate outside consciousness. In the face of these
questions, it seems sensible to consider other types of
knowledge first, and to determine the extent to which
they can account for subjects' performance. We return to
the evidence for knowledge of rules in artificial grammar
learning tasks in section 2.5.3.
The picture with regard to memory for whole strings
and knowledge of substrings seems reasonably clear.
Such knowledge is easy to articulate and there is ample
evidence that subjects do acquire this information, be-
cause they do articulate it. These types of knowledge are
also consistent with a variety of contemporary memory
models, such as chunking (Servan-Schreiber & Anderson
1990), distributed memory (Cleeremans & McClelland
1991), and memory-array models (e.g., Estes 1986; Hintz-
man 1986; Nosofsky 1986). In addition, these models have
been shown to approximate subjects' grammaticality test
performance. For example, Dienes (1992) compared a
number of these memory models on a set of gram-
maticality judgment data and was able to achieve good
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fits, particularly with distributed memory models. We
return to this topic in section 3.3.
With these different knowledge types in mind, we can
now ask what sort of information subjects in artificial
grammar learning tasks actually acquire, and whether
they are conscious of it. A number of studies have asked
these questions using several methods and have asked
them at various points during training and testing.
Mathews et al. (1989) interrupted subjects periodically
during training and asked them to instruct an imaginary
confederate how to distinguish the grammatical strings.
The trained subjects performed better on the gram-
maticality test than did the yoked subjects, suggesting
that not all of the trained subjects' knowledge was explicit
and reportable. This verbal report procedure, however, is
essentially uncued recall, and so is unlikely to evoke all of
the subjects' knowledge of the grammar. More interest-
ing, though, is that the verbal instructions that subjects
did report consisted mainly of legal bigrams and other
short sequences, sometimes coded by their positions in
legal strings.
In a study by Servan-Schreiber and Anderson (1990),
subjects were trained on grammatical strings using a
recall task. For training, the strings were divided into
substrings using gaps (T PPP TX VS). Servan-Schreiber
and Anderson hypothesized that subjects in all grammar-
learning tasks encoded the strings into substring chunks,
and the gaps were used to ensure consistent chunkings
across subjects. Subjects' written recall preserved these
gaps. Servan-Schreiber and Anderson suggested that this
phenomenon demonstrates that subjects were in fact
encoding the strings as sequences of short strings in
accord with the gaps. The subjects' later grammaticality
judgments supported this contention as follows. Servan-
Schreiber and Anderson constructed ungrammatical
strings that consisted of illegal sequences of legal sub-
strings (e.g., PPPTXTVS). If subjects were learning just
the substrings then these strings would be falsely ac-
cepted as legal strings. Indeed, 50% of these strings were
mistakenly accepted. On the other hand, test strings that
violated specific substrings were correctly rejected; only
26% of these strings were mistakenly accepted. Both
subjects' written protocols during training and their test
performance, then, support the hypothesis that subjects
learn simple substring information in grammar-learning
tasks. That only 50% rather than 100% of the strings
containing illegal sequences of legal substrings were ac-
cepted does not imply that knowledge of substrings is
insufficient to account for performance completely. Com-
pared to grammatical strings, these nongrammatical
strings (by definition) still contain illegal bigrams (e.g.,
XT in the example above). In addition, subjects' knowl-
edge at test time is clearly incomplete: previously seen
grammatical strings were only accepted 70% of the time.
Moreover, Servan-Schreiber and Anderson (1990)
went on to build a model that acquired chunks and then
used them to evaluate the grammaticality of test strings.
The model performed at the level of trained subjects (r =
0.935). This result supports their claim that subjects are
learning and using chunks by demonstrating that chunks
are learnable and sufficient to account for the level of
performance of subjects on the grammaticality task.
It is possible that Servan-Schreiber and Anderson's
presentation technique, placing gaps in the training
strings, biased subjects' learning procedure. A similar
experiment by Perruchet and Pacteau (1990), however,
used the standard (no gap) format during training and
found similar results. Subjects were trained on strings
generated from the same grammar that Reber and Allen
(1978) used. To test for awareness of simple substrings,
trained subjects performed a recognition test on letter
pairs present in the training strings. Subjects performed
quite well: only 3 out of 25 old pairs were judged less
familiar than any new pair. The correlation between
recognition scores and the frequency of occurrence of
pairs in the training strings was 0.61. According to the
results of the recognition test, then, subjects were aware
of the relative frequencies of letter pairs. Similarly, Du-
lany et al. (1984) concluded that a recognition test of
awareness could elicit as much knowledge as was pro-
jected in the grammaticality test.
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) also constructed test
strings that contained either (1) illegal orders of legal
pairs, or (2) illegal pairs. If subjects only had information
about legal pairs on which to judge the grammaticality of
test strings, then the illegal pairs should have been
rejected, but the illegal orders of legal pairs should have
been mistakenly accepted as grammatical. This is the
pattern of results Perruchet and Pacteau obtained. Dis-
criminability, measured in D scores (zero indicates ran-
dom responding), was 22 for illegal pairs but only 7 for
illegal orders. These results therefore further support the
hypothesis that subjects are aware of and make use of only
simple substring information.
Perruchet and Pacteau then considered a model that
used pair frequency information to make grammaticality
judgments. The model produced the same level of perfor-
mance as subjects, except in one instance. Subjects were
sensitive to the beginnings and endings of strings, but the
model was not. Perruchet and Pacteau concluded that
subjects primarily knew letter pairs, but also which pairs
could legally start and end strings. Together with the
behavior of Servan-Schreiber and Anderson's (1990)
chunking model, these results show that simple
fragment-memorization systems can be sufficient to ac-
count for subjects' imperfect performance on gram-
maticality tests.
Dienes et al. (1991) also found evidence that subjects
were sensitive to more than just pairs. Following training
and a grammaticality task, subjects were given incom-
plete letter sequences varying in length from zero letters
upwards (e.g., VXT. . .) and asked to judge which single-
letter continuations (M? V? X? R? T?) were acceptable at
the next location in the string. In this sequential letter
dependencies (SLD) task, which was hypothesized to be
sensitive to conscious knowledge of the grammar, sub-
jects were sensitive to illegal orders of legal pairs even in
the middle of strings. Dienes et al. showed that the
knowledge that subjects demonstrated in the completion
task correlated with their grammaticality judgments and
could be used to model the grammaticality judgment
data. They found in addition that knowledge gleaned from
subjects' free reports also correlated with their gram-
maticality judgments, but that less knowledge was re-
ported in the free report task than in the continuation
task. These correlations suggest that a single knowledge
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source is tapped by both tasks, but that the free report
task, uncued recall, is less sensitive.
Reber and Allen (1978) asked subjects to describe
retrospectively their learning experience and, concur-
rently, to justify their grammaticality judgments. Overall,
subjects justified their classifications on 821 out of 2,000
test strings. Subjects reported using a variety of informa-
tion in making their grammaticality judgments. The viola-
tion or nonviolation of bigrams was the most common
justification, especially concerning the first bigram of a
string. String-initial bigrams accounted for fully 30% of
the justifications. Violations of single letters, particularly
the first or last letter of a string, and violations of trigram
or longer sequences were also reported, as well as recog-
nition of and similarity to whole training strings. The
grammaticality responses to the remaining unjustified
cases presumably consisted of guessing or of knowledge
that could not be elicited by verbal report.
So much for substring knowledge. Vokey and Brooks
(1992; Brooks & Vokey 1991) have argued that subjects
can encode whole-item information in addition to sub-
string information. They found that the similarity of test
strings to specific whole-study strings is an important
factor in subjects' grammaticality judgments. When the
grammaticality and the similarity of the test strings were
varied independently, they were shown to be additive
factors on grammaticality judgments. Vokey and Brooks
argued that such a result indicates that subjects have
encoded the whole strings and can determine similarity
relationships between strings.
Brooks and Vokey's evidence for whole-string informa-
tion raises no particular problems for our interpretation of
the artificial grammar learning data, since subjects are
clearly aware of their whole-string knowledge just as they
are aware of the substring knowledge; the study task, after
all, requires the subjects specifically to memorize whole
strings. However, as Brooks and Vokey (1991, p. 321)
themselves concede, their results can at least in principle
be explained without reference to whole-item knowl-
edge. Just as grammatical test strings tend to contain
more studied bigrams than nongrammatical strings (Per-
ruchet & Pacteau 1990), so also a test string that is highly
similar to a study string will contain more studied bigrams
than one that is less similar. In fact, Vokey and Brooks'
results have been challenged by Perruchet (1994), who
has shown that both the effect of similarity and the
apparently independent effect of grammaticality that
Vokey and Brooks obtained can in turn be reduced to
substring knowledge. Grammatical test strings tend to
contain more substring components that were part of the
training strings than do nongrammatical items. The same
is true for similar and dissimilar test items, with similar
items tending to contain more substring components
from the study strings.
A final piece of evidence supports the view that gram-
maticality judgments are controlled by comparison to
memorized substring or whole-item information. On
such a view, but not on an abstraction account, it is likely
that judgments would be relatively susceptible to changes
in the superficial characteristics of the studied strings. To
test this, Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) required subjects
to pronounce the training strings from one grammar and
to spell the training strings from another grammar. At
test, subjects were asked either to pronounce or to spell
test strings and to judge their grammatical status. Sub-
jects were more likely to assign test strings to grammars
when the encoding task matched the task for the test
string than when they differed. Test strings that were
equally similar to strings in both grammars were assigned
to the grammar where the encoding and test tasks
matched. Such results, although consistent with the idea
that judgments are based on a comparison with a set of
items in memory that represent the study items in a
relatively unanalyzed form, would clearly not be antici-
pated if what was encoded were the underlying abstract
rules of the grammar.
Our conclusion from this section, then, is that subjects
use their memory system to acquire knowledge of (possi-
bly) whole strings and (certainly) their parts, and that this
simple information is conscious both during acquisition
and testing. The results reported by Dulany et al. (1984),
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990), and Dienes et al. (1991)
show that the knowledge that subjects can consciously
retrieve in a recognition test is sufficient to explain their
grammaticality judgments. From the evidence we have
considered, we do not need to assume the existence of an
additional implicit knowledge base, and conclusions to
the contrary have arisen because of failures to meet the
Information Criterion.
Our interpretation rests on the results of a variety of
tests of conscious knowledge that have attempted to
address the Sensitivity Criterion. Dienes et al.'s (1991)
SLD test, for instance, which required subjects to judge
which continuations of a sequence of letters were legal,
was actually found in a signal detection analysis to be more
sensitive than the implicit grammaticality test itself.
Thus, if such a test is accepted as a measure of explicit
knowledge, no evidence of a dissociation between learn-
ing and awareness emerges. Of course, an alternative (see
Reber et al. 1985; and the reply, Dulany et al. 1985) is to
argue that performance on these explicit tests is contami-
nated by unconscious influences; subjects may choose a
correct continuation on the SLD test as a result of some
implicit knowledge to which they do not have conscious
access.2 The problem with this interpretation, however,
is that it means we would have to abandon the test as an
index of conscious learning and rely instead on verbal
reports, in which case it is hard to see how the Sensitivity
Criterion can ever be met. And if that criterion cannot be
met, then how are defenders of unconscious learning ever
going to unconfound test type from sensitivity, and hence
establish the existence of unconscious learning?
We believe it is rather unlikely that unconscious influ-
ences play a significant role in the SLD test. Presenting
subjects with a letter sequence (e.g., VXT. . .)andasking
them to judge, under no time pressure, whether a given
letter (e.g., M) could continue the sequence would seem
to be a prototypical example of a task requiring conscious
reflection, even if it involves mere conscious recollection
of studied strings. Nevertheless, to claim that the SLD
test is only sensitive to conscious information does re-
quire adopting what Reingold and Merikle (1988) call the
"exclusiveness" assumption: the assumption that perfor-
mance on a test of awareness is only affected by conscious
influences. This, of course, is a very strong assumption
and one that may well be incorrect.
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2.5.2. Learning systems. In addition to the question of
awareness, a second issue concerns whether whole item,
bigram, and possibly rule information are acquired by a
single learning system or by separate systems. If they are
acquired by separate systems, perhaps those systems
interfere with each other's operation? To examine this
possibility, Reber and Allen (1978) manipulated the train-
ing task. Subjects either observed the strings without any
explicit task (observation training), or they performed a
paired-associate task, where each string was paired with a
different city name. The idea was that the paired-
associate task would require better item encoding,
thereby facilitating item knowledge but potentially inhi-
biting other learning processes.
The paired-associate task produced several significant
differences from the observation task. Overall, paired-
associate subjects were less accurate on their gram-
maticality judgments: 72.4% versus 81.2% accurate for
observation subjects. Paired-associate subjects produced
twice as many recognition justifications as did observation
subjects (77 vs. 40), and paired-associate subjects' proba-
bility of making consistent errors suggested they were
more likely to develop unrepresentative knowledge than
were observation subjects.
Clearly, the two training tasks affected the quantity of
whole-item and substring knowledge that was acquired,
but the underlying learning processes do not appear to be
in opposition. The verbal reports show that both groups
justified their responses with the same knowledge
sources, but to differing degrees. It appears, then, that
whole-item learning is compatible with substring learn-
ing. Vokey and Brooks (1992) examined a range of encod-
ing tasks that produce differences in the extent of item
knowledge, but they also found no reliable interference
between item knowledge and substring knowledge.
Finally, Dienes et al. (1991) required subjects to gener-
ate random digits during training. Their goal was to test
whether this task would interfere selectively with sub-
jects given explicit instructions to search for rules that
describe the study strings, but not with subjects given
implicit instructions simply to observe the study strings.
Instead, Dienes et al. found equivalent reductions in
learning for both implicitly and explicitly instructed
subjects.
2.5.3. Implicit rule induction. Although the considerable
evidence presented above supports the conclusion that
subjects' knowledge consists of simple substrings (or whole
strings), there are two further pieces of evidence that
support the conclusion that subjects learn rules. The first
piece of evidence supporting rule learning was reported
by Reber and Lewis (1977). Subjects were trained on a
subset of strings and then solved "anagrams" based on the
remaining strings generated from the grammar - that is to
say, they took strings of letters and rearranged them to
make grammatical strings. The frequencies of bigrams
produced by subjects in the anagram task were tabulated
and compared with the frequencies of the bigrams in the
training set and in the full set of grammatical strings. If
subjects were learning bigram frequencies from the train-
ing strings, the correlation between the frequencies of
bigrams in the training strings and in the solved anagram
strings should be high. While this was the case, Reber and
Lewis found that the correlation between the frequencies
of bigrams in the solved anagrams and in the whole
grammar was actually higher. This result suggests that the
subjects went beyond the training set to learn the rules of
the grammar.
Perruchet et al. (1992), however, argued that Reber and
Lewis's (1977) result must hold on statistical grounds
alone. The anagrams demand the production of certain
bigrams and not others, in fact, exactly those bigrams that
are underrepresented in the training set. Suppose, for
example, that VT is a bigram in the grammar that is
underrepresented among the training strings. VT must
then be overrepresented among the solved anagram
strings since the training and correctly solved anagram
strings together constitute the complete set of grammati-
cal strings. It is no wonder, then, that the correlation
between the frequencies of anagram bigrams and training
bigrams is low and that the correlation between anagram
bigrams and the full grammar bigrams is higher. Per-
ruchet et al. went on to demonstrate this fact empirically
by training subjects only on the individual bigrams from
the training strings. Under these circumstances, subjects
could not be learning rules because they only saw bi-
grams, yet as with Reber and Lewis's subjects the fre-
quencies of their anagram bigrams also correlated better
with the full grammar bigrams than with the training
string bigrams. The original conclusion, therefore, that
subjects go beyond the training strings to learn rules
appears to have been an artifact of the experimental
design.
The second and more compelling piece of evidence for
abstraction is the fact that subjects show some degree of
transfer to strings governed by the same underlying
grammar, but formed from a new set of letters or from a
completely new set of stimuli such as tones. Reber (1969)
trained subjects to recall grammatical strings, and when
he switched to a new set of letters, subjects showed no
increase in recall errors. This result suggested that sub-
jects had learned abstract rules that were easily instanti-
ated with different letters. More impressively, Altmann
et al. (in press) required subjects to observe a set of letter
strings, generated from the grammar shown in Figure 2,
prior to making grammaticality judgments concerning
sequences of tones. Some of the tone sequences could be
generated from the grammar by substituting a tone for a
letter (e.g., middle C for the letter M). Altmann et al.
found that exposure to letter sequences allowed gram-
matical and nongrammatical tone sequences to be dis-
criminated at better-than-chance levels. Although the
improvement was generally small (about 5% increase in
correct classifications), this result strongly suggests that at
least some aspects of the abstract structure of the letter
sequences had been isolated and were available to aid
classification of the tone sequences.
It is important to note that the change of stimulus set
did have a detrimental effect on performance, however.
Compared to a situation in which the study and test items
were from the same set (both letters or both tones),
classification performance was significantly impaired
when the study and test sets differed. Thus, abstract
knowledge was plainly not the sole source of information
that subjects were relying on - specific memorized frag-
ments or strings must also have been playing a role. A
study by Mathews et al. (1989) confirms this conclusion.
In Mathews et al.'s study, over a series of training sessions
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subjects were trained either on a single-string set or on
different sets generated from the same underlying gram-
mar. Subjects in the same set condition learned better,
and a final switch to a new set doubled the error rates in
the single-set training condition. Such a result would not
be expected if an abstract set of underlying rules were the
sole factor guiding classification, because the rules would
apply equally to the new and to the original letter set.
What is the significance of these results for unconscious
learning? To the extent that subjects might be poor at
describing what they have abstracted, such results may
imply that unconscious learning is taking place. But given
the rather small improvement in classification perfor-
mance that results from training and testing on different
sets of items, it is quite likely that what is abstracted is
fairly limited (e.g., only two initial symbols are legal, the
first two symbols of a string cannot be the same, etc.), and
it is quite possible that subjects, if asked, would be able to
report such simple regularities. In sum, although the data
from transfer studies do suggest that some aspects of the
underlying structure can be abstracted, from the point of
view of unconscious learning the significance of these
findings has yet to be established.
2.5.4. Conclusions. These studies indicate that relatively
simple information is to a large extent sufficient to account
for subjects' behavior in artificial grammar learning tasks.
In addition, and most important, this knowledge appears
to be reportable by subjects. Appreciable knowledge of
the grammar does not seem to be acquired by explicit
hypothesis testing or other complex analytic processes
(although we return in sect. 3.2 to consider some rather
different cases where grammars appear to be learned
explicitly). Instead, knowledge seems to be mainly accu-
mulated over training by simple memory mechanisms
that collect frequency statistics on bigrams, slightly
longer sequences, and possibly whole items.
2.6. Awareness in instrumental learning tasks
In contrast to the conditioning and artificial grammar
studies described above, which arrange relationships be-
tween external cues, instrumental tasks establish some
contingency between an action the subject performs and
an associated outcome. Learning is measured as a change
across trials in the propensity to perform the action.
Naturally, the question we may again ask is whether such
learning can occur without awareness. As in his review of
Pavlovian learning studies, Brewer (1974) concluded that
the answer to this question is no. There have recently
been some further investigations of the role of awareness
in instrumental learning: we consider results separately
from tasks in which the instrumental contingency is
simple or more complex. By "simple" we mean any task in
which there is ostensibly just one action available to the
subject.
2.6.1. Simple instrumental learning tasks. Svartdal (1989;
1991) has reported a number of studies in which subjects
are led to believe that there is a relationship between a
reinforcer and one aspect of responding, when in fact the
critical variable is some other aspect of responding. For
example, Svartdal (1991) presented subjects with brief
trains of between 4 and 17 auditory "clicks." Subjects
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immediately had to press a response button exactly the
same number of times and were instructed that feedback
would be presented when the number of presses matched
the number of clicks. In reality, however, feedback was
contingent on the rate of responding: for some subjects, it
was given when the interresponse times (IRTs) were
lower than in a baseline phase, while for others it was
given when IRTs were higher.
Svartdal (1991) obtained evidence of learning, in that
IRTs adjusted appropriately to the reinforcement contin-
gencies, but subjects seemed to be unaware that it was the
rate of responding that was important. A structured ques-
tionnaire revealed no evidence of awareness of the contin-
gency between response rate and feedback in subjects
whose response rate had adjusted appropriately.
Such demonstrations appear at first glance to be quite
compelling, especially as the contingency to be learned is
such a simple one. It is unclear, however, that the Infor-
mation Criterion is met in these and similar studies,
because it is very difficult to rule out the possibility that
subjects acquire "correlated" hypotheses about the rein-
forcement contingency that are incorrect from the experi-
menter's point of view but happen to produce response
profiles that are difficult to distinguish from those gener-
ated by the correct hypothesis. For example, suppose
subjects learn that resting their hand in a certain position
increases reinforcement rate. This could be a true experi-
enced contingency if that hand position was conducive to
a fast or slow response rate. Such an "incorrect" hypoth-
esis would generate behavior that was very similar to what
would be produced by the correct hypothesis, yet a
subject who reported hand position as the crucial variable
would be regarded by the experimenter as "unaware" of
the reinforcement contingency.
Although such a criticism is undoubtedly post hoc,
there is good evidence of subjects' behavior being under
the control of such correlated hypotheses. In the 1950s, a
number of studies asked subjects to generate words ad
libitum and established that the probability with which
they would produce, say, plural nouns was increased if
each such word was followed by the experimenter saying
"umhmm" (e.g., Greenspoon 1955); as with Svartdal's
(1991) experiment, this result occurred in subjects appar-
ently unable to report the reinforcement contingency.
However, in an elegant study, Dulany (1961) proved that
subjects were hypothesizing that reinforcement was con-
tingent on generating a word in the same semantic cate-
gory as the previous one. Although incorrect, this hypoth-
esis was correlated with the true one, in that if the subject
said "emeralds" and was reinforced, then staying in the
same semantic category meant they were more likely to
produce another plural noun ("rubies") than if they shifted
categories. Thus the subjects were perfectly aware of the
contingency that was controlling their behavior, namely,
the contingency between staying in the same semantic
category and reinforcement.
In sum, even ignoring possible insensitivity in the test
of verbal awareness, results such as Svartdal's (1991)
cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of unconscious
learning. Subjects may learn a rather different contin-
gency from that explicitly programmed by the experi-
menter, and the Information Criterion may hence fail to
be met. The problem is particularly worrisome in operant
studies because, by definition, the experimenter has little
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control over the subject's behavior and therefore over the
contingencies that may be present. In nonoperant tasks,
the problem can be avoided because the experimenter
can in principle eliminate all reinforcement contingencies
except the one of interest. For this reason it seems that
clear evidence for unconscious learning is likely to be
difficult to establish in instrumental learning tasks.
In contrast to such apparent dissociations between
learning and awareness, Shanks and Dickinson (1991)
have argued that there are a number of variables that
seem to have rather similar effects on performance assess-
ments of learning and on awareness. In two studies,
subjects performed a simple operant-learning task in
which pressing a key on a computer keyboard was related,
via a schedule of reinforcement, to a triangle flashing on
the screen. Subjects were exposed to a reinforcement
contingency in which they scored points whenever the
triangle flashed but lost points for each response, so that
they were encouraged to adapt their response rate to the
reinforcement schedule. Learning was demonstrated by
changes in subjects' rates of responding. As a measure of
awareness, subjects were asked to report on a scale from 0
to 100 what they thought was the relationship between
the response and the reinforcer.
Shanks and Dickinson (1991) found that response rate
was sensitive both to the degree of contiguity between the
response and reinforcer and to the degree of contingency
between them. At the same time, subjects' judgments
were equally sensitive to these factors. Furthermore,
certain judgmental illusions likewise manifested them-
selves in performance measures. For example, subjects
frequently judge an action and an outcome to be related
when in fact they are not. Shanks and Dickinson found
that this effect appears in performance measures such as
response rate as well as in verbal judgments. Of course,
the appearance of a bias in two behavioral measures
strongly suggests that they are mediated by a common
underlying process.
The notion that learning and awareness proceed in
tandem is corroborated to the extent that they are affected
in similar ways by various manipulations. Shanks and
Dickinson's results indicate that - at least for the two
important factors of contingency and contiguity - this is
exactly the case. Shanks (1993) discusses some further
apparent concordances.
The human operant-learning literature provides per-
haps the most convincing evidence that learning and
awareness are associated in simple learning tasks. A
wealth of data shows concordances between response rate
and verbal reports under different schedules of reinforce-
ment (e.g., Cataniaet al. 1989; Rosenfarb et al. 1992; see
also Skinner 1984b, and accompanying commentaries).
For instance, Rosenfarb et al. required subjects to press a
button either on a differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate
schedule, in which reinforcers were delivered for a re-
sponse provided that 5 sec had elapsed since the preced-
ing response, or on a fixed-ratio schedule in which eight
responses were required to earn a reinforcer. Rosenfarb
et al. found that subjects' verbal reports concerning the
programmed contingency accorded very well with the
actual contingencies. Furthermore, there was a strong
correlation between the time at which responding be-
came appropriate for a schedule and the time at which
verbal reports indicated awareness of the reinforcement
contingency operating in that schedule.
2.6.2. Complex instrumental control tasks. Several exper-
iments have investigated the relationship between learn-
ing and awareness in more complex instrumental learning
tasks where the subject has to learn to control an interac-
tive system. Again, the basic idea is as shown in Figure 1,
with some learning episode followed by an assessment of
awareness. In most of these tasks awareness at time t2 is
measured by verbally questioning the subject.
Berry and Broadbent (1984) conducted an influential
and widely cited experiment in which there was an
apparent dissociation between learning and awareness.
As in Hayes and Broadbent's (1988) study, one of the tasks
they used required subjects to interact with a computer
"person." On each trial, the subject entered an attitude
(e.g., polite) to the computer, which then responded with
its attitude (e.g., unfriendly). The subject's task was to try
to get the computer to be friendly. The computer's atti-
tude on each trial was a simple numerical function of the
subjects input on that trial and the computer's previous
attitude. Inclusion of the computer's attitude on the
previous trial makes the task quite a difficult one to learn.
Berry and Broadbent (1984, Experiment 1) found, not
surprisingly, that performance improved, with practice:
significantly more trials on target occurred during a
second block of 30 trials than during the first block.
However, scores on a structured questionnaire designed
to assess the subjects' reportable knowledge of the task
were no better after the second block than after the first
one. Hence, here we have apparent evidence that learn-
ing to perform a task can take place without any change in
awareness of the underlying structure of the task. Similar
results have been obtained in a number of other studies
(e.g., Berry & Broadbent 1987; 1990; Broadbent et al.
1986; Hayes & Broadbent 1988; Stanley et al. 1989).
On the other hand, a detailed examination by Sander-
son (1989) found evidence of associations rather than
dissociations between performance and reports. Sander-
son argued that because subjects often have complex prior
beliefs about the interactions within a large system, and
because these beliefs may be erroneous in a laboratory
version of the system, it is possible for their mental
models to undergo considerable revision without yielding
an overall improvement in accuracy. It is only with pro-
longed practice that mental models, and hence the verbal
reports based on them, begin to show noticeable im-
provement. Consistent with this, Sanderson was able to
obtain significant performance improvements at the same
time as weak improvements in the overall accuracy of
verbal reports in a complex transportation task, but she
showed that the detailed nature of the verbal reports was
changing very considerably.
A further experiment by Berry and Broadbent (1984)
found the converse of the previous dissociation, namely,
reportable knowledge improving without corresponding
improvements in task performance. One group simply
completed two sets of trials, while between the two sets
another group received detailed verbal instructions about
the nature of the input-output relationship. These instruc-
tions essentially represented a verbal description of the
equation governing the computer's attitude. When ques-
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tioned at the end of the experiment, subjects who had
received instructions outscored those who had not, yet
the groups were indistinguishable in terms of number of
trials on target. Thus a change in "awareness" (or at least a
change in reportable knowledge of the task) was not
accompanied by a change in task performance.
What are we to make of such dissociations? One possi-
bility is that it is not only possible for learning to proceed
without awareness, but in addition the system responsible
for implicit learning is quite independent of another
(explicit) system in which learning is accompanied by
awareness. Such a "systems" account would then be able
to explain why we can obtain double dissociations of the
sort reported by Berry and Broadbent (1984): learning to
perform the control task involves the implicit system, and
proceeds without awareness, while a change in awareness
involves the explicit system and can proceed without any
benefit in task performance.
While double dissociation results are certainly consis-
tent with the notion that there are two learning systems,
one conscious and the other unconscious, we feel that an
alternative account is equally feasible: there may be two
systems, both of which are conscious, but which encode
different types of knowledge. The basic problem is that
we do not know that the sort of knowledge the subjects in
Berry and Broadbent's experiments acquire when learn-
ing to perform the task is at all the same as the knowledge
they require to score well on the test of reportable
knowledge (i.e., the results may fail to meet the Informa-
tion Criterion). Suppose, for the sake of argument, that
good task performance simply depends on learning an
unrelated set of stimulus-response (S-R) pairs or instances
(evidence for such a possibility certainly exists; see
Cleeremans 1993b). It is then not hard to imagine that
although practice provides the subjects with more and
more knowledge of this sort, they might be hard pressed
to use such knowledge when faced with questions about
possible structural rules underlying the task. At the same
time, giving the subjects detailed instructions about the
task may improve their knowledge of the rules, and hence
their questionnaire scores, but might not transfer to
better performance on the task itself since S-R knowledge
is required for that. But of course the subjects' inability to
describe the rules underlying the task does not imply that
the S-R learning occurred without awareness: if they were
asked to report that knowledge, perhaps subjects would
be able to do so. In sum, there are ways of interpreting
such data that do not appeal to unconscious learning (see
Stanley et al. 1989, for an examination of some of the
alternative types of knowledge that subjects may encode).
A second problem concerns the sensitivity of the test of
awareness. Can we be certain that the questionnaire
procedure exhausts the subject's knowledge of the task?
Can we be confident that failure to express on the ques-
tionnaire any awareness of the nature of the task means
that the subjects were unaware at the time they were
learning? For example, one alternative strategy would be
to ask each subject to instruct a yoked "partner" in how to
perform the task. If the partners could then perform the
task as well as the original subjects, we would conclude
that the original subjects were in fact able to articulate all
their task knowledge. Such procedures have been used
with other learning procedures (e.g., Mathews et al.
1989, for grammar learning) and have proven highly
sensitive.
2.6.3. Conclusions. Instrumental learning experiments
arrange some relationship between the subject's actions
and certain outcomes. Implicit learning would be demon-
strated if learning, as indexed by changes in instrumental
behavior, occurred in the absence of awareness of the
reinforcement contingencies. Although some studies
have found that subjects seem unaware of the relevant
contingencies, reliance on verbal report means that the
Sensitivity Criterion is unlikely to have been met. Fur-
thermore, because the experimenter necessarily relin-
quishes a certain degree of experimental control in an
instrumental learning task, it is difficult to rule out the
possibility that the subject is responding on the basis of a
correlated hypothesis, in which case the Information
Criterion is violated. Finally, even ignoring these consid-
erations, a surprisingly large number of studies have
documented impressive concordances between behavior
and awareness.
2.7. Learning and awareness In serial reaction time
tasks
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) and Lewicki et al. (1987)
introduced a simple and ingenious technique, the serial
RT task, in an attempt to demonstrate unconscious learn-
ing. In Nissen and Bullemer's version, a stimulus is
presented on each trial in one of four locations (A-D) and
the subject simply has to press the button corresponding
to that location as fast as possible. The subject is given
instructions appropriate for a typical choice RT task, but
in fact there is a sequence underlying the selection of the
stimulus on each trial. The question is, can subjects learn
the sequence without being aware of it? With respect to
Figure 1, the subject is presented with a series of learning
trials in which there are predictive relationships between
stimuli. These are accompanied by both a concurrent
assessment of learning (RT) and a later assessment of
awareness.
Some of the most compelling evidence for unconscious
learning using this technique comes from a later study by
Willingham et al. (1989); this study is worth considering
in some detail because of the heavy reliance placed upon
it in recent discussions of conscious and unconscious
processing (e.g., Velmans 1991). In their first experiment,
Willingham et al. s subjects performed a 4-choice RT task.
The actual sequence of signals was DBCACBDCBA,
which repeated many times with no break between cy-
cles. Subjects' RT improved across a total of 400 trials. To
see whether this improvement represented knowledge of
the sequence or general nonspecific speedup, Will-
ingham et al. compared the speedup of their subjects to
that obtained in a group of subjects from the earlier study
by Nissen and Bullemer (1987) for whom there had been
no structured sequence; for these control subjects, target
location was random from trial to trial, except that the
same location never occurred on consecutive trials.
The improvement in RT was significantly greater in the
sequence group than in the control group, apparently
indicating that sequence learning had occurred. Further-
more, this was still true for subjects who subsequently
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reported no awareness of the existence of a sequence
during the RT trials.
2.7.1. Problem of suitable control group. Although such
results suggest the possibility of unconscious learning,
there are a number of significant problems with such
experiments. First, the demonstration of sequence learn-
ing has typically involved one of the following two com-
parisons: (1) a comparison (e.g., Willingham et al. 1989)
between a group exposed to the sequence and one for
whom the stimulus on each trial is chosen at random (with
the constraint that stimuli never repeat on consecutive
trials), or (2) a within-subjects comparison (e.g., Hartman
et al. 1989) between performance at the end of a long
period of exposure to the sequence and performance on a
subsequent block of trials where the stimuli are chosen at
random, again with the constraint that stimuli never
repeat on consecutive trials. The problem with both of
these comparisons is that performance can differ between
the sequence and random trials without the subject hav-
ing any knowledge - implicit or otherwise - of the
sequence.
As a moment's reflection reveals, faster responses on
the DBCACBDCBA sequence compared with a random
sequence might simply be due to response biases devel-
oping during exposure to the sequence. The stimuli are
not equally frequent (B and C occur three times, D and A
twice) in the 10-trial sequence. Thus in the sequence, but
not in the random conditions, the subject is to some
degree able to predict which stimuli are most probable, a
fact that - as has been demonstrated extensively (see
Broadbent 1971) - will allow fast responses to develop.
Clearly, the appropriate comparison is with a group of
subjects who receive a "pseudorandom" series con-
strained to have the same number of each of stimuli A, B,
C, and D per 10 trials as appear in the sequence proper,
and in which stimuli never repeat on consecutive trials.
Such an experiment was reported by Shanks et al. (1994).
One group of subjects was presented with the normal
sequence, another with the pseudorandom series, and a
third with a "truly random" sequence, in which again
there was the constraint that stimuli never repeated on
consecutive trials. The stimuli were dots arranged in a
horizontal row and the general procedure followed that of
Willingham et al. (1989).
After 400 RT trials, subjects in the sequence group
were classified on the basis of a structured interview as
having no knowledge of the sequence, some knowledge,
or full knowledge. The prediction was that if the no-
knowledge subjects had indeed learned something about
the sequence, they should have speeded up more than
the pseudorandom subjects. In all but the truly random
group the RT difference between the first and fourth
block of 100 trials was significantly greater than zero. The
normal-sequence/full-knowledge group speeded up
more than any of the others; the difference between the
normal-sequence/full-knowledge and pseudorandom
groups confirms that the normal-sequence/full knowl-
edge subjects had indeed learned something about the
sequence. However, there was no significant difference
between the normal sequence/no-knowledge and pseu-
dorandom groups, though both speeded up more than
subjects exposed to the truly random series. Thus, we
suggest that with Willingham et al. s stimuli and proce-
dure, most if not all of the supposedly implicit learning in
the normal-sequence/no-knowledge group was simply
due to the development o(f response biases reflecting
knowledge of the frequencies of the different stimuli.
As a consequence, Willingham et al.'s experiment fails
to satisfy the Information Criterion. The subjects may
have been unable to articulate information about the
sequence verbally simply because they were not learning
(in any sense) about the sequence. Instead, they were
learning about the frequencies with which the different
stimuli occurred. This is information they may, if asked,
have been able to report.
2.7.2. Prediction tests as measures of awareness. The
second problem is that, even ignoring the above consider-
ations, we cannot rely just on the subjects' informal
reports as assessments of their state of awareness some
seconds or even minutes previously. Two somewhat dif-
ferent strategies have been advocated with regard to
using more sensitive tests of awareness, namely, recogni-
tion and prediction tests. We discuss recognition tests in
the next section. Prediction tests, introduced by Nissen
and Bullemer (1987), require the subject to try to predict
the next element of the sequence; such a test was used by
Willingham et al. (1989) in addition to their verbal report
test. After the RT phase of their experiment, Willingham
et al. instructed subjects to try to predict on each trial
where the stimulus would next appear, with no require-
ment for rapid responses. Subjects simply chose response
keys on each trial until they picked the correct one, at
which point they would then try to predict the next
stimulus. Across many blocks of this prediction task, the
subject again has the opportunity to learn the sequence.
Evidence for explicit knowledge of the rule appears as
savings (compared with the control group) in the number
of trials required to learn the sequence in the prediction
task.3
The rationale behind the prediction task is that if
subjects are instructed to try to predict events and are
able to do so with above-chance accuracy, this is evidence
of conscious knowledge, because their predictions must
be based on conscious expectancies. As this task requires
the subject to act on a conscious expectancy concerning
which stimulus will appear next, it is apparently a test of
awareness of elements of the sequence. This contrasts
with the RT task, in which they have to respond as fast as
possible to the current target. The prediction task is a
good one in that it is irrelevant whether or not the
subjects believe that their performance in the RT phase
was being affected by the sequence (indeed, they may not
even be able consciously to report having detected a
sequence). All that matters is whether any evidence of
savings emerges in the prediction task, for, according to
the reasoning behind the task, such savings must be due
to conscious information about the sequence.
More to the point, failure at the prediction task would
demonstrate a subject's inability to draw consciously on
. information about the sequence, thereby supporting the
contention that the information indeed is implicit. It is
important to drawing such a conclusion that the predic-
tion task satisfies the Sensitivity Criterion where verbal
reports did not. The retrieval cues for the prediction task
are virtually identical to those of the reaction time task.
Hence we now have two tests that are almost identical,
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but in one the subject's performance (i.e., RT) is mea-
sured and in the other awareness is assessed. This very
much follows the rationale of recent experiments on
unconscious perception (e.g., Merikle & Reingold 1992),
where the test of awareness and the test of perception are
designed to differ in little more than the instructions
given to subjects. Although the temporal arrangement of
stimuli and responses is different in the two tasks, and the
response metrics are quite different, the prediction task
nonetheless represents an interesting new procedure for
assessing awareness.
What are the results obtained from studies using the
prediction task? Willingham et al. (1989, Experiment 1)
discovered that subjects they had classified as unaware on
the basis of their verbal reports not only speeded up in the
RT phase but also, according to Willingham et al., showed
no evidence of awareness as assessed by the prediction
task. Such a result appears to provide quite compelling
evidence of implicit learning, even if Shanks et al.'s (1994)
data suggest that learning probably involved frequency
rather than sequence information. It is important to note
that this dissociation of RT speedup and prediction perfor-
mance only applies to subjects who have been selected as
unaware on the basis of their verbal reports. Across all
subjects (regardless of their verbally reported awareness),
RT speedup and prediction performance tend to be
closely associated, as experiments by Cleeremans and
McClelland (1991) and Perruchet and Amorim (1992)
have shown.
Willingham et al. compared the performance of their
normal sequence/no-knowledge subjects in the predic-
tion task with that of a "no-training" group who had not
received the RT phase at all. This comparison was the
critical evidence that the sequence learning in the
normal-sequence/no-knowledge subjects was implicit.
However, there are three problems with these results.
First, although Willingham et al. claimed that there was
no evidence of savings on the prediction task in their
"no-explicit-knowledge" subjects, close inspection of
their data reveals that these subjects did perform at a
better level than naive subjects, though not significantly
so. Over each of the first six sets of 10 trials of the
prediction task, performance was better in the normal-
sequence/no-explicit-knowledge group than in the con-
trol group by about 5% in each set (Willingham et al.
1989, Fig. 3). On the first block of trials, the normal-
sequence/no-explicit-knowledge . group scored 42.6%
correct and the control group 38.7%. Although small,
this trend is as much evidence for savings as it is for a
dissociation between awareness and learning. A similar
conclusion may be drawn for the data reported by Hart-
man et al. (1989), where small but consistent savings are
also apparent.
Second, Perruchet and Amorim (1992) pointed out that
Willingham et al. did not instruct their subjects that the
stimulus sequence in the prediction phase would be the
same as that in the RT phase. Hence subjects may not
have been maximally motivated to show transfer savings
in the prediction task. The third and final problem is that
Shanks et al. (1994), in their replication and extension of
Willingham et al.'s study, obtained savings that were of a
statistically significant magnitude. Shanks et al.'s normal-
sequence/no-knowledge subjects performed much better
(mean 5.7 correct predictions) than the no-training con-
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trol subjects (mean 2.7) across the first 10 trials of the
prediction phase, indicating that at least some of the
knowledge they had acquired in the RT phase but were
unable to report verbally was available for transfer to the
prediction task. In sum, we conclude that the Willingham
et al. study has failed to establish unconscious sequence
learning.
A number of other studies have also used the sequence-
learning task. Several of these have adopted Willingham
et al.'s procedure of classifying some subjects as unaware
on the basis of their verbal reports and then examining
their prediction task performance. Others have sought to
obtain different dissociations between RT speedup and
prediction performance. Whatever the strategy used, we
suggest that claims for implicit learning in these studies
(e.g., Cohen et al. 1990; Hartman et al. 1989; Howard &
Howard 1989; Knopman 1991; Lewicki et al. 1987;
Lewicki et al. 1988; Nissen & Bullemer 1987; Nissen et al.
1987; Stadler 1989) are difficult to interpret for many of
the reasons we have raised concerning Willingham et al.'s
experiment. These other studies either (1) fail to show
that subjects have acquired any sequence knowledge in
the RT phase, (2) show small but consistent trends toward
savings in the prediction task in supposedly unaware
subjects, (3) present control subjects in the prediction
task with random rather than pseudorandom sequences,
or (4) do not provide feedback in the prediction test and
hence run the risk of inducing forgetting of the sequence,
which will lead to an underestimation of conscious knowl-
edge. Caution suggests that these studies do not warrant
the conclusion of reliable sequence learning in the ab-
sence of awareness.
Rather than reviewing all of these studies, we consider
two widely cited ones (Lewicki et al. 1988; Stadler 1989)
that illustrate some of the problems. Lewicki et al. (1988)
presented subjects with blocks of trials that were ar-
ranged into sequences of five trials. On each trial a target
appeared in one of the four quadrants of the computer
screen and the subject had to respond by pressing the key
appropriate to that quadrant. RTs were collected from a
total of 4,080 experimental trials experienced by each
subject. On the first two trials target location was random,
except that the target was never displayed twice in the
same place. Target location on trial 3 was determined by
what had happened on trials 1 and 2. If the movement on
the first two trials had been horizontal, then the move-
ment from trial 2 to trial 3 was vertical; if it was vertical,
then the next was diagonal; and if it was diagonal, the next
was horizontal.
Similarly, target location on trial 4 depended on target
locations on trials 2 and 3, and target location on trial 5
depended on its locations on trials 3 and 4. The net effect
was that target location on trials 3, 4, and 5 was entirely
predictable from the underlying rules, but locations on
trials 1 and 2 were random. Hence if the subjects were
indeed learning something about the rules, this should
have manifested itself in a significantly greater reduction
in RTs across blocks on trials 3,4, and 5 than on trials 1 and
2, and this is exactly what Lewicki et al. found (in fact,
they took as their dependent measure the number of
correct responses with latencies less than 400 msec). Also,
when the rules were changed toward the end of training,
reaction times increased on trials 3, 4, and 5 but not on
trials 1 and 2.
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Lewicki et al.'s (1988) subjects could apparently report
next to nothing about the rules determining target loca-
tion. "None of the subjects mentioned anything even
close to the manipulated pattern of exposures" (p. 33),
although eight of the nine subjects did seem to be aware
that their performance had dropped when the rules were
changed. Lewicki et al. concluded that the subjects had
learned the rules determining target locations on trials 3—
5 implicitly or unconsciously.
Perruchet et al. (1990), however, disputed Lewicki et
al.'s (1988) conclusions. The criticism is that the set of
possible events that could occur on trials 3-5 was more
constrained than the set of events that could occur on
trials 1 and 2. By analyzing the rules that determined the
permissible transitions from one trial to another, Per-
ruchet et al. were able to show in their replication of
Lewicki et al.'s experiment that speedup in RTon trials 3—
5 relative to trials 1 and 2 was mainly due to relative
speedup only on trials 4 and 5; furthermore, it was almost
entirely due to two factors. First, on trials 1 and 2, but not
trials 3-5, there were some occasions when the stimulus
moved back to a location from which it had just come;
these backwards movements led to a slowing of RTs
simply because they increased the unpredictability of the
movement. Second, on trials 1 and 2 there were infre-
quent horizontal movements, which again led to a slowing
of RTs. On trials 4 and 5 horizontal movements were not
permissible. Rather than learn rules such as, "If the
movement from trial 1 to trial 2 was horizontal, then the
next movement will be vertical," subjects need only have
learned that the possible transitions had widely different
overall probabilities. Low-probability transitions tended
to occur on trials 1 and 2 and hence led to slower RTs.
Clearly, Lewicki et al.'s data fail to show that the
knowledge that subjects could articulate in their verbal
reports was in any way poorer than the knowledge that
underlay their RT speedup. This fails to meet the Informa-
tion Criterion and hence Lewicki et al.'s belief that
knowledge of the composition rules was necessary for RT
improvement is almost certainly not correct. Instead,
relative RT speedup is simply due to subjects' learning that
certain movements of the target occurred with low proba-
bility. As Perruchet et al. say, "The fact that subjects do not
articulate any of the composition rules no longer applies if
improvement in performance turns out to be unrelated to
this kind of knowledge" (1990, p. 497). Furthermore,
"Subjects' reports on the frequency of occurrence of
particular target transitions would have been rejected as
irrelevant to the actual manipulation" (p. 512).
Perruchet etal. did not assess their subjects verbally, but
on the basis of Lewicki et al.'s results we may assume that
on such a test they would also be classified as unaware.
However, a verbal report test assessing experimenter-
defined sequence knowledge may fail the Sensitivity
Criterion. Perruchet etal. therefore used a prediction test
in their study to see whether the subjects were indeed
unaware. Toward the end of the experiment, they required
one group of subjects to predict where they thought the
target was due to appear. These predictions only had to be
made intermittently, because there were between 4 and 11
normal RT trials between successive prediction trials. On
such a trial, a question mark appeared in the center of the
screen and subjects pressed the button matching the
location of the target that seemed most probable.
Perruchet et al. found that subjects performed at signif-
icantly better than chance levels on the prediction trials.
On trials 3, 4, and 5 they averaged 55.6% correct predic-
tions, against a chance value of 33.3% (which assumes that
subjects have learned - explicitly - that the target never
appears in the same location on consecutive trials). On
trials 1 and 2, only 29.7% of predictions were correct. If
we take prediction responses to be conscious "reports" by
the subjects of their expectancies about target location,
then these results contradict Lewicki et al.'s (1988) claim
that their study supported a dissociation between implicit
and explicit knowledge. On the contrary, subjects seemed
just as able to "report" target location as they were to show
selective RT improvements.
We have already described Lewicki et al.'s (1987) exper-
iments in section 2.3.2 and the ways in which they failed
to meet either the Information or the Sensitivity Crite-
rion. Briefly, the verbal report is likely to be an insensitive
measure, and subjects were likely to be using a simpler
form of knowledge to perform the task than Lewicki et al.
considered. Stadler's (1989) replication is worth consider-
ing, though, because it made a concerted attempt to meet
these criteria. Each trial consisted of the presentation of a
target item in one of the four quadrants of a computer
screen, designated A-D. The choice of target location on
each trial was nonrandom, and the question was whether
the subjects would be able to detect this nonrandomness.
Subjects were presented with sequences of seven trials,
with rules constructed so that target location on the
seventh trial could be predicted from its location on trials
1, 3, 4, and 6. On each of the first six trials, the digit 6
appeared on its own in one of the quadrants of the screen,
but on trial 7 (the "complex" trial), it was embedded in a
display containing 36 digits. Reaction time on the seventh
trial was the measure of interest. Again, the rules specify-
ing target location were deterministic: thus, if the target
appeared in locations C, A, D, and B on trials 1,3, 4, and 6
respectively, then on trial 7 the target would be in loca-
tion A.
Stadler (1989) repeated Lewicki et al.'s (1987) finding
that RTs on the target trials decreased significantly across
a large number of complex trials. To assess awareness,
Stadler used a prediction task in which subjects were free
to use whatever knowledge they had acquired, be it of the
rules or of fragments of sequences, to predict target
location. The task thus meets the Information Criterion,
and because it reinstates much of the learning context,
should also go a good deal of the way toward establishing
equal sensitivity to conscious information in the aware-
ness and performance tasks. In the prediction task,
Stadler presented each of the four subjects with 48 se-
quences of seven trials, with target location on the sev-
enth (complex) trial being determined by its location on
the first, third, fourth, and fifth of the simple trials. On
the complex trial, instead of presenting the target and
distractors and requiring the subjects to locate the dis-
tractor as quickly as possible, Stadler presented a ques-
tion mark in each possible location, and the subjects had
to guess in which quadrant the target would appear. No
feedback was given.
Stadler found that the four subjects made correct pre-
dictions on, respectively, 13, 11, 11, and 11 of the 48
sequences, where chance performance was 12/48.
Clearly, there is no hint here of transfer to the prediction
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task. But in the absence of feedback on the prediction
sequences, it seems to us that there is a very substantial
likelihood that over the 48 test sequences, subjects would
have forgotten a large part of whatever knowledge under-
lay their RT performance. Without feedback, 48 se-
quences (including 288 simple trials) represents a vast
amount of interfering information. To be fair, Stadler
could not, with his design, have given feedback, because
better-than-chance performance would have been ascrib-
able equally to savings from the RT stage and to new
learning of the sequences. For this reason, designs in
which relative savings in the unaware group are compared
to those in a novel control group are much to be preferred;
they allow a sensitive savings test to be administered
without the problem of the forgetting of the sequences.
Alternatively, Stadler could have interspersed his predic-
tion trials throughout further RT trials in order to offset
any forgetting on the former. At any rate, acceptance of
the null hypothesis (of no transfer to the prediction trials)
would be better warranted if we knew that there was no
hint of transfer on the first few trials, but Stadler did not
present these data.
In the meantime, we suggest that cautious readers
should not interpret these results, or any of the sequence
learning results we have reviewed, as convincing evi-
dence for learning without awareness.
2.7.3. Recognition tests. As an alternative to prediction
tests, several researchers have argued that an appropriate
and sensitive test of the subject's explicit knowledge -
particularly if that knowledge is fragmentary - is to use a
recognition memory test. Using the Nissen and Bullemer
(1987) task, Perruchet and Amorim (1992), for instance,
presented subjects in the test phase with 4-trial se-
quences such as DBCA, which had either been part of the
training sequence or not, and required them to respond
exactly as they had in the study phase prior to making
recognition decisions about the sequences. The results
indicated that the old and new sequences could be dis-
criminated, and furthermore, the recognition scores cor-
related extremely highly (r = 0.821) with RTs. On this
basis, there is little evidence that sequence learning was
unconscious. However, Perruchet and Amorim did not
divide their subjects into aware and unaware groups, and
it remains possible that their subjects included an un-
aware subgroup in whom recognition performance was at
chance.
More interesting are data reported by Willingham et
al. (1993). Using the standard 4-stimulus task, one-half of
the subjects saw a random sequence and one-half saw a
16-trial repeating sequence, equated for overall stimulus
frequencies. After the learning phase all subjects were
given a detailed verbal questionnaire consisting of five
questions and were also given a recognition test, in which
five 16-trial sequences were shown, and the subjects had
to rate how likely it was that each sequence had been the
one used in the RT phase. The mean rating for the
distractor sequences was subtracted from that given to the
target sequence to yield a recognition measure.
Consistent with the idea that sequence learning was
unconscious, Willingham et al. (1993) found only small
and nonreliable correlations between the awareness mea-
sures (the verbal and recognition measures) and RT
speedup in the study phase. This result also confirms, of
course, that the recognition measure indexes something
different from the performance measure. However, when
Willingham et al. examined their individual subjects'
data, they found that only two out of 45 sequence subjects
could be classified as genuinely unaware of the sequence:
the remainder all scored better than the median of the
random subjects on one or more of the awareness mea-
sures. Thus it is only for these two subjects that we have
any evidence of unawareness. When the RTs of these
subjects were examined, they did indeed improve signifi-
cantly more across trials than the random subjects, but
interpretation is complicated by the fact that they started
with abnormally slow RTs and ended the training phase
with RTs similar to the random subjects. Finally, as
Perruchet and Gallego (1993) point out, in a sample of 45
subjects, two of them might be erroneously misclassified
as unaware simply because of unreliability in the aware-
ness test. Obviously, a much larger sample is needed
before strong conclusions can be drawn.
2.7.4. What is learned in sequence-learning experiments?
Perhaps it should come as little surprise that, in general,
RT performance and awareness tend to correlate (see
Perruchet & Amorim 1992). Indeed, it is well established
that in choice RT tasks, when subjects make a correct
prediction about which stimulus will appear on the next
trial, their RT on that trial will be much faster than if they
had made an incorrect prediction (e.g., Simon & Craft
1989). But what exactly is the nature of the knowledge that
subjects acquire in a sequence-learning experiment? In
attempting to answer this question, perhaps we can bet-
ter understand why there is such a temptation to regard
the learning as unconscious.
In the studies we have described, the experimenter
arranges that the location of the target is governed by a
complex rule or set of rules. For example, in Lewicki et
al.'s (1987) and Stadler's (1989) experiments, one of the
rules says that if the target appeared in locations C, A, D,
and B on trials 1, 3, 4, and 6, respectively, then on trial 7
the target will be in location A. In some studies (e.g.,
Lewicki et al. 1988) it appears that the experimenter is
assuming that significant learning in the RT stage must
occur because subjects learn those rules in their entirety.
But the Information Criterion cautions us to examine
closely whether RT speedup can be due solely to learning
of the entire rule: Might performance not simply be due
to learning of more fragmentary information? In the
Lewicki et al. (1987) study, might RT improvement not
arise just from the subjects' learning contingencies be-
tween, say, target locations on trials 4 and 6 and target
location on trial 7?
The best evidence to date suggests that learning frag-
ments of the training sequences is probably sufficient to
explain the available sequence-learning data (see Per-
ruchet, in press). Cleeremans and McClelland (1991,
Experiment 1) were able to compare RTs to targets that
could only be predicted by knowing the previous three
elements of the sequence. They found a reliable differ-
ence between RTs to targets that conformed to the rules
compared to those that did not, indicating that subjects
could indeed maintain three items of temporal context.
However, no evidence emerged that they could maintain
four items of context. If such a result is generally valid -
though the size of the temporal context that can be
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maintained is likely to be influenced by the exact experi-
mental procedure - it would be very unlikely that
Lewicki et al.'s (1987) subjects could learn rules requiring
knowledge of six items of context.
Cleeremans and McClelland (1991, Experiment 2) ob-
tained more direct evidence of the constraints on the
amount of context subjects can maintain. They set up a
task in which the location of the stimulus on a target trial
could only be predicted by knowing where the stimulus
had appeared four (and sometimes more) trials previ-
ously. Confirming the results of their first experiment, no
evidence emerged that subjects could learn this long-
range contingency, even when presented with a massive
60,000 trials. Instead, subjects appeared to be able to
predict target location by reference only to the last one,
two, or three locations. Thus, asking subjects to report
entire rules risks falling foul of the Information Criterion.
2.7.5. Objections to prediction and recognition tests.
Given the tentative conclusion we have reached, namely,
that prediction tests do in general reveal savings and that
recognition tests so far have not yielded clear dissociations
from RT speedup, defenders of unconscious learning
might say that these tests are not truly tests of awareness.
In all probability, they might argue, subjects do not
"know" why they press certain keys in the prediction task;
perhaps their fingers just get pulled toward certain keys.
According to some of Lewicki et al.'s (1988, p. 33) sub-
jects, describing their RT performance, "their fingers
were doing the job by themselves." Perhaps this happens
as much for prediction as it does for the RT task. Similarly,
perhaps subjects say "old" in a recognition test not be-
cause they are aware that the test sequence was part of the
study sequence but because of perceptual fluency (see
Perruchet & Amorim 1992). As we have mentioned al-
ready, there is no inherent reason why any behavioral
measure should be influenced exclusively by conscious
processes. In the language of the subliminal perception
literature, maybe these tasks are not exclusive (Reingold
& Merikle 1988).
If the prediction and recognition tests are not pure
measures of awareness, then any conclusion based on
them - e.g., that supposedly unaware subjects are in fact
aware of the sequence - is called into question. But there
are at least three reasons to doubt that unconscious
processes do play a significant role. First, remember that
in the prediction task, a response is required that is
different from the one that was performed in the RT task.
In the prediction task subjects respond to the next stim-
ulus, whereas in the RT task they respond to the current
stimulus. So, if the claim that prediction responses are
under unconscious control is correct, subjects would
make erroneous responses on the prediction task. This
does not seem to be the case to any significant degree.
Second, if some unconscious process is contributing to
recognition performance, it seems that RTs should be
faster in the recognition test for sequences that were part
of the original sequence than for those that were not.
Perruchet and Amorim (1992) were unable to find any
evidence for this. Finally, Willingham et al. (1993) used
three different versions of the recognition task. In one,
subjects responded to the test sequences just as they had
in the study phase, and then gave recognition ratings.
Other subjects merely observed the stimulus sequence
prior to making a recognition judgment, and a third
subgroup saw the sequence presented in the form of the
digits 1-4 rather than in terms of screen locations. The
latter two procedures should rule out perceptual fluency
as the basis of judgments, yet Willingham et al. observed
no difference between the three tests. We believe this
strongly suggests that the recognition test is a genuine
measure of awareness of the sequence.
Of course, if the prediction task and recognition tests
cannot be treated as tests of awareness, we have no
recourse other than to examine the subject's verbal re-
ports as the only available index of explicit knowledge,
and this, we have argued, is unsatisfactory because it
precludes meeting the Sensitivity Criterion. Instead,
some authors have suggested that we should abandon the
narrow version of the dissociation paradigm that underlies
these implicit learning studies (see sect. 2.1) and try to
demonstrate qualitative differences between conscious
and unconscious learning. It could be argued that such a
difference would exist if the information that can be
expressed in performance (RTs) increases dramatically
across learning trials while the information available to
awareness only changes marginally. Awareness may not
have to be entirely absent. Thus, presumably, one might
say that subjects in the Willingham et al. (1989) experi-
ment were able to project more information in their RTs
than in their predictions (where the savings tended to be
only about 5%), and thus, even though prediction perfor-
mance was better than chance, this is still evidence for a
distinction between implicit and explicit learning. But
without measures of (1) the amount of information that is
transmitted when a subject shows an RT speedup of x
msec, and (2) the amount of information the subject is
transmitting when their prediction performance im-
proves by y%, it is very hard to assess such objections. We
have no model for how much information is being con-
veyed by these different measures (for discussion of the
same point, see Nelson 1978; Reingold & Merikle 1988).
It is exactly for this reason that one normally looks for
cases where awareness of some variable is absent but
performance is significantly affected by that variable,
because even if we have no formal description of informa-
tion, we know that a variable (which represents informa-
tion) is being conveyed in performance but not in reports.
For example, we would know that a variable such as the
predictability of a sequence is affecting RT but not re-
ports, and therefore RTs are conveying more information.
Thus it is impossible to invalidate the null hypothesis (that
performance and prediction convey the same amount of
information) unless something can be done to show that
more information is being conveyed in the implicit than in
the explicit measure.
2.7.6. Conclusions. Sequence-learning studies have used
prediction and recognition tasks as indices of awareness.
These tasks reproduce the stimulus context of the learn-
ing stage (hence addressing the Sensitivity Criterion), and
can be performed at above-chance levels, whether the
subjects' knowledge is of fragments or of the complete
sequence (hence meeting the Information Criterion).
However, contrary to claims that sequence learning is
unconscious, the results to date suggest that in most cases
subjects are aware of the relevant knowledge, and that
their knowledge consists of fragments of the training
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sequence. We believe that no convincing evidence of
implicit learning has yet emerged in sequential RT tasks;
nevertheless, this is a very promising field of research that
may in the future allow more positive conclusions.
3. Encoding instances versus inducing rules
In the introduction we raised two fundamental issues
concerning implicit learning: that of consciousness during
learning and the type of knowledge acquired. By crossing
these factors we obtain four hypothetical learning sys-
tems: unconscious instance/fragment learning, uncon-
scious rule learning, conscious instance/fragment learn-
ing, and conscious rule learning. This review has shown
that the evidence for unconscious learning of any sort is
highly questionable; we accordingly conclude that uncon-
scious learning is unsupported in general. It is time, then,
to turn to our second dimension for characterizing disso-
ciable learning systems, namely, the content of the ac-
quired knowledge, and to assess the rules versus in-
stances distinction within the domain of conscious,
explicit learning.
In the following discussion we use the term "implicit
learning tasks" to refer to the sorts of tasks reviewed in
section 2.
3.7. Evidence from studies of concept learning
Perhaps the most important conclusion from our discus-
sion so far is that performance in a variety of different tasks
can be well accounted for by reference to fragmentary
knowledge or knowledge of instances rather than to ab-
stract rules. In the present section we pursue this idea by
showing that to a large extent human performance in
more traditional concept-learning studies can also be well
understood in such terms. However, the concept learning
literature leads us also toward more compelling evidence
that people can genuinely learn rules. Thus we begin to
see a characteristic that does distinguish different learn-
ing systems: whether the knowledge acquired is of in-
stances or rules.
A view of concept learning that had been popular for
many years prior to the 1960s was that learning a concept
involves the acquisition of a rule specifying the features
necessary and sufficient for membership of that category.
However, when Rosch (1975) argued that for many natu-
ral categories it was impossible to specify the necessary
and sufficient features, and when Posner and Keele (1970)
showed that subjects could learn to classify random dot
patterns that had not been generated by deterministic
rules, research began to be dominated by the alternative
view that concepts are represented by prototypes. A
prototype is an abstraction from a set of training stimuli
that corresponds to their central tendency.
On the prototype view, category membership is deter-
mined simply by computing which of a series of stored
prototypes the test stimulus is closest to. As in the rule-
based account, in prototype theories the subject is as-
sumed to abstract something from the training stimuli and
not to retain information about those specific instances.
3.1.1. The role of instances. The view that the learning of a
concept could be based on little more than the encoding
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of the separate instances that fall under the concept began
to emerge in the late 1970s in the work of researchers such
as Lee Brooks and Douglas Medin. They observed that,
contrary to what would be expected on a prototype
account, subjects do appear to retain information about
training instances, in that studied instances can bias
subsequent classification decisions (e.g., Brooks 1978;
Homa et al. 1981; Malt 1989; Medin & Schaffer 1978). On
the basis of such findings, Medin and Schaffer (1978)
proposed that one component of a concept is simply a set
of memorized exemplars or instances.
Although Medin and Schaffer assumed that both in-
stance storage and prototype abstraction could occur
during the Teaming of a concept, subsequent studies have
shown that performance in a great many category-
learning studies can be understood in terms of instance
storage alone (for a historical review, see Medin & Florian
1992). We can illustrate the power of instance-storage
theories by considering the results of a study by Shin and
Nosofsky (1992), who examined category learning with
dot patterns. Shin and Nosofsky first performed a
multidimensional-scaling analysis on subjects'judgments
of pairwise similarity for the patterns, which yielded
coordinates in psychological space for each of the pat-
terns. Other subjects were then trained to classify some of
the patterns into three categories and, following that,
they were tested on their classification decisions for the
remaining patterns.
The instance view proposes that subjects memorize the
actual exemplars seen during training and base their
classifications on the similarity between a test item and
stored instances. Since Shin and Nosofsky knew the
psychological coordinates of all of the patterns, they were
able to compare subjects' decisions to test patterns with
the predictions of a model that assumed that classification
was determined solely by similarity to memorized in-
stances. They found a remarkable degree of concordance
between predicted and observed classifications, with over
95% of the variance in the observed classifications being
accounted for in a 1-parameter model. A prototype the-
ory, assuming that the training instances formed the basis
for an abstracted prototype, performed much more
poorly in predicting responses.
The implications of such results for implicit learning
cannot be overemphasized. The stimuli used in typical
categorization experiments are every bit as complex and
difficult to label verbally as are the stimuli used in
implicit learning experiments, so the powerful evidence
for instance storage that emerges from categorization
experiments should encourage us to take very seriously
the possibility that the encoding of instances is a major
factor in implicit learning experiments as well.
3.1.2. Evidence for rule induction. Despite the wealth of
evidence in favor of instance theories of concept learning,
we argue that it is also possible for people to classify
objects on the basis of a rule or hypothesis. As a partic-
ularly dramatic example, consider the evidence for a
difference between instance learning and rule learning in
the sexing of day-old chicks (Biederman & Shiffrar 1987).
It has been estimated that professional sexers, trained
with feedback on instances, require 2.4 months of solid
practice to reach 95% accuracy. However, naive subjects
trained on one simple rule immediately achieved 90%
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accuracy. Of course the simple rule misses the rare and
subtle exceptions that instance learning can provide, so
further accuracy gains will be difficult. On the other hand,
the initial difference in training time is immense.
Laboratory demonstrations of contrasts between rule
and instance learning have been provided in a number of
studies (e.g., Allen & Brooks 1991; Kemler Nelson 1984;
Nosofsky et al. 1989; Regehr & Brooks 1993; Smith &
Shapiro 1989; Ward & Scott 1987). Consider, for instance,
Nosofsky et al.'s (1989) Experiment 1. In this experiment,
the stimuli were semicircles with an interior radial line:
16 stimuli were constructed from the combination of four
sizes of semicircle (1 . . . 4) with four angles of inclination
of the radial line (1 . . . 4). In one condition, subjects
learned to classify three of the stimuli into category 1 and
four into category 2, and then were tested for their
transfer performance across the remaining nine stimuli.
The dependent measures were the overall probabilities
with which subjects placed each of the 16 stimuli into
categories 1 and 2.
Nosofsky et al. (1989) found that 97.9% of the variance
in these combined classification probabilities across sub-
jects could be accounted for by a quantitative model that
assumed that stored instances were the only basis on
which the decisions were made, an impressive fit that
confirms the conclusion of the Shin and Nosofsky (1992)
study. In addition, however, Nosofsky et al. compared
their model to several rule-based descriptions. Specifi-
cally, it would have been possible for subjects to learn the
categorization problem by inducing a rule for partitioning
the stimulus space into response regions. For instance,
one rule that would have correctly classified the training
stimuli was the rule: a stimulus is in category 2 if the value
of angle is 1, or the value of size is 1, or the value of angle
is 4; otherwise the stimulus is in category 1. Nosofsky et al.
constructed a variety of such set-theoretic rules, but
found that none of them fitted the overall classification
performance of the subjects nearly as well as their in-
stance model. From such data it would appear that sub-
jects rely on nothing more than stored representations of
the training items in classifying stimuli.
When they looked at the behavior of individual sub-
jects, however, Nosofsky et al. (1989, Experiment 1)
found that some subjects' classification responses con-
formed to patterns that were quite unlikely according to
an instance theory, and yet they matched fairly simple
rules. Thus, at the level of individual subjects, some
evidence for rule following rather than generalization to
stored instances did emerge. In their second experiment,
Nosofsky et al. chose two rules that could be used to
classify the stimuli accurately, and gave two different
groups of subjects explicit instructions to follow one of the
two rules in classifying the stimuli. Here, the instance
theory failed dramatically, accounting for only 82.4% and
40.9% of the variance in responses for the two groups. In
contrast, 99.5% and 93.6% of the variance in the subjects'
classifications in the two groups were accounted for by the
rules themselves. Similar results were obtained in their
Experiment 3, using a different set of stimuli. Thus, here
we have clear evidence that subjects are able to learn an
abstract rule and hence need not rely just on stored
instances.
An even more compelling demonstration of the inade-
quacy of pure instance storage comes from recognition
memory data that Nosofsky et al. collected during the test
phase of their experiments. Although in Experiment 1
subjects had no difficulty recognizing the old training
stimuli and discriminating them from new test stimuli,
when subjects were explicitly instructed to use a rule to
classify the stimuli in Experiment 2, no evidence
emerged that the subjects could remember which test
stimuli had been training stimuli. The implication of this
result is that these subjects had encoded nothing in the
training stage except the rule: they had not encoded any
of the instances. This remarkable finding shows that when
appropriate conditions are established, subjects can in-
deed learn an abstract rule from exposure to instances. Of
course, just because subjects had to be given rule-
following instructions in Nosofsky et al.'s studies before
they would actually engage in rule following does not
mean that this will always be necessary. In fact Nosofsky
et al.'s stimuli make rule following difficult in that the
stimuli do not readily lend themselves to verbal
descriptions.
Other compelling evidence for rule learning, from
tasks using more complex stimuli, has been reported by
Allen and Brooks (1991) and Regehr and Brooks (1993).
The rationale of the experiments was as follows: suppose
that subjects learn to classify stimuli in a situation where a
simple, perfectly predictive classification rule exists and
they are then tested on transfer items that vary in sim-
ilarity to the training stimuli. Observed behavior with the
transfer items can be of two contrasting types: (1) transfer
items similar to old items from the opposite category (bad
transfer items) may be classified as quickly and as accu-
rately as items similar to old items from the same category
(good transfer items), or (2) the bad transfer items may be
classified much less rapidly and accurately than the good
transfer items.
The first case above would be consistent with classifica-
tion being determined by the speeded application of a
rule. In this case all that matters is whether the rule
assigns the transfer item to one category or the other.
Whether the item is similar or not to a training instance,
and whether that instance was in the same or a different
category, should be immaterial. On the other hand, the
second outcome described above would be consistent
with categorization on the basis of similarity to training
instances, and there would be no need to cite a rule as
being part of the classification process.
Allen and Brooks (1991) and Regehr and Brooks (1993)
obtained evidence that both sorts of outcome can occur,
depending on the type of stimuli used and the precise
nature of the task. They trained subjects to classify ani-
mals into two categories. The animals varied in terms of
five binary-valued dimensions: body shape, spots, leg
length, neck length, and number of legs, but only three of
the dimensions were relevant. In some experiments sub-
jects were explicitly told the classification rule (e.g.,
category 1 is defined by the conjunction of long legs,
angular body, and spots). Evidence for rule learning - no
difference in latency or accuracy in classifying a new item
similar to a training item and in the same category versus a
new item similar to a training items but in the opposite
category - was related to a number of factors. For exam-
ple, rule learning was more likely to be the controlling
process when subjects were actually told the rule prior to
the task, although this was not a necessary condition. It
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also depended on the nature of the stimuli used: highly
individual stimuli tended to elicit instance-based rather
than rule-based classification, and stimuli composed of
interchangeable features tended to elicit more rule-based
classification behavior.
Additional factors that appear to determine the balance
between rule learning and instance learning have been
investigated. Smith and Shapiro (1989) found that rule
learning was less likely when subjects had to perform a
secondary task during the learning stage and when the
training stage was conducted as an incidental learning
task. Smith and Kemler Nelson (1984) found that rule
learning was less likely in a speeded than an unspeeded
learning task, and also that there seems to be a develop-
mental trend in rule learning: in situations where adults
classify according to a rule, children often do so on the
basis of similarity to training instances. In sum, laboratory
studies have established the reality of rule- or hypothesis-
based concept learning and have begun to identify the
circumstances that determine when it predominates.
3.2. Rule Induction from artificial grammars
In our earlier discussion of artificial grammar learning, we
suggested that performance could be well understood on
the assumption that subjects principally learn about
whole strings (instances) and about legal substrings. Al-
though some evidence for abstraction exists (e.g., Alt-
mann et al., in press), such a view denies that knowledge
of abstract grammatical rules plays a major part in perfor-
mance. However, when subjects are told prior to seeing
them that the strings are rule governed, and particularly if
they are taught something about finite state grammars
(Mathews et al. 1989; Reber et al. 1980), a pattern of
results rather different from that seen under normal
conditions occurs. Under these conditions, subjects ap-
pear to engage in a very explicit form of rule induction or
hypothesis testing that produces reportable rules. The
dissociation between performance and verbal reports
does not occur under these conditions.
Reber et al. (1980) extensively instructed subjects on
the nature of finite state grammars before, during, or after
presenting the training strings. When instruction oc-
curred before training, subjects performed well on the
grammaticality task but showed evidence of having
learned unrepresentative rules: rather than random er-
rors from guessing, their errors were consistent. Nonran-
,dom mistakes fit with the idea that subjects were trying
out various hypotheses in turn. At test time subjects will
have some hypothesis for evaluating test strings, but it
may be incorrect and therefore produce consistent errors.
Further supporting this claim, Reber et al. found that a
well-ordered presentation of training strings, making the
structure of the underlying grammar more salient, as-
sisted learning only in the case where the explicit instruc-
tions occurred early in training. The conclusion is that the
explicit instructions promote an explicit hypothesis test-
ing strategy, and that well-ordered string presentation
was particularly helpful for this learning strategy.
Mathews et al. (1989) found that the nature of the
grammar also affected subjects' ability to learn it via an
explicit strategy. Finite state grammars are difficult to
learn explicitly: instructions that promote hypothesis
testing but provide no information about the nature of
grammar rules, such as instructions to "find the rules," fail
to produce good learning (Perruchet & Pacteau 1990;
Reber et al. 1980). Indeed, Mathews et al. found that
subjects given such instructions learned no better than'
subjects given incidental learning instructions. Other
types of grammars, however, are easier to learn explicitly.
For example, subjects in Mathews et al.'s study readily
acquired a biconditional grammar in which strings con-
sisted of two sets of four letters, with three rules mapping
the letters between the sets. Mathews et al. observed far
superior learning in subjects instructed to search for rules
than in subjects given incidental learning instructions.
Moreover, in contrast to subjects given rule-searching
instructions, subjects given incidental instructions did
not acquire this grammar at all, a result that strongly
argues for the existence of independent learning systems.
How does explicit hypothesis testing differ from the
memory-based processing that is the norm in implicit
learning paradigms? Smith et al. (1992) compiled a set of
eight characteristics of rule following behavior. For exam-
ple, a defining feature is that rules ought to apply equally
well to familiar, unfamiliar, and abstract problems or
stimuli (as in Allen & Brooks 1991; Regehr & Brooks
1993). Smith et al. review numerous experiments that
demonstrate subjects following rules such as modus
ponens and the law of large numbers.
Turning to rule learning, Smith et al. point to subjects'
learning protocols and their ability to report intermediate
hypotheses as evidence for rule learning. Indeed, explicit
hypothesis testing presumes that the hypotheses are
conscious and reportable. Protocols indicate that generat-
ing and testing these hypotheses is a slow, labored, and
conscious process. Lea and Simon (1979) describe a gen-
eral framework for understanding the cognitive processes
involved. Hypothesis testing, they claim, is a form of
problem solving involving search through two problem
spaces: the space of hypotheses and the space of experi-
ments or instances to test hypotheses.
Studies of series completion, a task that is similar to
artificial grammar learning, provide a clear example of the
characteristics of the hypothesis-testing strategy (Ko-
tovsky & Simon 1979). In this task, subjects are shown a
single string of letters that contains a short repeating
pattern (e.g., MABMCD) and are asked to continue the
series. Their protocols clearly indicate that they cycle
through gathering evidence from the string and generat-
ing hypotheses to fit the data. In addition, subjects'
occasional mistakes are consistent with their last-
considered, but incorrect, hypothesis. They will then
produce consistent errors as did subjects in the grammar
learning studies (Reber et al. 1980). Finally, unusual
hypotheses are difficult to generate and therefore un-
likely to be discovered; this effect has been shown in
several hypothesis-testing paradigms (Bruner et al. 1956;
Klahr et al. 1990; Klayman & Ha 1989; Wason 1968). This
unsurprising effect may explain the difficulty observed in
getting subjects who are instructed to find the correct
grammar rules actually to do so. These rules may be
unusual enough that they are difficult for subjects to
generate without detailed instruction.
How is rule generation and evaluation performed in
this dual problem space? Lea and Simon (1979) offer
several alternatives. The simplest alternative is to refrain
from any feedback from the evaluation stage to the gener-
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ation stage except to signal rejection when a hypothesis is
disconfirmed by data. Rule generation is then essentially
blind to the detailed data of experiments or instances.
More sophisticated alternatives allow more information
from experiments or instances to inform the generation
process. In concept-formation tasks, Lea and Simon
found that different subjects' behaviors conformed to
different alternatives.
Protocols from Kotovsky and Simon's (1979) series-
completion task provide some indication of what alterna-
tives might underlie subjects' behaviors in implicit learn-
ing tasks. Kotovsky and Simon's protocols showed that
subjects examined the series and discovered periodicities
in the letters. Subjects then developed compact rules to
describe those periodicities. The explicit hypothesis-
testing strategy in grammar-learning experiments might
operate similarly. As subjects observe strings, they may
discover repetitive sequences. Subjects could then at-
tempt to learn those sequences and develop rewrite rules
to describe sequences of those sequences. Unfortunately,
we do not know of any protocol data that examine this
question.
To conclude, subjects performing explicit hypothesis
testing demonstrate in their protocols clear reports of
intermediate hypotheses and a relatively slow time course
of processing. These phenomena stand in contrast to the
obscure and superficial report and relatively fast time
course of processing found in protocols of subjects engaged
in typical implicit learning tasks. Though we have seen no
data, we predict that subjects' behavior in grammar-
learning experiments under explicit hypothesis-testing
instructions will more closely resemble Bruner et al.'s
(1956) and Kotovsky and Simon's (1979) subjects than
subjects working under implicit instructions.
It seems clear, then, that there are two separate learn-
ing strategies available to subjects, and that these strate-
gies can be invoked by differences in the instructions
given to subjects. The rule-induction strategy is charac-
terized by conscious effort to develop and evaluate hy-
potheses that are often unrepresentative of the actual
grammar. This strategy can be invoked by detailed in-
structions and it can be facilitated by sensibly ordered
examples. The "instance" strategy is invoked by instruc-
tions simply to memorize or observe the training strings,
and it does not seem to be affected by the presentation
order of training strings (Reber et al. 1980). Under this
strategy subjects encode the whole strings and their basic
features - such as pairs and triplets. Both strategies
appear to be conscious, but the contents of consciousness
vary. The rule-induction strategy trades in hypotheses
and is well characterized as problem solving, but the
instance strategy trades only in simpler data and seems
well characterized as memorization.
3.3. Models for implicit learning tasks
How do computational models fit with the results we have
discussed? We first consider the computations involved
and then turn to the issue of consciousness.
Artificial grammar research has provided the most
detailed analysis of what types of knowledge are acquired
during implicit learning tasks and what processes use
them at test time. There is memory for whole strings for
recognition and similarity judgments, and substring frag-
ments for piecemeal familiarity judgments. Distributed-
memory models in general and Parallel Distributed Pro-
cessing (PDP) models in particular are well suited to these
knowledge types and tasks. Networks are capable of
learning both types of knowledge simultaneously and in
the same set of weights. Dienes (1992) compared a variety
of distributed- and memory array models on a set of
grammar-learning data and found that an autoassociative
network using the delta rule for learning fit the data best.
The less competitive alternatives were connectionist
models using the Hebb rule, and three memory array
models.
The autoassociative network model consisted of a single
layer of units that were completely interconnected. Each
unit coded for one letter at a particular position in a string.
Accordingly, there were five units (one for each letter) for
each of six string positions. A variety of other local and
distributed encoding schemes were also tested, but no
great qualitative differences were found. The model was
trained on the set of 20 training strings shown to subjects,
and the delta rule (Widrow & Hoff 1960) was used to
change the weights until each training pattern could
reproduce itself over the input units. In one set of simula-
tions, the model was trained on each stimulus the same
number of times as were subjects. Each training trial,
therefore, was equivalent for subjects and for the model.
The model was tested on the grammaticality task by
requiring it to compute a response to each test string. If
the model could correctly reproduce the input with mini-
mal error, the response was called "grammatical." If the
model reproduced the input with a large error, the re-
sponse was called "ungrammatical."
The delta rule model produced a high level of perfor-
mance on the grammaticality test. It also produced the
same ratio of random errors to consistent errors as did
subjects. Critically, its ranking of the grammaticality of
the test strings correlated highly with subjects' rankings.
No other model could produce this correlation.
A somewhat similar account has been proposed for
sequence learning. Cleeremans and McClelland (1991)
developed a simple recurrent network model to simulate
their human sequence-learning data. Since much of the
benefit in reaction times during the sequence task is
presumed to come from predicting the next stimulus, the
model was designed to predict the next stimulus at each
point in the sequence. The input layer of the model
encoded one stimulus of a sequence at a time and used
one unit for each of the possible stimuli in the "grammar"
of stimulus sequences. As the model stepped through a
sequence, the input layer successively encoded each
stimulus in turn. At each step, activation from the input
layer was fed forward through the model to produce
activations in the output layer to represent the model's
prediction about the upcoming stimulus. During train-
ing, the weights between units were adjusted so as to
produce accurate predictions.
The model's behavior corresponded to the human data
in three ways. First, after training, the model performed
at the same level as subjects on the sequence task.
Second, the model learned at the same rate as subjects.
Cleeremans and McClelland drew a correspondence be-
tween single training trials for subjects and single training
trials for the model. The model matched subjects' perfor-
mance throughout the time course of training. Cleere-
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mans and McClelland divided knowledge of the grammar
into sets, depending on how many previous stimuli were
required to make accurate predictions at each point in a
sequence. Like subjects, the model first acquired knowl-
edge allowing it to predict correctly in cases where only
one previous stimulus was important. Both subjects and
the model then slowly acquired the longer, more complex
dependencies.
The third match between subjects and the model was
the length of delay between predicted stimuli and their
predicting context. Cleeremans and McClelland created
a grammar with a set of stimuli that intervened between a
predictive beginning stimulus and a predicted ending
stimulus (e.g., 15553 vs. 25554). For both subjects and the
model, only three intervening stimuli could be tolerated
before the initial stimulus was forgotten.
As discussed above, concept learning also often appears
to be mediated by the conscious memorization of in-
stances. Recently, PDP models have been developed to
simulate human results on these tasks as well (Gluck &
Bower 1988; Kruschke 1992; McClelland & Rumelhart
1985; Shanks & Gluck 1994). These models produce close
quantitative fits to a variety of concept identification,
classification, and recognition data. Like the other PDP
models, they learn in a memorization-like fashion by
encoding individual stimuli and modifying their weights
in response to each stimulus to process that stimulus
better.
What about more fragmentary information? Perruchet
and Pacteau (1990) found that subjects recognized fre-
quent bigrams better than infrequent bigrams. This re-
sult requires some representation of the frequency of
bigrams. An important feature of distributed memories
(Cleeremans & McClelland 1991; Dienes 1992) is that
they produce frequency statistics, in the form of strengths
of encodings, as a by-product of the memorization pro-
cess. Such a process has two good points: it does not
require any covert computations to produce useful knowl-
edge, and the computations it does require - memoriza-
tion - fit with subjects' reportable experience of the
training tasks.
These PDP models, therefore, capture a variety of
data from sequence-learning, grammar-learning, and
concept-learning tasks. Their details differ, but their basic
representational abilities and modes of processing are the
same. In this sense, they provide a unifying mechanism
for learning both whole item and fragment knowledge and
for simulating a wide range of cognitive phenomena from
conditioning to sequence and grammar learning. Cleere-
mans (1993b) discusses at length some of the correspon-
dences between human performance in implicit learning
tasks and the behavior of connectionist models.
These models do not, however, say anything about
consciousness. A standard idea in the psychological litera-
ture is to equate consciousness with the states of a pro-
cessor, rather than with the processes themselves. In a
PDP model, the states are the transitory activations of the
units. "We assume that responses and perhaps the con-
tents of perceptual experience depend on the temporal
integration of the pattern of activation over all of the
nodes" (McClelland & Rumelhart 1981, p. 381). In the
models of instance memorization, these activations en-
code the features of individual stimuli. There is no repre-
sentation within the models of rules or of the testing of
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hypotheses. These representations, therefore, fit well
with the idea that what subjects are doing in implicit
learning tasks is memorizing the stimuli.
The ability to generalize and perform above chance on a
grammaticality task arises from the fact that memorization
takes place in a distributed system, where every memory
contributes to every response. In a connectionist model
such as Dienes's (1992), memorization occurs when the
weights of the network are changed to encode a stimulus.
Similar stimuli produce similar weight changes that es-
tablish strong connections over time, whereas dissimilar
stimuli, or parts of stimuli, produce dissimilar weight
changes that wash out over time. In this way, the central
tendency and underlying structure of a set of stimuli is
slowly captured by the weights. In both the Dienes (1992)
and Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) models, the sys-
tem is fully "aware" of the stimulus on each trial. In the
latter model, the input layer encodes the stimulus one
letter at a time, and that letter is fully activated. The input
layer in Dienes's model encodes an entire string at once.
While the stimulus on each learning trial is fully regis-
tered, the weights of the network start out very weak and
slowly grow stronger with training, as knowledge is ac-
quired. The models say, therefore, that subjects are fully
aware of each stimulus, and that they slowly grow more
aware of the underlying structure of the stimulus set as
the weights grow stronger. But just as awareness of the
structure may be very limited early in training, so will the
extent to which that structure actually controls perfor-
mance: "awareness" and performance will be correlated.
In contrast, connectionist models do not fit well with
our understanding of the explicit hypothesis-testing strat-
egies also found in the grammar-learning literature (sect.
3.2). Lea and Simon (1979) describe a possible mecha-
nism, along the lines of the "general problem solver," to
perform hypothesis testing. This learning strategy is dif-
ferent enough from the memorization strategy in process
and results so that it is not surprising that it calls for a
different sort of mechanism to execute the hypothesis-
testing computations.
4. Learning and amnesia
In our evaluation of learning systems we have not consid-
ered at all the evidence from patients suffering from the
classic anterograde amnesic syndrome (Squire 1992). Be-
cause these patients are generally considered to suffer
from a learning or memory deficit, it is worth considering
briefly how the data from this population relate to the data
from normal subjects.
We know of no convincing data that would suggest that
amnesics are capable of unconscious learning. It is very
important to note that most studies have used episodic
memory tests and hence fail to meet our condition for
inferring unconscious learning from unconscious mem-
ory. For example, amnesic patients show normal or near-
normal responding to a previously conditioned stimulus
although they are apparently unable to recall the condi-
tioning episode (Weiskrantz & Warrington 1979). But this
is an example of case (2) rather than case (3) from section
2.3.1 (Fig. 1) and is therefore insufficient to establish that
learning had been unconscious: that is, subjects may have
been conscious of the reinforcement contingency but
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unable to remember the episode in which it was learned.
The amnesics, if asked, may well have been able to report
a conscious expectancy of the US (unconditioned stim-
ulus) given the CS.
It is true that a number of studies have shown that
amnesics, like normals, can sometimes acquire informa-
tion but be unable to report it verbally. Thus Nissen and
Bullemer (1987; see also Knopman 1991) found that
Korsakoff amnesic patients could speed up on a sequential
RT task but report neither the sequence nor awareness of
the existence of a sequence. However, as our discussion in
section 2 revealed, that subjects are unable to report
verbally some information they can otherwise be shown to
have learned does not prove that the learning was uncon-
scious, and this is as true for amnesics as it is for normal
subjects. Nissen and Bullemer did not use a prediction
test for conscious knowledge, and we know of no other
studies that have attempted to use more sensitive tests of
awareness.
This is not to imply that amnesics' poor performance on
explicit memory tests is due to the insensitivity of such
tests. On the contrary, this is unlikely to be the case
because compared to normals, amnesics appear to be
selectively impaired on explicit tests such as recognition
(but see Ostergaard, 1994, for a contrary view). For
example, Knowlton et al. (1992) reported that amnesics
can perform as well as normals in judging the gram-
maticality of new strings generated from an artificial
grammar while being very poor at recognizing the train-
ing strings. It is hard to see how such dissociations can be
explained by differences in sensitivity between the gram-
maticality and recognition tests, because in that case the
effect should be comparable for normals and amnesics.
Instead, the evidence suggests that amnesics have a
genuine problem with a certain class of memorial experi-
ence (i.e., episodic memory; see Humphreys et al. 1989,
for a relevant computational model). However, there is no
reason to believe that the problem involves awareness at
the time of learning, or more specifically that results from
amnesics provide any evidence for unconscious learning.
With respect to the learning of rules versus instances,
there seems little doubt that amnesics can perform well
(possibly at the same level as normals) in tasks that can be
mastered by learning instances or fragments. Thus, in
addition to Nissen and Bullemer's (1987) demonstration of
learning in a sequential RT task, Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
report of excellent artificial grammar learning in amnesics
suggests that instance or fragment learning is intact. In
contrast, evidence for genuine rule learning is sparse,
which is not surprising given the problems involved in
distinguishing instance from rule learning. Nevertheless,
there is some evidence of conscious rule learning in
amnesia. For example, Wood et al. (1982) report that
although amnesics have some difficulty learning the Fi-
bonacci rule, they are able to do so.
5. Summary
A variety of strategies have been used to assess, more or
less directly, the content of a subjects awareness during a
learning episode. Evidence for implicit learning would
come from (1) demonstrations of learning with subliminal
stimuli, and (2) dissociations between task performance
and measures of awareness such as verbal reports. The
latter dissociations appear at first sight to provide evi-
dence for implicit learning, because the inability to report
the relevant stimulus relationship licenses the inference
that learning may have occurred without awareness.
We have argued that there is little convincing evidence
of learning with subliminal stimuli. On the other hand,
with respect to the unconscious learning of stimulus
relationships, we have documented a number of dissocia-
tions between performance and reports. There are none-
theless two reasons to question whether they establish
implicit learning. First, there may be a relatively uninter-
esting explanation of such dissociations, stemming from
the experimenter's failure to address the Information
Criterion. If learning involves the acquisition of informa-
tion /, but the experimenter is focusing on information /*,
then subjects may appear to be unaware of the relevant
knowledge when in fact they are aware of it. Second, if the
test of reportable knowledge fails to meet the Sensitivity
Criterion, it is impossible to know whether a dissociation
is genuine or merely reflects inadequate sensitivity to
conscious information in the awareness test. Our review
suggests that when attempts are made to use sensitive
tests, dissociations do not emerge. Finally, if one is
unprepared to accept recognition or prediction tests as
measures of conscious knowledge, then it is difficult to see
how the Sensitivity Criterion can ever be met. It is simply
a fact of life that tests of verbal recall tend to be less
sensitive to small amounts of knowledge than other be-
havioral measures. Perhaps alternatives to the simple
dissociation logic adopted in almost all experimental tests
of unconscious learning need to be explored, as they have
in studies of unconscious perception (Reingold & Merikle
1988).
Our evaluation of the results that have emerged is
similar to Holender's (1986) conclusion in this journal
concerning unconscious semantic activation. Although
there are some interesting pieces of evidence, a cautious
approach would suggest that unconscious learning has not
yet been satisfactorily established. Instead, there is sub-
stantial evidence for more than one conscious learning
strategy and knowledge type. People certainly can learn
and use rules, and they can also memorize instances and
fragments. Researchers have begun to identify the factors
(e.g., study time, stimulus properties) that are conducive
to rule learning and instance learning.
Proponents of implicit learning, which is hypothesized
to involve the unconscious learning of rules, have failed to
demonstrate that it accurately describes a class of human
learning abilities. On the contrary, human learning is
almost invariably accompanied by conscious awareness,
and in tasks such as artificial grammar learning, where
learning is frequently thought to involve rule abstraction,
performance is most often based on the acquisition of
instances or fragments from the training stage.
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NOTES
1. The mere exposure effect may provide a paradoxical exam-
ple of how instructions that seem to encourage the subject to
rely on available conscious knowledge can result in their doing
so to a lesser degree than instructions for a performance task.
Several well-known studies (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980;
see Bornstein 1992, for a review) have given subjects very brief
presentations of geometrical figures prior to testing them with
pairs of stimuli consisting of one old and one new figure. For
each pair, the subjects had to indicate which one was old and
which one was preferred. Results indicate that subjects will
choose the old stimulus for their preference judgment although
their ability to discriminate old from new stimuli in the recogni-
tion test is at or close to chance. On the face of it, this provides a
powerful dissociation between results obtained from closely
matched performance (preference) and awareness (recognition)
tests. Ignoring the possibility that the procedure may fail to
meet the requirement for inferring unconscious learning from
unconscious memory (sect. 2.3.1), we suggest that the result is
still not evidence for unconscious learning because, relative to
the preference test, the recognition test may encourage subjects
to discount deliberately a conscious source of information (viz.,
stimulus familiarity), because they know that familiarity can be a
poor index of whether a stimulus has recently been seen.
Evidence for this interpretation comes from a recent experi-
ment by Merikle and Reingold (1991), who found that as testing
continued, the recognition test gradually became more sensi-
tive to the old/new distinction than the preference test (i.e.,
hypermnesia occurred). This result is consistent with the idea
that subjects began to rely on familiarity in making their recog-
nition judgments because they realized that when they dis-
counted it, they had no other cues on which to base their
recognition decision.
2. A possible empirical way to determine whether uncon-
scious influences do play a role would be to adopt Jacoby's (1991)
process dissociation technique of asking subjects to provide
letter continuations but to avoid any continuation that they had
seen in the study phase. If some studied continuations were
given, that would indicate the presence of unconscious in-
fluences.
3. The prediction task bears a striking but presumably unin-
tentional resemblance to the task used by the parapsychologist
Schmidt (1969) in his tests of precognition. In Schmidt's experi-
ments, target selection on each trial was determined by random
particle emission from a strontium-90 source, yet subjects were
apparently able to predict at better-than-chance levels where
each target would appear! In our discussion of data from the
prediction task, we ignore the rather distressing possibility that
subjects' performance may be influenced by such precognitive
abilities.
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Is learning during anaesthesia implicit?
Jackie Andrade
Medical Research Council Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge CB2 2EF,
England; jackie.andrade@mrc-apu.cam.ac.uk
Shanks & St. John (S&S) argue that learning during clinically
adequate anaesthesia will be implicit, since the patient will be
rendered unconscious by the anaesthetic. Unfortunately, this is
not necessarily the case: adequate anaesthesia ensures that the
patient will have no explicit memory for intraoperative events,
but there is evidence that amnesia sets in prior to the abolition of
awareness. For example, Andrade et ail. (in press) assessed
cognitive function in anaesthetised volunteers. They found that
there was a dose at which subjects were still able to respond (by
raising their arm) to target exemplars in a categorisation task or
repeated words in a working memory test and yet scored at
chance on a subsequent forced-choice recognition test for infor-
mation presented during anaesthesia. It is therefore possible, at
least in principle, for someone to be conscious during surgery
and yet not remember being so on recovery.
Levels of arousal vary considerably during an operation,
according to the ongoing surgical procedure, but there is not yet
a reliable method for monitoring these changes, let alone for
determining whether a given level of arousal is accompanied by
awareness. The use of neuromuscular blockers to relax patients
means that the traditional clinical signs, such as changes in
breathing or muscle tone, are no longer effective for detecting
fluctuations in arousal. The problem of detecting awareness is
highlighted in a recent paper by Moerman et al. (1993). They
investigated a number of cases in which patients had explicit
recall of intraoperative events. Experienced anaesthetists could
not reliably distinguish the anaesthetic records of these aware
patients from the records of patients who had remained uncon-
scious throughout surgery.
Research using Turnstall's (1977) isolated forearm technique
suggests that up to 44% of surgical patients may experience
some intraoperative awareness (Russell 1986). This technique
involves tying a cuff around the patient's arm at the time of
injection of the neuromuscular blocker so that the arm remains
free to move. Patients are assumed to be aware if they raise that
arm in response to a command to do so. This task meets S&S's
Information Criterion, since patients are responding to the
stimulus itself and not just to one (possibly irrelevant) aspect of
it. The stumbling block is that anaesthesia - like drunkenness or
sleepiness - reduced motivation, so there are cases where
patients have reported, on recovery, that they were aware
during anaesthesia but could not be bothered to let anyone know
(Parkhouse 1960). Russell (1989) even reports a case in which the
patient said she was aware of the commands but wanted to play a
game with the anaesthetist by doing the exact opposite of what
she was commanded. The isolated forearm technique therefore
fails to meet the Sensitivity Criterion.
Another approach to monitoring awareness during an-
aesthesia is to record EEG (electroencephalogram) responses to
auditory stimulation, and to infer changing levels of awareness
from changes in the pattern of this evoked responding. One
measure of evoked responding that may prove useful for mon-
itoring awareness is known as "coherent frequency" (see
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Munglani et al. 1993). The coherent frequency of the auditory
evoked response represents the frequency of auditory stimula-
tion that elicits the maximal response in the EEG. In the
aforementioned study by Andrade et al. (in press), changes in
the coherent frequency correlated highly with changes in cogni-
tive performance brought about by varying the dose of anaesthe-
tic administered. Assuming that awareness is a function of
cognition, this is preliminary evidence that this measure of
auditory-evoked responding can be used to predict changes in
awareness.
However, it is a big step from measuring fluctuations in
awareness to determining the point at which awareness ceases.
EEG measures indicate a gradually declining level of awareness
as anaesthesia progresses, yet there is presumably a precise
point at which consciousness of a particular stimulus ceases. To
quote a colleague, the crux of the problem is that "we don't have
ear-lids" - loss of awareness of visual stimuli may occur when
patients can no longer open their eyes, but the persistence of the
auditory-evoked response suggests that at least a low level of
auditory processing continues throughout anaesthesia. Defining
the point at which patients lose awareness of auditory stimuli is
therefore a far trickier problem.
Most studies of implicit memory for intraoperative events
have not monitored awareness at all. Had they done so, one of
two possible conclusions might prevail: either learning may
occur regardless of the level of awareness, suggesting that
awareness is not important for the sort of learning assessed by
implicit memory tests in these studies, or learning may be
observed only when awareness reaches a certain level. A recent
study by Schwender et al. (1992) supports the latter position.
They found that when the early cortical component of the
auditory-evoked response was preserved, 5 out of 10 patients
showed evidence of implicit memory for a story played to them
during surgery, whereas only 2 out of 20 did so when the early
cortical component was abolished.
To conclude, monitors of awareness during anaesthesia are
currently being developed, and there is some evidence to
suggest that subjects learn information only when their level of
awareness is above a certain point. However, there is not yet a
reliable way of determining whether a patient is aware of a
particular stimulus. Since this is crucial to the current debate,
implicit memory for intraoperative events cannot be taken as
evidence for implicit learning.
Awareness inflated, evaluative conditioning
underestimated
Frank Baeyens, Jan De Houwer, and Paul Eelen
Department of Psychology, University of Leuven, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium;
fpaas21 @blekul 11.earn, bitnet
Even though a broadly accepted operational definition of aware-
ness does not exist, Shanks & St. John (S&S) do not even attempt
to formulate explicitly their own working definition. However,
the claim that there is no convincing evidence for unconscious
learning is mainly due to S&S's implicit conception of aware-
ness, and more particularly, a consequence of their interpreta-
tion of the Sensitivity Criterion. Throughout the paper, S&S
argue against reliance on verbal reporting as a valid awareness
index. They propose other behavior indices, such as sequential
letter dependencies (SLD) tasks (for artificial grammar learning)
or prediction tasks (for serial reaction-time studies) as more
exhaustive and sensitive assessment tools. S&S would like us to
accept that any verbal or nonverbal behavior which might
reasonably be thought of as reflecting a judgement based on a
belief-that-X should be treated as an index of awareness-of-X.
However, no formal criteria are provided to determine whether
or not a particular behavior can "reasonably" be considered a
judgement based on a belief-that-X.
This approach is troublesome, because in the limit the dis-
tinction between aware/unaware knowledge becomes meaning-
less. Consider the following study by Baeyens et al. (1993).
While performing a distraction task, Ss were first exposed to a
covariation between a subtle difference in the line-thickness (A)
(thick/thin) of geometric figures and the valence (B) (posi-
tive/negative) of subsequently presented slides. Next, Ss evalu-
ated a series of stimuli which differed in line-thickness. Ss (1)
were not able to report the crucial A-B covariation, not even
when explicitly instructed to search for it; (2) performed at
chance level on a recognition questionnaire, (3) but demon-
strated having acquired some knowledge about the crucial
covariation, as evidenced by the evaluative ratings of the test-
stimuli. Given (1), (2), and (3), we inferred learning without
awareness. S&S might argue that awareness tests (1) and (2) are
insensitive in relying on verbal reporting, and that an assess-
ment of awareness type prediction test could reveal awareness
which would otherwise be undetected. The results obtained in
Experiment 3 (Baeyens et al. 1993) are of crucial importance in
this respect. After the acquisition phase, Ss were led to believe
that either a positive or a negative picture would be presented
subliminally following the thick/thin line slides. Actually, the
positive and negative pictures were never shown. Ss were
required to indicate on each trial whether they believed they
had seen the positive or the negative slide. This test was
conceptualized as a (valence-free)- implicit knowledge test, and
Ss actually performed better than at chance. However, accord-
ing to the S&S criteria, these same data could equally well be
interpreted as demonstrating awareness of the covariation, since
judgements (or predictions) "must be based on conscious ex-
pectancies"! Apparently, S&S tend to equate a theoretical con-
struct - such as "expectancy" - which might be invoked to
explain performance, with the phenomenological experience of
"having a conscious expectancy."
We should add that S&S are aware of this type of problem, but
their arguments against the idea of prediction/SLD tasks being
influenced by unaware knowledge are not at all convincing. For
example, in the context of serial reaction tasks, they depend on a
very narrow concept of the content-of-Iearning, namely, specific
motor responses, rather than, for example, the spatiotemporal
organisation of the stimuli. We do not see any compelling reason
to accept this interpretation.
That the evidence for implicit learning apparently disappears
in these examples is due to a conception of awareness which
departs strongly from the standard conception, grounded in
phenomenology. As long as one believes it is useful to distin-
guish between learning with or without awareness, one cannot
but accept that the ultimate criterion for (un)awareness-of-X is
the presence (or absence) at t2 of a phenomenal state of having-
the-subjective-impression-to-consciously-know-that-X or have-
noticed-X at tv This state should be evidenced by (1) a correct
verbal statement at tl of X (recall) or by an endorsement at t2 of a
statement expressing X (recognition), whereby (2) subjects indi-
cate they are not merely guessing, and (3) the statement X is
about the state-of-affairs experienced at tl. In addition, (4) t2
should be as close in time as possible to (,, and (5) the perfor-
mance and the awareness test should be as similar as possible in
terms of retrieval context. It should be noted that this set of
formal criteria is in line with Merikle and Cheesman's (1986)
emphasis on phenomenal experience as the ultimate ground to
distinguish between perception with or without awareness.
When this set of criteria is applied, for example, to the results
obtained in evaluative conditioning, the evidence of unaware
evaluative learning is substantial. S&S's claim that "unconscious
evaluative learning has not yet been adequately established,"
however, arises not only from their inflated awareness concept,
but also from a somewhat flawed presentation of the actual data.
First, S&S present a strange interpretation of the results of the
Baeyens etal. (1990a) study. Namely, S&S agree that concurrent
awareness measurement (CAM) is technically impossible with-
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out creating/manipulating awareness. Next, however, the very
fact that CAM resulted in the majority of Ss becoming aware of
the CS-US contingencies is used to demonstrate that the recog-
nition questionnaire did not meet the Sensitivity Criterion!
Also, the nonsignificant result for the concurrently unaware
pairs may not be surprising, given the very limited number of
data available for this comparison. The important observation in
this study was that evaluative conditioning was not influenced
by the absence or presence of CAM, while this same manipula-
tion resulted in low versus the creation of high awareness. This
argues for the orthogonality of evaluative conditioning and
explicit learning of contingencies.
Second, S&S consider the results of the Baeyens et al. (1992)
study as an instance of association rather than dissociation
between awareness and learning. However, they only tell part of
the story. Increasing the number of conditioning trials indeed,
resulted - at least in the 2/5/10 trial range - in an increase in
awareness and in conditioning, but the absence of any correla-
tion between level of awareness in a S and level of conditioning
(over the levels of the number of acquisition trials) also sug-
gested that the increase in awareness and conditioning were not
necessarily located in the same Ss. Also, a dissociation was
observed between conditioned valence shifts and awareness
when proceeding from 10 to 20 acquisition trials: whereas
awareness continued to increase from 10 to 20 trials, condition-
ing actually decreased. Similar dissociations were observed in
Baeyens et al. (1989), in which it was demonstrated that percep-
tual CS-US similarity enhanced awareness but not evaluative
shifts; and in an evaluative flavor conditioning study (Baeyens et
al. 1990b) in which we observed that when a flavor-CS was
correlated with a highly aversive US-flavor, none of the Ss
demonstrated contingency awareness (recognition test), but
they did evidence clear conditioning. When a color-CS was
used, however, a substantial number of Ss were contingency-
aware, but no conditioning was observed. All these findings are
instances in which evaluative learning and awareness clearly did
not "proceed in tandem," but related in an orthogonal manner.
Third, S&S do not discuss evaluative conditioning studies in
which the US, but not the CS, was presented subliminally (De
Houwer et al. (1994); Krosnick et al. 1992; Niedenthal 1990).
The power of these studies is that it appears to be extremely
unlikely that to not-subjectively-experienced USs might ever
support the conscious detection of a systematic relation be-
tween US and CS. Nevertheless, reliable evaluative condition-
ing has been demonstrated under these degraded input
conditions.
We should finally stress that it is not the demonstration of
unaware learning per se but further evidence for functional
differences between instances of conscious or unconscious
learning that will be necessary to substantiate the claim that
research concerning the conscious/unconscious distinction in-
volves more than a naive fascination for a causally noneffective
dichotomy (Merikle & Reingold 1992).
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A step too far?
Dianne C. Berry
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United Kingdom; sxsberry@readingac.uk.
To start my commentary on a positive note, Shanks & St. John
(S&S) suggest that we need to be cautious when accepting
evidence in favour of implicit (or unconscious) learning. They
posit two criteria which they argue need to be applied when
considering studies in this area. This is a useful step forward as it
is clear that a number of studies that have commonly been cited
as evidence in favour of implicit learning would fail the authors'
Information Criterion and Sensitivity Criterion. However, I
believe that S&S go a step too far in their rejection of the
evidence. I have four main objections to their treatment of the
evidence.
1. Conscious processing as a default assumption. S&S adopt
the position that unless researchers can prove conclusively that
learning is unconscious then we should assume that it is con-
scious. However, they never justify why conscious processing
should be the default assumption. Not all researchers would
accept this position. Reber (1990), for example, has argued
strongly for the primacy of the implicit. This default assumption
gives rise to the following three objections.
2. "If In doubt throw It out." In reviewing the evidence, S&S
seem to adopt the (implicit or explicit) rule of "if in doubt throw
it out." In line with this, they seem to apply a different criterion
in discussing studies claiming to provide evidence in favour of
implicit learning and studies purporting to provide evidence
against it. For example, in considering Perruchet and Pacteau's
(1990) artificial grammar learning study (sect. 2.5.1), S&S do not
mention Perruchet and Pacteau's failure to use an appropriate
control group, nor the other criticisms of this study raised by
Reber (1990) and Mathews (1990). Similarly, in discussing Per-
ruchet and Amorim's (1992) sequence learning study (sect.
2.7.3), S&S point out that the researchers did not divide
subjects into aware and unaware groups, but they still go on to
accept Perruchet and Amorim's conclusions. However, in dis-
cussing the sequence learning study by Stadler (1989), which
could be interpreted as providing evidence in favour of implicit
learning, the authors mention a possible problem with Stadler's
procedure and conclude that "readers should not interpret these
results . . . as convincing evidence for learning without aware-
ness" (sect. 2.7.2).
3. Selective sampling of experimental evidence. Clearly S&S
could not hope to review all relevant implicit learning studies.
However, in places I felt that they had ignored some studies that
were particularly relevant to their arguments. For example,
after discussing Berry and Broadbent's (1984) study with the
sugar production and person interaction tasks (sect. 2.6.2), they
state that a detailed examination by Sanderson (1989) found
evidence of associations rather than dissociations between per-
formance and reports. However, Sanderson's work was based on
a very different task (Broadbent's city transport task). S&S do not
describe the findings of the more relevant Stanley et al. (1989)
study, which used the same tasks as Berry and Broadbent.
Stanley et al. also found evidence of verbalisable knowledge
increasing with extensive practice, but they still found a signifi-
cant dissociation between task performance and verbalisable
knowledge. Failure to report the Stanley et al. findings is even
stranger because S&S go on to state that "one alternative
strategy [to questionnaires] would be to ask each subject to
instruct a yoked "partner" in how to perform the task. . . . Such
procedures have been used with other learning procedures
(e.g., Mathews et al., 1989, for grammar learning) and have
proven highly sensitive." But this is just the procedure used by
Stanley et al.
On a related note, S&S refer to "questions about possible
structural rules underlying the task" in discussing Berry and
Broadbent's (1984) type questionnaires. Although I agree that
these questionnaires might not pass S&S's Sensitivity Criterion,
the questions do not ask about possible structural rules. Given a
certain history of responses, they ask subjects either to predict
the next value of the output variable or to state which level of the
input variable would be needed to bring the output level to
target (i.e., in line with what subjects have to do when control-
ling the tasks). Furthermore, even if we accept S&S's argument
that these questions would not be expected to elicit the relevant
S-R knowledge, why were subjects not able to report the
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knowledge (until they had received 570 trials of practice) using
Stanley et al.'s (1989) teachback procedure?
4. Knowledge Is assumed to be explicit even when this has not
been tested. Throughout the target article the authors assume
that certain types of knowledge are likely to be explicit, even
when this has not been tested. Hence, in discussing the Alt-
mann et al. (in press) finding of transfer from letter strings to
musical tones (sect. 2.5.3), S&S suggest that "it is quite possible
that subjects, if asked, would be able to report such simple
regularities. " Similarly, in discussing Willingham et al.'s (1989)
sequence-learning experiment (sect. 2.7.1), S&S state that "this
is information they may, if asked, have been able to report."
Although these statements are qualified, S&S subsequently
distinguish between unconscious learning of fragments and
instances and unconscious rule learning, and they argue that
"this review has shown that evidence for unconscious learning of
any sort is highly questionable" (sect. 3). The problem is that it is
not really valid to draw a conclusion about unconscious learning
of instances and fragments because in most studies the aware-
ness issue has simply not been addressed.
5. A final note. Taking these four objections together, it could
be argued that S&S are too premature in concluding that
"human learning is almost invariably accompanied by conscious
awareness." It could also be argued, however, that they have
focused too closely on the issue of conscious awareness. Many
proponents of implicit learning do not equate the term with
unconscious learning (e.g., Berry, 1994; Berry & Dienes 1993;
Mathews et al. 1989). Rather, they argue that implicitly and
explicitly acquired knowledge might be better distinguished on
other grounds, for example, by looking at whether they have
different properties of storage and retrieval. It is a pity that
Shanks & St. John did not devote more of their article to
considering attempts to establish other qualitative differences
between implicit and explicit learning.
Are subliminal mere exposure effects a form
of implicit learning?
Robert F. Bornstein
Department of Psychology, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA 17325;
bbornste@gettysburg.edu
Although Shanks & St. John's (S&S's) review of the implicit
learning literature includes extensive discussions of research on
Pavlovian conditioning, artificial grammar learning, instrumen-
tal learning, and learning and awareness in serial reaction time
tasks, it devotes virtually no attention to studies of stimuli
perceived without awareness. In fact, early in their analysis of
the implicit learning literature (sect. 2.2), S&S assert that
"although there have been some positive results [in studies of
perception without awareness], a corresponding number of
negative findings leads us to suggest that unconscious learning
with subliminal stimuli has not yet been conclusively
demonstrated."
S&S's assertion is certainly correct with respect to certain
areas of subliminal perception research (see Bornstein 1989b).
However, their statement is clearly incorrect with respect to at
least one area of research in this domain. Specifically, studies of
Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc's (1980) subliminal mere exposure
(SME) effect (i.e., subjects' increase in liking for stimuli that
have been repeatedly exposed for very brief durations, but that
cannot be recognized or discriminated from other briefly pre-
sented stimuli at better-than-chance levels) have produced
robust, replicable results (see Bornstein 1992). SME experi-
ments provide compelling evidence for the existence of percep-
tion without awareness, both within the context of traditional
dissociation models of unconscious perception (Erdelyi 1985)
and within the context of Reingold and Merikle's (1988) more
recent direct/indirect framework.
The purpose of this commentary is to discuss research on
SME effects, focusing on S&S's assertion that SME effects do
not represent an example of implicit learning. In the following
I will (1) discuss studies demonstrating that SME effects
are robust and reliable; (2) review studies demonstrating that
SME effects influence subjects' affective, cognitive, and behav-
ioral responses; (3) describe recent findings indicating that SME
effects can last for up to one week; and (4) note the methodologi-
cal limitations in SME studies that do not permit us to conclude
unequivocally that SME effects are an example of implicit
learning.
SME effects are robust and reliable. To date, there have been
more than a dozen published experiments demonstrating that
stimuli perceived without awareness produce robust mere expo-
sure effects (see Bornstein 1992, Table 1, for a summary of these
results). Although the majority of these investigations used
simple geometric stimuli (e.g., Mandler et al. 1987), at least one
study (Bornstein et al. 1987) has obtained SME effects with
more naturalistic social stimuli (i.e., photographs of college
students). Not only do stimuli perceived without awareness
produce robust exposure effects, but recent meta-analytic re-
views and laboratory studies have demonstrated that the magni-
tude of the exposure effect produced by stimuli perceived
without awareness actually exceeds the magnitude of the expo-
sure effect produced by stimuli that are recognized by subjects
at better-than-chance levels (see Bornstein 1992 for a detailed
discussion of these findings).
SME effects Influence affective, cognitive, and behavioral re-
sponses. Although Zajonc's (1968) initial conceptualization of
the mere exposure effect focused exclusively on affective re-
sponses to repeated, unreinforced stimulus exposures, evi-
dence collected during the past two decades indicates that mere
exposure effects may also influence subjects' behavioral and
cognitive responses. With respect to behavior, at least one study
(Bornstein et al. 1987, Experiment 3) has demonstrated that
repeated subliminal exposure to a photograph of a college-age
student influenced subjects' behavioral responses to that stu-
dent when the student was later encountered in a laboratory
negotiation task. With respect to cognition, several studies
(e.g., Mandler et al. 1987) have demonstrated that repeated
subliminal exposure to a stimulus influences subjects' cognitive
evaluations of that stimulus. Clearly, SME effects influence
subjects' reactions to a stimulus on a variety of rating
dimensions.
SME effects are relatively long lasting. Most SME experiments
assess subjects' reactions to a stimulus after only a brief period of
delay between stimulus exposures and ratings (Bornstein
1989a). One experiment, however, (Seamon et al. 1983b) as-
sessed systematically the effect of delay between exposures and
ratings on the magnitude of the exposure effect. Seamon et al.
examined affect ratings of briefly presented polygon stimuli
collected immediately after stimulus exposures, one day later,
or one week later. Not only did Seamon et al. find that SME
effects persisted for one week following stimulus exposures, but
these researchers actually found a slight increase in subjects'
affect ratings of merely exposed stimuli between the one-day
and one-week delay periods. This result dovetails with recent
meta-analytic findings demonstrating that there is a positive
relationship between the amount of delay between stimulus
exposures and ratings and the magnitude of the exposure effect
(see Bornstein 1989a, Table 6).
Are SME effects a form of Implicit learning? Although SME
effects are robust and reliable, affect a variety of outcome
measures\ and last for up to one week following stimulus
exposures, it does not necessarily follow that they are a form of
implicit learning. Such a conclusion would require researchers
to demonstrate that subjects' responses to merely exposed
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subliminal stimuli generalize to other, similar stimuli that are
encountered at some later date (see Reber 1969; 1989a). Unfor-
tunately, such a study has never been conducted. To be sure,
there is ample evidence that supraliminal mere exposure effects
generalize to other similar stimuli, and that these effects have
many of the characteristics of implicit learning (see Gordon &
Holyoak 1983). However, until a mere exposure effect experi-
ment such as that conducted by Gordon and Holyoak with
supraliminal stimuli is conducted using subliminal stimuli, it
will be impossible to draw firm conclusions regarding the
generalization of SME effects to other related stimuli. Until
such a study is conducted, researchers will not be able to
determine whether SME effects fulfill the criteria required to
demonstrate the existence of implicit learning effects.
Conclusion. S&S argued that studies of perception without
awareness do not provide evidence for unconscious learning
because these experiments have been difficult to replicate and
have never provided evidence that stimuli perceived without
awareness produce measurable effects on behavior (sect. 2.2). A
review of the literature on SME effects suggests that these
conclusions are unwarranted. Although SME effects have not
yet been used to demonstrate implicit learning effects, the SME
paradigm has the potential to provide important information
regarding this issue. Thus, it would be premature and counter-
productive to ignore the SME paradigm as a tool for studying
implicit learning. SME experiments might well prove useful in
increasing our knowledge regarding the parameters of implicit
learning phenomena while simultaneously providing important
information regarding the range of affective, cognitive, and
behavioral effects produced by stimuli perceived without
awareness.
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Of what are we aware?
Nathan Brody and Michael J. Crowley
Department of Psychology, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT 06459
Shanks & St. John's (S&S's) target article persuasively demon-
strates the power and importance of the Sensitivity Criterion as
a test for determining the nature of a subject's conscious experi-
ences. We recently completed a study that illustrates the impor-
tance of the Sensitivity Criterion.
In our study, Ss were presented with a standard artificial
grammar learning experiment. In addition to the usual proce-
dures, Ss were asked to respond to a grammatical knowledge
questionnaire that included a variety of questions about their
knowledge of the rules of the grammar, including questions
about abstract features of the grammar such as the rules govern-
ing recursions as well as knowledge about permissible letter
sequences. Ss were assigned to conditions in which their knowl-
edge of the grammar was assessed before or after performing the
standard grammatical classification task.
We obtained the following results: (1) Ss demonstrated ex-
plicit grammatical knowledge on the questionnaire. Ss had a
mean score on the grammatical questionnaire that was 2.48
standard deviations higher than the mean of a control group that
had not been exposed to the grammatical strings. The mean
score of the experimental group on the grammatical classifica-
tion task was 2.19 standard deviations higher than the mean of
the control group. (2) The correlation between performance on
the grammatical knowledge questionnaire and the grammatical
classification task was .54. The test retest reliability obtained by
correlating scores for the two different random orders of the
same items in the grammatical classification task was .58. (3)
Whether Ss responded to the questionnaire before or after
performing the classification task did not influence their classifi-
cation performance.
These results demonstrate that Ss acquire explicit knowledge
from exposure to grammatical strings and individual differences
in the amount of knowledge acquired are related to performance
on the grammatical classification task. More generally, these
data illustrate the power of the Sensitivity Criterion and indicate
that what Ss are aware of may be a function of the way in which
awareness is assessed.
Methods of assessing awareness may induce awareness that
was not previously present. The awareness of the explicit rules
of the grammar that is demonstrated in the grammatical ques-
tionnaire in our study may or may not have been present at the
initial exposure to the grammatical strings and may have been
induced by the act of filling out the questionnaire itself.
Methods of assessing awareness may obscure a subject's
knowledge. Consider the typical findings of studies demonstrat-
ing preferences for previously encountered geometric stimuli
that Ss do not know they have encountered (Seamon et al. 1983a;
1983b). In these studies, Ss are tachistoscopically exposed to
geometrically similar stimuli. They are then asked to discrimi-
nate between previously presented stimuli and new stimuli. If
the conditions of viewing are properly arranged, Ss will demon-
strate chance levels of performance on the discrimination task. If
they are asked to choose which of a pair of old and new stimuli
they like, they will prefer the previously encountered stimuli.
Discrimination by preference occurs as long as one week after
the initial presentation of the stimuli, when Ss' ability to dis-
criminate between stimuli previously encountered and new
stimuli is exactly at chance. It is possible that the question
"Which of these stimuli have you encountered?" elicits a search
of memory traces. The tachistoscopic conditions of viewing of
the stimuli should create poorly articulated memory traces that
are subject to intralist interference if Ss engage in a search
process attempting to discriminate old from new stimuli. The
question "Which stimulus do you like?" may not induce a search
of memory traces. Ss may respond immediately and therefore
the access to the encoded memory traces may be more direct
and less subject to intralist interference. If this analysis is
correct, then the different questions asked of Ss may access
memory in different ways. Different results for the different
questions do not necessarily provide evidence for separate and
independent encoding of affective and cognitive knowledge.
Awareness must be inferred from responses. Methods of
assessing awareness may each be subject to method-specific
sources of variance that change the relationship between aware-
ness and the response indicators used to infer the presence of
awareness. One of the reasons that signal detectability theory
provided a major methodological advance in the study of sublim-
inal perception is that the theory described the relationship
between responses and awareness. Changes in responses might
or might not be indicative of a change in a subject's experience.
Howe et al. (1993) argued that it is necessary to develop formal
models of the relationship between responses and the hypo-
thetical processes that are related to them in order to demon-
strate independence of processes. So too, formal models relat-
ing states of awareness to response indicators may be required to
demonstrate unconscious influences on behavior. In the ab-
sence of such models, S&S's criteria appear to have considerable
validity. If the sensitivity requirement is satisfied by appro-
priately exhaustive procedures, and it is possible to demonstrate
the Ss are neither aware nor capable of being made aware of
something, and it is possible to demonstrate that what Ss are not
aware of has an influence on behavior that is different from what
it would have when it is in awareness, then it will be necessary to
assume that there are unconscious influences on behavior. Are
there such influences?
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Is implicit learning about consciousness?
Richard A. Carlson
Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park,
PA 16802-3106; cvy@psuvm.psu.edu
I heartily agree with Shanks & St. John's (S&S's) central point -
that "unconscious' implicit learning has not been adequately
demonstrated. I am generally enthusiastic about their summary
of the logic necessary for such a demonstration - their Informa-
tion and Sensitivity Criteria. I also find convincing their argu-
ment that the learning systems or modes that have been experi-
mentally dissociated are conscious instance/fragment learning
and conscious rule learning. Of course, my agreement and
enthusiasm are based at least in part on the compatibility of their
conclusions with those of my own efforts (e.g., Carlson &
Dulany 1985; Dulany et al. 1984). But I have the nagging feeling
that the central point has been missed - that this review fails in a
fundamental way to do justice to the literature on so-called
implicit learning.
I believe the problem is that very compelling intuitions,
supported by commonsense observations, lend credence to the
notion of implicit learning. In teaching and discussing this
literature, I find that sufficiently detailed experimentation and
argumentation may silence - but rarely if ever convince -
students and colleagues who begin with a belief in unconscious
or implicit learning. Furthermore, I suspect that many thought-
ful people will continue to think that this literature is somehow
about what is and is not conscious, rather than being convinced
that it concerns instead (merely?) the distinction between in-
stance and rule learning.
For me, the central questions thus ought to be - What are the
sources of these intuitions concerning implicit learning, and
how are we to encompass them in our scientific understanding of
the mind? Part of the answer is certainly suggested by the
concept of correlated hypotheses (Dulany 1961; S&S, sect.
2.6.1., para. 3). Students of implicit learning might do well to
explore the links between this concept and action identification
theory (Vallacher & Wegner 1987), which outlines some system-
atic sources of variation in how individuals will identify their
own actions - and by extension, their own knowledge. More
fundamentally, we cannot make progress in this area so long as
cotisciousness and awareness remain largely primitive, un-
analyzed constructs. Rather than arguing about, for example,
whether recognition tests do or do not assess conscious knowl-
edge^.g., Dulany etal. 1985 vs. Reberetal. 1985), we ought to
ask: What constitutes consciousness in these learning and test
situations? For example, what information specifies an experi-
encing self during learning and at test (e.g., Carlson 1992;
Natsoulas 1992)? How does the "perceptually given" self
(Neisser 1991) differ from learning to test? What difference
might this difference make in subjects' abilities to report their
experiences?
I have space only to suggest an answer to the question posed at
the beginning of the previous paragraph. That answer goes
something like this: when learning and test situations provide
overlapping stimulus-specifying (or, more precisely, but more
awkwardly, domain-object-affordance-specifying) information,
but differ substantially in the self-specifying information they
provide, evidence for implicit learning can be obtained.
Stimulus-specifying information simply comprises the percepti-
ble properties of the displays presented to subjects. The notion
of self-specifying information is perhaps less familiar: just as
perspective information in pictures specifies a visual standpoint
for the depicted scene (Gibson 1971) and the "ambient optic
array' specifies a point of observation within the environment or
an "ecological self" (Neisser 1991), the information available in
experimental learning and test situations specifies an experienc-
ing (learning, judging, etc.) self.
As presented by S&S, the Information Criterion refers only to
stimulus-specific information (perhaps expressed at various
levels of abstractedness). But correlated hypotheses, as freely
expressed by subjects in operant conditioning experiments such
as those analyzed by Dulany (1961) in an earlier literature on
"learning without awareness," include self-specific information
about such things as intentions: for example, "I am trying to."
And Dulany's fully developed theoretical analysis of learning in
this paradigm demonstrated that performance could be pre-
dicted by the combination of subjects' intentions and their
hypotheses about which behaviors were being reinforced (Du-
lany 1968).
My suggestion, then, is that two aspects of implicit learning
situations must be considered. First, as S&S note, accuracy of
test performance is (given appropriate subject goals) deter-
mined largely by the overlap of stimulus-specific information
available to subjects' awareness between learning and test. For
example, for a particular test situation we can determine the
performance to be expected on the basis of information that
might be paraphrased as "the presence of these features makes
this letter string grammatical" - regardless of whether "these
features" is an instance-based or abstract specification (e.g.,
Dulany et al. 1984; 1985). Second, the intuition that learning is
"implicit' or "unconscious" is supported by cases in which there
is a lack of overlap or correspondence between self-specific
information available during learning and at test. Here, Val-
lacher and Wegner's (1987) observations about how individuals
identify their own actions may provide some clues to under-
standing. To understand how consciousness is involved, we
must ask not just what information guides performance, but how
it does so in combination with subjects' intentions and attention.
Appropriately interpreted, then, evidence from situations in
which learning seems to be implicit might tell us about the
nature of consciousness and its role in learning rather than
marking points to be labeled "conscious" and "implicit." I hope
that the careful analyses presented by Shanks & St. John will
help shift discussion in that direction.
The aware pigeon
A. Charles Catania
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD
21228-5398; catania@umbc7.umbc.edu
I have no trouble with the proposition that human verbal
behavior can determine the subsequent verbal or nonverbal
behavior of the same individual. The phenomenon has been well
documented and is especially convincing when the shaping of
verbal behavior is followed by a change in nonverbal behavior
that is described by the newly shaped verbal behavior (e.g.,
Catania et al. 1982). With respect to such procedures, it may be
useful to point out that recent research by Svartdal (1992)
showed that response force became more sensitive to operant
contingencies with increases in cognitive load in a complex
discriminative task. That research obtained verbal reports by
asking subjects what they would tell someone else about how to
succeed in the task; subjects reported only strategies for attend-
ing to various properties of the task stimuli rather than response
properties (e.g., hand position) that might have been correlated
with differential force.
But Svartdal's experiment, of course, like so many others
discussed by Shanks & St. John (S&S), involves only a dissocia-
tion between a verbal report and a response measure and
therefore fails to meet S&S's Information and Sensitivity Crite-
ria. Their concern, as expressed even in their title, is with
human learning systems, but the problems posed by human
verbal behavior for the assessment of awareness suggest that it
might be better to turn to nonhuman organisms. With such
organisms, we are less likely to make inappropriate assumptions
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about the behavior the subject comes into the experiment with.
Furthermore, as for awareness or other private events (cf.
Skinner 1945; 1984a; 1984c), when we try to teach others when it
is appropriate to speak of awareness, we have no more access to
what is going on in their heads than to what is going on in the
head of the pigeon. (I regard both kinds of heads as full, not
empty, but I do not expect to find out much about what is in them
just by asking.)
So here goes with some pigeon thought experiments. Sup-
pose I present symbol sequences to a pigeon and teach it to peck
a left key after it sees any one of a set of symbol sequences
generated by a finite-state grammar and a right key after it sees
any one of a set of symbol sequences not generated by that
grammar (this would probably not be hard to do; pigeons can
learn even large arbitrary stimulus sets at fairly high levels of
accuracy if procedures are set up properly: e.g., Vaughan 1988).
Once I have taught the pigeon to discriminate the symbol
sequences in this way, I can now set out to discover the particular
features of the sequences upon which this discrimination de-
pends by presenting probes of various new legal and illegal
strings. Except that the reinforcement contingencies will be
appropriate for the behavior of a pigeon rather than a human,
the methods closely resemble those described by S&S in their
discussion of the research that followed upon Reber's (e.g. 1967;
1969; 1976) experiments. One possible outcome is that the
pigeon might demonstrate that it had learned some features of
the finite-state grammar; another is that it might demonstrate
that it had learned some other set of features, such as particular
substrings.
Consider yet another experimental arrangement. On one of
four pigeon keys I present some stimulus, such as a red spot, to a
pigeon. Over successive trials the position of the spot varies in
some systematic way on the array of four keys and I teach the
pigeon to peck the key on which the red spot appears. Once the
pigeon's responding is well established, it is likely that its
reaction times will be shorter than usual when the stimulus
appears in positions that are predictable in some way from the
algorithm that determines the successive positions of the spot,
much as in the serial reaction time tasks described by S&S. (This
is probably even easier to do than the first proposed experiment;
much more complex responding with respect to locations and
response timing has been studied with pigeons: e.g., Shimp et
al. 1989.)
Next, I complicate the procedure a little. On each trial, all the
keys are first lit white; I then allow the pigeon to produce the red
spot only by pecking the key to which the red spot has been
assigned on that trial by the algorithm. I would not find it
surprising if pecks on an appropriate key were more likely when
the spot was scheduled to appear in a position that was predict-
able in some way from the algorithm than otherwise. On the
other hand, I could also imagine that to make the experiment
work I would have to refine the procedure (e.g., by embedding
occasional prediction trials within the sequence of reaction time
trials rather than presenting prediction and reaction time trials
as separate sequences at different times, or maybe even by
finding some way to obtain both a prediction and a reaction time
on the same trial). After all, a failure to obtain a correlation
between reaction times and accuracy of predictions over trials
within the sequence might only mean that the procedures had
not yet adequately met S&S's Sensitivity Criterion, so these
experimental moves are consistent with their strategy (sect.
2.3.2) of making performance and awareness tests as alike as
possible, except for differences in instructions.
For the present purposes, it hardly matters whether in the
first experiment the pigeon showed us that it had learned the
finite-state grammar or some set of features, such as particular
substrings, or that in the second experiment its reaction times
and correlated predictions depended on sequence learning or
response bias; it also makes no difference whether what is
learned is characterized as particular associations, relationships,
or concepts. The question is whether it is appropriate to speak of
the pigeon's awareness, because according to S&S's criteria, the
evidence from the pigeon should be as acceptable as that from a
human. They have ruled out verbal reports as one of their
criteria for judging a learner's awareness, and therefore their
Information and Sensitivity Criteria should be as applicable to
nonhuman organisms as to human ones.
If that is so, however, then they must conclude that the
pigeons are as aware of whatever features our probes identify as
the humans would have been under parallel procedures. In fact,
by their criteria (sect. 2.7.3) differential responding to events in
recognition tests is equivalent to awareness of them. If learning
about events is synonymous with being aware of them, however,
of what use is the concept of awareness? In other words, S&S
have designed a set of conditions such that learning cannot occur
without awareness, because learning has become their criterion
for awareness. Thus, their account seems to have some and
perhaps all of the properties of a reductio ad absurdum. After
presenting their criteria they say, "It is . . . important to recog-
nize that our criteria do not make unconscious learning
undemonstrable" (sect. 2.3.2), but by the end they have demol-
ished every possible proof.
This is perhaps to be expected. Terms such as consciousness
and awareness have been around for a long time, but they have
yet to acquire consistent technical senses in psychology (cf.,
Verplanck 1992). Whatever else S&S do in response to this
commentary, I hope they will provide an explicit definition of
these terms. What sorts of things are they? Are they precursors
or consequences of behavior? According to S&S, awareness has
content, but does that mean it is not a process? Given that the
parallel distributed processing models reviewed by S&S simu-
late human performances that meet their criteria for awareness,
must we assume that the models or the computers that imple-
ment them are aware? Is there a difference between conscious-
ness and awareness? What about awareness, if what the subject
is presumed to be aware of is actually not the case? When, in
their very last paragraph, S&S speak of "conscious awareness,"
do they really mean to imply that there might be such a thing as
unconscious awareness? And what about the evolutionary ori-
gins of awareness? There must have been existing behavior
before there could be any awareness of that behavior, but what
survival advantages can awareness have without something to be
aware of? Did the earliest discriminations require that the
organism be aware that it was discriminating? Probably not.
Like it or not, S&S have brought us back to verbal reports: "Of
course, if the prediction task and recognition tests cannot be
treated as tests of awareness, then we have no recourse other
than to examine the subject's verbal reports as the only available
index of explicit knowledge" (sect. 2.7.5). If we are interested in
them, we must tackle the sources of our own vocabularies to
understand how they function in our scientific verbal behavior.
There are some properties of the phenomena to which the term
consciousness is applied that are inextricably tied to human
verbal reports, but we must not forget that those reports are
behavior too. My own view is that awareness of our own
awareness (as in distinguishing between being aware of a stim-
ulus and being aware that you are aware of it) is one of the special
characteristics of human behavior. One starting place to learn
about it is in the study of verbal behavior and of the practices by
which we learn the consistent use of these vocabularies from
each other, even though our verbal communities can act only
upon public behavior and the circumstances under which it
occurs. For that purpose, we must look not to the syntactic
structure of verbal behavior but to its functional properties
(Skinner 1957).
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Awareness and abstraction are graded
dimensions
Axel Cleeremans
Laboratoire de Psychologie Industrielle et Commerciale, University Libre de
Bruxelles CP 122. 1050 Brussels, Belgium; axcleer@is1.ulb.ac.be
When Reber (e.g., 1967) introduced the notion that learning
could proceed without awareness, psychology was very different
from what it is today. In particular, the dominant metaphor for
information processing was one based on the use of symbol
manipulation carried out in rule-following systems - the kind of
goal-directed, fully conscious activity subjects engage in when
solving complex formal problems (Newell & Simon 1972).
Hence Reber's fascination with his subjects' apparent ability to
acquire and use information about material generated from
finite-state grammars without being able to tell him what the
rules were. This phenomenon that Reber dubbed implicit
learning has now been replicated dozens of times: we cannot
report verbally on every aspect of what motivates our decisions
after a learning episode.
Shanks & St. John (S&S) indicate themselves that they have
no argument with the existence of such dissociations. However,
they dispute the claim that such dissociations necessarily entail
the existence of a separate, independent unconscious learning
system. Instead, they propose (along with others, see Perruchet
& Amorim 1992) the following account of implicit learning.
Subjects in typical implicit learning situations acquire a single
database of fully conscious, fragmentary information about the
stimulus material. This knowledge is demonstrably sufficient to
account for subjects' performance. Independent mechanisms
have access to that knowledge to sustain task performance on the
one hand, and explicit reports on the other. Usually, associations
are observed between performance and explicit reports. In
cases where dissociations are observed, these stem from failures
of the tests of explicit knowledge to be either sensitive enough
(hence failing the Sensitivity Criterion) or to ask subjects about
what they know, that is, instances rather than rules (hence
failing the Information Criterion).
In this commentary I want to suggest that such a "systems'
view may not be the best way to understand the data nor to gain
new insights into the mechanisms involved. I have three basic
problems with S&S's account.
First, I doubt that anyone researching implicit learning would
be willing to defend the position that S&S take pains to demol-
ish, namely, that there is an unconscious mind that is just the
same as the more familiar conscious one, only minus conscious-
ness. I doubt that even Reber ever believed in such a strong
statement, and there is indeed little empirical evidence to
support it. Such a "systems" analysis, in which crude dichot-
omies are used to account for the data, needs to be revised in
light of the fact that both availability to consciousness and
abstraction appear to be graded and separate dimensions with
which to characterize knowledge and learning. New ways of
thinking about these issues have emerged, particularly through
recent developments in computational modeling. A further
point here is that I believe it is misleading to reinterpret the data
in terms of variation along one dimension (instances vs. rules)
instead of along the other (conscious vs. nonconscious) because
these dimensions, as S&S themselves recognize at one point in
their target article (sect. 1.1, para. 5), are independent.
Second, this account fails to acknowledge that neither task
performance nor tests of explicit knowledge are process-pure
(Merikle & Reingold 1991). Explicit knowledge can demonstra-
bly influence performance (e.g., Curran & Keele 1993), and
knowledge acquired during performance can similarly influence
tests of explicit knowledge. In addition, most tasks are presum-
ably carried out using a mixture of strategies that range from
mere memorization to active rule induction. Because of this,
associations between performance and explicit reports are in-
deed expected in most cases. Note, however, that some sub-
jects, such as amnesic patients, show no evidence of explicit
sensitivity to instances despite remaining able to perform com-
plex discriminations. I simply fail to understand S&S's rather
crude dismissal of these data as evidence that learning can be
implicit.
Third, and perhaps most crucial, this account is not a process
theory. It may be descriptively adequate in the simplest of cases,
but it fails to have explanatory power and plausibility in more
complex cases. As an illustration, consider the difference be-
tween problem solving and learning about sequential structure
in a choice reaction time (RT) experiment. Solving a complex
problem without the aid of external memory is very hard and
fully explicit, because all the relevant pieces of information need
to be held in working memory, the contents of which subjects
are aware of by definition. By contrast, learning about the
sequential structure of the stimuli in a choice RT task is implicit
and effortless — indeed, almost automatic — because information
about the sequence can modulate performance without being
represented in working memory, that is, without being in the
"focus of awareness." Relevant relationships between stimuli
need not and are not represented in consciousness when learn-
ing is taking place. This may be hard to believe as long as one
sticks with a warehouse metaphor of cognition, where large
databases of facts about the world are accessed by the various
mechanisms that need them. Indeed, in such a case the frag-
mentary information that the database contains has been repre-
sented in working memory during learning and can be retrieved
during a recall or recognition test. If one makes the further
assumption that this knowledge is exclusively responsible for
performance, then it indeed becomes hard to understand what
is implicit about implicit learning.
I find it rather implausible, however, that subjects' knowledge
can be adequately accounted for by such theories. Consider, for
example, a subject performing in Cleeremans & McClelland's
(1991) experiments. In sharp contrast to the simple, short,
repeating, deterministic sequences used in the vast majority of
sequence-learning experiments, the stimulus material we used
was generated from a nondeterministic finite-state grammar.
Hence, almost all permutations between elements of subse-
quences of any length appear during training, albeit with differ-
ent frequencies. There is an infinite number of such sequences,
and still thousands of them if one only considers subsequences of
up to six elements. I find it utterly implausible to assume that
subjects who were merely instructed to respond to the current
stimulus would somehow consciously encode and memorize all
these possible subsequences and use this knowledge to prepare
explicitly for the next event. Yet, the reaction time data shows
exquisitely detailed sensitivity to the ensemble of constraints
resulting from an encoding of all the subsequences (see Cleere-
mans 1993b). There is no evidence whatsoever that subjects
have conscious access to this kind of distributional information
about the stimulus material. The fact that subjects can con-
sciously retrieve specific instances does not tell us anything
about whether these instances are what performance is based
on, nor does it tell us anything about how they are used, if at all,
during learning. This is not to say that one could not, in
principle, account for these data through pure instance-based
theories, but rather than doing so it seems to produce either
implausible or purely descriptive interpretations of the data.
As S&S again acknowledge, the crucial distributional informa-
tion gets represented spontaneously as a "side effect" of process-
ing in connectionist networks. In the rest of this commentary, I
would like to show how such models provide better natural
primitives with which to understand both processing and repre-
sentation in implicit learning experiments.
Connectionist networks learn by processing instances. Yet,
the internal representations they develop as a result of process-
ing may or may not be more general than what could be derived
from a list of the processed instances, depending on a variety of
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factors, such as the network's representational resources or the
demands of the task. For example, a simple recurrent network
(SRN; see Cleeremans 1993b; Elman 1990) trained to process
sequences generated from a finite-state grammar will some-
times develop internal representations that are organized in
clusters, with each cluster representing a node of the grammar -
as abstract a representation as could be. In other cases, however,
the network's internal representations tend to be organized in
numerous very small clusters that each correspond to one or a
few training instances (see Servan-Schreiber et al., 1991, for
detailed examples). As a case in point, the SRN has often been
described as processing fragmentary information. This is de-
scriptively correct, but it is not how things work inside the
network. The network does not develop a database of subse-
quences that it can consult and ponder about as a result of
training. Instead, as it processes each stimulus, the constraints
that exist between the successive elements of the sequence are
progressively incorporated in the pattern of connection weights
so as to allow the network to respond better to the task demands.
Note that the fact that subsequences are not explicitly repre-
sented in the network does not make it incapable of recognizing
such sequences either. The network can indeed be used as a
finite-state recognizer (Servan-Schreiber et al. 1991), and could
discriminate between old and new sequences just as human
subjects can.
In short, there is a representational continuum that extends
from raw storage of instances to fully abstract representations.
Abstraction is a graded dimension. Hence it may not be surpris-
ing to find that subjects end up developing representations that
are abstract in some cases and not in others.
Turning now to consciousness, S&S are right in pointing out
that current models of implicit learning phenomena are essen-
tially silent on the issue of awareness. I therefore disagree with
their interpretation of weight changes in connectionist networks
as resulting both in better performance and better awareness of
the structure of the training set. On the contrary, the very fact
that obviously nonconscious and elementary networks are able
to account for human performance in a number of complex
implicit learning tasks has always struck me as evidence that
awareness is in fact ancillary in these tasks, that is, that it is not
required for successful performance, and that additional mecha-
nisms are needed to represent its effects. In addition, S&S seem
to misapply what they describe as a "standard idea in the
psychological literature" (sect. 3.3., para. 11), that is, that the
states of a computational system can be interpreted as the
contents of consciousness but not the processes that produce
these states. In a connectionist network, activations represent
states whereas processing is carried out through connections
between units. Hence, if we stick to the standard interpretation,
there is no sense in which a network that grows stronger
connections in response to its training environment becomes
more aware of the constraints represented by the weights on
these connections.
Thus, a cautious approach here requires one to admit that the
models have nothing to say about awareness per se.' However,
one can still usefully explore the effects of awareness on perfor-
mance, for example, by assuming that being aware of some
additional knowledge about the stimulus material makes that
knowledge available for further processing and allows it to
modulate performance (see Cleeremans 1993a).
As far as empirical data are concerned, I very much agree with
Whittlesea and Dorken's (1993) recent analysis. Briefly, they
suggest that knowledge can be implicit for a variety of reasons,
such as because one's attention is not drawn to the relevant
relationships, because people have "poor theories about what
they learn and its implications for future performance" (p. 245),
or because "knowledge may have an unconscious influence on
subsequent activities" (p. 245) and may be hard to describe
explicitly when it is distributional in nature and represented in
nonverbal codes.
Hence, it seems that awareness is also a graded dimension. In
the case of implicit learning, the key point is that: subjects do not
need to be aware of all the relevant constraints when making a
decision. These constraints are implicit in the sense that they
are not all simultaneously represented in working memory
when the decision is made.
To conclude, there is indeed no need to appeal to a wholly
separate and super-powerful unconscious learning system to
understand implicit learning data. Implicit learning involves
elementary and familiar mechanisms. Yet, by the same token,
there is also no need to assume that knowledge can only
modulate performance if it is explicitly represented. Distribu-
tional knowledge can be acquired incidentally and used implic-
itly in different contexts.
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NOTES
1. Note also that even if one assumed that internal representations or
connection weights were available for inspection by some other part of
the system, it may not necessarily be easy to extract synthetic informa-
tion from them. It takes sophisticated analysis methods to uncover the
structure present in distributed, time-varying representations.
Dissociable definitions of consciousness
Zoltan Dienes and Josef Perner
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, Sussex University, Brighton,
Sussex BN1 9QG, England; dienes@epvax.sussex.ac.uk.;
losef@epvax.sussex.ac.uk.
Shanks & St. John (S&S) have provided us with a clear and
cogent statement of why we should not believe in implicit
learning. They find that all the evidence reviewed is consistent
with the claim that whenever subjects learn that A predicts B,
they have conscious knowledge of the A-B relationship. S&S use
what at first sight seems like a perfectly reasonable definition of
being conscious of the A-B relationship, namely, subjects have
conscious knowledge if they are able to state that they expect B
in the context of A on a forced-choice test. This type of objective
threshold indeed captures some aspect of our intuitive notion of
consciousness. It misses out on an important aspect, however -
an aspect that has probably been inspiring the "believers" in this
debate.
Our intuitions about consciousness are not exhaustively spe-
cified by the type of objective threshold used by S&S. Chees-
man and Merikle (1984) pointed out that one could also define a
subjective threshold of consciousness, namely, knowledge un-
derlying discriminative performance could be considered un-
conscious if subjects believe they are literally guessing on the
test. In that case, subjects lack metaknowledge about their
knowledge; they do not know that they know. Blindsight pa-
tients show by their discriminative responding that, for exam-
ple, the knowledge about whether the stimulus is a circle or a
square is above objective threshold. However, the knowledge
could be regarded as unconscious because patients claim they
are guessing. Chan (1992) argued that knowledge of artificial
grammars could be unconsvious in that same sense of subjects
lacking metaknowledge about their knowledge: Chan found that
subjects were just as confident in their incorrect responses as in
their correct ones.
These results were recently replicated and extended by
Dienes et al. (submitted), who found that when subjects be-
lieved they were literally guessing in classifying test strings of an
artificial grammar, they were still classifying significantly above
chance. That is, knowledge of an artificial grammar can be below
a subjective threshold of awareness, as defined by Cheesman
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and Merikle (1984). In addition, a secondary task during the test
phase interfered with knowledge above the subjective threshold
but not below, indicating that the distinction might be carving
nature at its joint.
S&S's "objective threshold" criterion requires using direct
and indirect tests that are very similar in order to satisfy
plausibly the Sensitivity and Information Criteria. But then it
becomes exceedingly difficult to imagine an information pro-
cessing mechanism that would allow performance on the indi-
rect test but not the direct test. For example, take the claim that
(1) the subjects' knowledge of an artificial grammar consists of
knowledge of fragments of that grammar, say, predominantly
bigrams; and (2) this knowledge is conscious. According to S&S,
these are two orthogonal claims. Let us say we accept claim (1)
but not (2), that is, we think the knowledge is unconscious. How
should subjects perform on a bigram rating task? The problem is
that S&S provide no principled constraints for when uncon-
scious knowledge should and should not apply. What sort of
mechanism would not apply the knowledge when we give it a
task specifically chosen to tap exactly the contents of the knowl-
edge in exactly the situation in which all relevant retrieval cues
are present (so that it is a sensitive test)? If the bigram rating test
did not elicit the knowledge, we would have no grounds for
believing that the knowledge was of bigrams and not higher
order fragments. Thus, whenever the Information and Sensi-
tivity Criteria are satisfied, it becomes unlikely that an objective
threshold would detect different types of knowledge. It remains
quite possible that a subjective threshold would.
In trying to establish whether knowledge is unconscious, one
needs to ask how to establish whether knowledge is conscious.
S&S address this question only cursorily in section 2.7.5. They
argue that recognition and prediction are conscious tasks, and
that unconscious processes are unlikely to play a role. They put
forward two points in their defense:
1. They point out that in the sequence tasks, prediction and
RT tasks require different responses: in the prediction task,
subjects respond to the next stimulus, whereas in the RT task
they respond to the current stimulus. However, the savings in
the RT task are based on the previous stimulus anticipating the
next. Thus, for example, Cleeremans's connectionist model
(Cleeremans 1993b) of the sequence tasks can be used to
simulate either RT or prediction performance. Even if they
were responses to different aspects of the task, what does this
tell us about whether the prediction task requires conscious
knowledge of the sequence?
2. S&S argue that if some unconscious process is contributing
to recognition performance, it should behave in the same way as
RT. Specifically, RTs should be faster in the recognition test for
old rather than new sequences, and perceptual fluency should
affect recognition. If these arguments have any force, they show
that recognition did not get at the same knowledge base as RT,
and thus that there was a failure to meet the Sensitivity or
Information Criteria. These arguments would only be relevant
to the issue of consciousness under the tacit assumption that
there are two and only two types of knowledge, and if a certain
measure of knowledge does not share certain properties (e.g.,
perceptual fluency) with measures of knowledge of one type
(i.e., the ones purported to be unconscious) then it must be
measuring the other type (i.e., be conscious). But there is no
reason to make this assumption, so the question of whether or
not recognition is purely conscious is not addressed by these
data.
We suggest that a powerful way of telling whether or not
knowledge is conscious is to ask the subjects. If subjects believe
they are literally guessing, we have good evidence the knowl-
edge is unconscious. By not asking subjects for the basis of their
recognition or prediction judgments, S&S might be failing to
meet their own Information Criterion. Recognition and predic-
tion judgments are always conscious in the trivial sense that
subjects are aware that they are making a judgment. However, it
does not follow that subjects have conscious knowledge of the
basis of their correct judgments. Making this inference violates
the Information Criterion; that is, from knowing that subjects
are aware of "making judgments" one cannot conclude that they
are aware of the basis of making these judgments.
S&S are aware of difficulties with their criterion and conclude
that if one cannot use recognition and prediction tasks as
exclusive measures of conscious knowledge, one has to rely
inadequately on recall. But this is not the only option: one can
give up the criterion and search for a more fruitful one. The
subjective threshold is one of the more promising ones (Berry &
Dienes 1993; Dienes & Perner, forthcoming; Merikle 1992).
Implicit practical learning
Elizabeth Ennen
Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
H3A 2T7 czeh@musica.mcgill.ca
Shanks & St. John (S&S) argue that the case for implicit learning
in humans has not been made. Their strategy is to catalog the
various implicit learning paradigms and show, in each case, why
the inference to unconscious learning is unwarranted. Given the
logical structure of this approach, the strength of their position
depends on the degree to which their catalog of implicit learning
paradigms is complete. If they have not examined all the likely
suspects, their claim that no one fits the bill is substantially
weakened. The omission of a careful analysis of human nonhippo-
campal skill learning is problematic for just this reason.
S&S argue that there are two types of learning: instance
learning and rule learning. Both instance learning and rule
learning consist of the acquisition of information about the
world. Learning a piece of information, be it an instance or a
rule, is not the same as learning how to perform a task. Informa-
tion learning, which includes both instance learning and rule
learning, can thus be distinguished from the purely practical
element of skill learning. Learning a skill may include, but is
never limited to, the learning of information. Once we isolate
the purely practical element of skill learning, we will have
located a genuine example of implicit learning.
The distinction between practical learning and information
learning can be illuminated by reviewing Gilbert Ryle's (1949)
distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. Cohen and
Squire (1980) in a article on the spared capacities of human
amnesics, misappropriate Ryle's terminology when they claim
that, "[The] distinction between procedural or rule-based infor-
mation and declarative or data-based information . . . is remi-
niscent of the classical distinction between knowing how and
knowing that." [See also Eichenbaum et al: "Two Functional
Components of the Hippocampal Memory System" BBS 17(3)
1994.] This comparison involves a misreading of the nature of
knowing-how, at least as it is understood in the philosophical
literature. The possession of information always falls into the
category of knowing-that; it matters not if the information is
data-based or rule-based. Knowing-how is something other than
information possession.
Ryle cautions against the temptation of confusing knowing-
how with the knowledge of rules. An agent may know that a
particular rule obtains without knowing how to apply it. Know-
ing the rules of chess, for example, does not ensure skillful
playing. Knowing-how itself cannot be explained by appeal to
knowing-that. Consider the case of knowing how to apply a rule.
If we try to explain this capacity by invoking the agent's knowl-
edge of some "rule-application rule," we will be faced with an
infinite regress. The agent's ability to apply the special applica-
tion rule must then be explained, ad infinitum. At some point,
talk of knowing-that (information possession) gives out, and we
must recognize the distinctiveness of the purely practical com-
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ponent of the agent's ability. Knowing-how is not the knowledge
of rules. Learning-how is not the acquisition of rule-based
information.
Successful information learning, or learning-that, tells us
something about the world. It takes the following general form:
an agent learns that x, where * is either an instance or a rule.
Practical learning, or learning-how, does not share this form.
Practical learning is the incremental modification of perceptual-
motor connections over time such that the agent acquires a
neurophysiological disposition for improved performance. In
the case of information learning, the causally relevant element
can be variously described as a set of neurophysiological changes
or their semantic correlate - the information acquired. When
agents learn that * is the case, we can ask whether or not they are
aware of .t. In the case of practical learning, the neurophysiologi-
cal changes have no semantic correlate; no "information" is
acquired. There is nothing in practical learning that could count
as an object of awareness.
For learning to be considered implicit, agents must be un-
aware of what they are learning while they are learning it. An
agent can be aware of a piece of information. An agent cannot,
however, be aware of a neural disposition for enhanced perfor-
mance. (An agent may be aware of the fact of having acquired
such a disposition but cannot be aware of the disposition itself.)
Since the causally relevant learning is nothing more than a series
of neurophysiological changes, and since agents never have
conscious access to neurophysiological changes, both the Infor-
mation Criterion and the Sensitivity Criterion are satisfied on
conceptual grounds. Practical learning is therefore a genuine
case of implicit learning.
Are rules and instances subserved by
separate systems?
Robert L. Goldstone and John K. Kruschke
Psychology Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-1301;
rgoldstone@indiana.edu and kruschke@indiana.edu
Although they find little evidence for an empirical dissociation
between unconscious and conscious learning, Shanks & St. John
(S&S) do argue for a "dissociation between a rule-induction
system and an instance-memorization system" (sect. 1.1). Al-
though the distinction between instance and rule processing is
intuitive, we find the conclusion that "it seems clear, then, that
there are two separate learning strategies" (sect. 3.2) to be
premature.
The first reason for questioning a clear dissociation between
systems for processing rules and instances is that the distinction
itself is unclear. If an entire episode is remembered in full
detail, then this would clearly seem to fall in the domain of an
instance processor. But, as is commonly assumed in exemplar
models of categorization, what if fewer aspects of the episode are
stored? If only one aspect is stored (e.g., an object's color), then
it is hard to tell whether an impoverished instance or a simple
unidimensional rule is being stored. Furthermore, some exem-
plar models assume that the information stored from an episode
depends on the instances that have already been learned (Aha et
al. 1991; Skorstad et al. 1988). For example, an exemplar model
might only store an object's color because the object's other
features are identical to a previous instance, or the model might
not store any information from an episode at all if it is already
correctly categorized. At the least, there appears to be a gradual
continuum from concrete instances to abstract rules.
The presence of a graded continuum does not show that a
distinction is without merit, but it does cast doubt on the
postulation of completely separate processing systems. Consid-
erations such as these have led Barsalou (1990) to argue that
exemplar and abstraction-based representations are empirically
indistinguishable from each other. Any substantive claim that
there are separate exemplar and rule-based systems can be
tested only when the "rule" and "exemplar" representations,
and their processing, are clearly defined.
The second reason for questioning a simple separation be-
tween instance- and rule-learning systems is the existence of
complex interactions between the systems. Rules often include
instance information. Exceptions to rules are often stored within
the rule (Schank 1982). In Nosofsky et al.'s (1994) RULEX model,
the same system that devises categorization rules also deter-
mines exceptions to the rules. There is a large amount of
evidence from analogical reasoning and problem solving (e.g.,
Ross 1987) that learned abstractions are not stored separately
from the concrete instances that give rise to the abstraction.
Instead, rules and abstractions are typically attached to their
concrete instantiations. Even when the abstraction has been
stored, it is often not detached from its specific instantiation
(Allen & Brooks 1991). This is difficult to reconcile with the view
that separate systems are responsible for extracting rules and
instance information. Instance information naturally affects and
intrudes upon rules.
Reciprocally, rules affect instance storage. Medin (1986) ar-
gues that rules and strategies filter and alter the instances that
will be stored. Nosofsky et al. (1989) provide evidence (cited by
S&S) that as rule use increases, the amount of preserved
instance information decreases. Thus, the instance storage sys-
tem is not automatic or independent of the rule system. If there
are two separate systems at all, then at least they seem to be
tightly coupled, rather than autonomous.
Pinker (1991) argued that past tense production in English is
based on dissociable rule and instance-association subsystems.
Part of the evidence he marshaled was that exceptional verbs are
strongly influenced by frequency of use, whereas regular verbs
are not; he also suggested that regular verbs, unlike irregulars,
do not form "attracting clusters in memory" (p. 253) on the basis
of similarity. Neither of those differences arises in simple
category-learning experiments, as explained above (e.g., Allen
& Brooks 1991). Thus, the type of evidence that has been used to
justify an instance/rule dissociation in language learning does
not seem to be found in generic category-learning paradigms.
Finally, demonstrations that subjects categorize differently
when asked to use rules might be just as consistent with
parametric variation within a single system due to instructions
as it is with the presence of a system solely dedicated to rule
processing. In fact, the former alternative has the advantage of
accommodating shared processes for rules and instances. It is
likely that many of the same mechanisms (e.g., history-
dependent storage, sensitivity to context, and attention to novel
or informative aspects) would be part of both instance- and rule-
learning systems.
The conclusion is not necessarily that S&S are wrong to
hypothesize separate learning systems for rules and instances.
However, it does not seem to us that a compelling case has been
made for two separate systems. Determining that two processes
are subserved by separate systems is notoriously difficult. Sub-
stantive progress in our understanding of learning is more likely
to involve tests of specific, formalized models and empirical
exploration of the exact interactions between instance and rule
learning. As increasingly rich interactions between the two
types of learning are discovered, the impulse to view instances
and rules as processed in separable, dissociable systems may
subside.
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Implicit assumptions about implicit learning
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The analysis that Shanks & St. John (S&S) offer of the distinction
between implicit and explicit learning appears to be guided by
some implicit assumptions. In evaluating the possibility that
learning can occur without awareness, S&S adopt the implicit
default hypothesis that all learning is conscious unless proven
otherwise. In addition, S&S propose explicit and highly strin-
gent criteria for evaluating whether learning can occur without
awareness. After concluding that the evidence does not meet
their strict criteria for rejection of this default hypothesis, they
proceed to accept it, concluding that although two basic learning
strategies exist, both operate "within the domain of conscious,
explicit learning." In contrast, their criteria for evaluating when
learning is instance-based are left implicit and appear to be
substantially more lenient. Finally, they assume that the distinc-
tion is fundamentally defined by a binary cut on some single
dimension: either unconscious versus conscious learning, or
learning by instances versus rules. The possibility that learning
modes could be usefully characterized in terms of multiple
converging properties is not seriously considered. In general,
the conclusions reached by S&S appear to depend on their
implicit assumptions at least as much as on their objective
assessment of the empirical evidence.
S&S point out that a serious question facing anyone interested
in investigating the role of awareness in learning is, "What
counts as a suitable test of awareness?" (sect. 2.1). The most
commonly used tests of awareness have been verbal reports of
stimuli or of rules governing the relationships within stimulus
sets. S&S correctly argue that researchers have often been too
lax in their criteria and have underestimated the contents of
awareness and too quickly conceded unconscious learning.
However, S&S then set up criteria that make tests of awareness
essentially coextensive with tests of learning. Their Information
and Sensitivity Criteria state that the measure of awareness
must test the same information as the measure of performance
and must be sensitive to all conscious knowledge. The combina-
tion of these criteria is highly restrictive, making it difficult to
distinguish tests of awareness from tests of performance. Fur-
thermore, S&S require not only episodic but also semantic
knowledge to be inaccessible for learning to be considered
implicit: "in order for us to infer unconscious learning . . . the
subject must be unaware of the relevant relationship that oc-
curred in the study episode in addition to being unaware of the
episode itself" (sect. 2.3.1). Given such stringent criteria, it
becomes impracticable to show that learning ever exceeds
awareness.
Because verbal reporting fails the criteria set up by S&S, they
suggest that a prediction task (Nissen & Bullemer 1987; Will-
ingham et al. 1989) can provide a more complete measure of
conscious knowledge. In this task, subjects predict the location
of the stimulus on the next trial by pressing a button matching
that location, a task marginally different from the reaction time
(RT) task in which subjects press a button matching the location
of the stimulus on the current trial. Presumably learning leads to
a speed-up on the RT task because subjects learn the sequence
of locations, knowledge that could also serve as the basis for
prediction. S&S argue that "the rationale behind the prediction
task is that if subjects are instructed to try to predict events and
are able to do so with above-chance accuracy, this is evidence of
conscious knowledge because their predictions must be based
on conscious expectancies" (sect. 2.7.2, emphasis added). But
presumably performances on both the RT task and the predic-
tion task are based on covariational knowledge. S&S go on to say
that "the prediction task satisfies the sensitivity criterion where
verbal reports did not," but they fail to say how any measure of
awareness that can satisfy the Sensitivity Criterion can be
distinguished from a measure of performance. What is being
measured in each task, and the relationship between measures
of awareness and performance, is therefore left unclear. One
possibility is that reaction time, prediction, and verbal report lie
on a continuum of accessible knowledge, each determining
performance in a different way.
The analysis offered by S&S appears especially strained in
their assessment of studies showing apparent implicit learning
by amnesics in serial reaction time (Nissen & Bullemer 1987)
and artificial grammar tasks (Knowlton et al. 1992). Although in
these studies amnesics had little or no detectable memory for
the training examples, S&S claim that such findings do not
provide firm support for unconscious learning (because S&S
would take any evidence of semantic knowledge, in addition to
or instead of episodic knowledge, as implying that learning was
conscious). Moreover, although elsewhere in the article S&S are
favorable to the use of recognition tests to assess explicit knowl-
edge, they nonetheless fail to accept amnesics' failures on such
tests (Knowlton et al. 1992) as providing any evidence for
unconscious learning. S&S instead suggest that prediction tests
need to be performed with amnesics. As noted above, however,
it is quite unclear how either prediction or recognition tasks
differentiate awareness from performance.
Their treatment of the evidence from studies with amnesics
reveals an apparent double standard in the way S&S assess
hypothesis about how implicit and explicit learning can be
differentiated. On the face of it, such evidence for learning
without memory for training examples is surely more compati-
ble with the hypothesis that implicit learning can operate
without awareness than it is with the hypothesis that implicit
learning is necessarily tied to instance memory. S&S first as-
sume that implicit learning depends on instance learning, then
note that amnesics perform well on implicit learning tasks, and
on that basis conclude that instance learning must be intact in
amnesics. They reach this conclusion despite acknowledging
that "amnesics have a genuine problem with a certain class of
memorial experience (i.e., episodic memory)." S&S apparently
view instance learning as quite distinct from episodic memory,
whereas memory for specific training instances has generally
been considered an example par excellence of episodic memory
in operation. The apparent fluidity in the implicit criteria that
S&S use to evaluate evidence of instance learning contrasts
sharply with the rigid nature of their corresponding explicit
criteria for evaluating evidence of learning without awareness.
In general, S&S appear to assume that the implicit/explicit
distinction must rest upon some binary cut along a single
dimension. Nowhere do they consider the possibility that two
modes of learning might be profitably distinguished not on the
basis of some absolute, one-dimensional divide, but rather on
the basis of several looser but converging properties. For exam-
ple, Holyoak and Spellman (1993, p. 278) characterize implicit
knowledge as "(a) knowledge about covariations in the environ-
ment, (b) learned by exposure to stimuli exhibiting the covaria-
tions, (c) obtainable without attention or awareness (although in
some cases similar knowledge might be obtained explicitly), and
(d) demonstrated by improved performance on tasks that seem
to require thinking (e.g., generalization and prediction); but it is
knowledge that does not have a fully explicit representation in
that (e) it is not fully verbalizable and (J) it is not manipulable in
the sense that it cannot be re-represented explicitly to serve as
input to other procedures." In addition, following Reber
(1992b), Holyoak and Spellman note that implicit knowledge
may be distinguished by its longer evolutionary history.
Such a mix of partial regularities is much less "neat" than the
simple dichotomies considered by S&S. However, it is such
tantalizing convergences between multiple properties, some of
which would otherwise seem unrelated, that continue to make
the implicit/explicit distinction so compelling as a focus for
research on learning and knowledge representation. Clearly,
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developing a more precise taxonomy of learning modes remains
an important goal for the field. This goal is more likely to be
achieved if we avoid implicit assumptions about implicit learning
that prematurely restrict theory development.
Development, learning, and consciousness
Mark L. Howe and F. Michael Rabinowitz
Department of Psychology, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St.
John's, Newfoundland, Canada A1B 3X9; mhowe@kean.ucs.mun.ca
The target article addresses an important question, namely, is
there any reason to suppose that there exist distinct learning
systems that operate using fundamentally different laws?
Whether independent systems are required to explain cognitive
functioning in general is of both historic and contemporary
relevance. The recent literature is replete with examples of this
concern in areas as diverse as animal learning (Shettleworth
1993), cognition and cognitive development (Howe et al. 1993),
and memory (Jacoby et al. 1993).
In their discussion of this problem, however, Shanks & St.
John (S&S) becloud two sets of key issues. The first concerns
consciousness. Here, the authors fail to distinguish between
three possible meanings of consciousness: the organism as
conscious while learning, the organism as being conscious of
learning, and the organism being conscious of what is being
learned. Nonhuman animals and human infants are typically
awake and alert (i.e., conscious in the first sense) when they
learn, but are not necessarily aware that they are learning (i.e.,
conscious in the second sense) or of what they are learning (i.e.,
conscious in the third sense). Thus, evidence bearing on the first
use of consciousness does not inform us about the second or
third use of consciousness (although the second or third can
inform the first).
The second issue concerns whether S&S are talking about the
existence of distinct learning systems per se or simply distinct
strategies subjects use in different learning contexts. This confu-
sion occurs early in their article, when they introduce the idea
that "distinct learning systems encode very different sorts of
information; one system induces rules, whereas a second system
memorizes instances" (sect. 1). Toward the end of the article, the
authors conclude that "there are two separate learning strategies
available to subjects, and that these strategies can be invoked by
differences in the instructions given to subjects" (sect. 3.2).
Although there is no doubt that subjects use different strategies
as a function of experimental instructions and other task vari-
ables, it is unclear how strategic differences relate to the prob-
lem of whether there exists more than a single learning system.
Because of these confusions regarding the nature of learning
and consciousness, it is difficult to evaluate S&S's conclusion
that (1) all learning is conscious and that (2) there exist two
independent systems, one for instance-based learning and the
other for rule-based learning. We would argue that distinguish-
ing between the three different meanings of consciousness
outlined earlier is crucial to understanding the role that con-
sciousness plays in learning, particularly in a developmental
context. Moreover, it is our contention that in the absence of
formal modeling it is futile to attempt to demonstrate the
existence of independent systems, whether for learning or for
memory (Howe et al. 1993).
Perhaps one of the most interesting issues raised in the target
article concerns the nature of the relationship between con-
sciousness and learning. A particularly interesting ramification
involves the role of consciousness in development. That is, is an
immature learning system (e.g., a human infant) conscious
when it learns and, if so, in what sense? Certainly this immature
system, although not verbally aware, is likely to have been
awake and alert while teaming. In addition, although the system
cannot provide us with a verbal report, it may know that it has
learned and may even know what it has learned.
These possibilities raise an interesting series of empirical,
philosophical, and theoretical issues. To begin, consider ques-
tions related to being conscious of learning. First, what does it
mean to say that an immature, preverbal system knows that it
has learned? In other words, how does it represent this knowl-
edge? If such a representation exists, perhaps it is one of the
earliest forms of metaeognition. Second, how can this knowl-
edge be measured? That is, what sort of behavior would unam-
biguously index this acquisition: recognition, prediction, trans-
fer and generalization, emotional responses (e.g., indices of
happiness), or nonverbally communicating the acquisition to
others? Third, what are its implications for subsequent develop-
ment; that is, is it a deterministic element in the development of
the system, one that produces an abrupt, stagelike transition?
For example, does the immature system show accelerated
learning in a variety of contexts following some demonstration
that the system knows it has learned.
Next, consider questions related to being conscious of what is
learned. First, what does it mean to say that an immature,
preverbal system knows what it has learned? Again, this is a
question of knowledge representation. Second, how can this
knowledge be measured? Here, unlike in measuring knowledge
that learning has occurred, only verbal awareness or some other
form of symbolic awareness (e.g., signing or drawing) seems
sufficient to demonstrate knowledge of what has been learned.
This is because nonsymbolic measures are not necessarily re-
lated to symbolic awareness in more mature systems. For
example, a subject who could predict a sequence would be
aware that the sequence was learned but might not be able to
verbalize the prediction rule. Using the rock-paper-scissors
game, children and adults have been unable to verbalize predic-
tion rules that they successfully used (Rabinowitz 1993). Third,
how does the immature system become verbally aware? Perhaps
the simple acquisition of language is sufficient to ensure verbal
introspection. Alternatively, this may be a later acquisition of
the system, one that is mediated by either the general linguistic
experience of hearing others describe thoughts, feelings, and
learning experiences or by first using language to facilitate
problem solving through the use of verbal hypothesis testing.
Fourth, what are its implications for subsequent development?
It seems obvious that verbal (or symbolic) awareness facilitates
cognitive development. Although there is little empirical data
relevant to this issue, one recent study has shown that children
learn more quickly and transfer concepts to new domains only if
they demonstrate verbal awareness of the concept (Rabinowitz
& Howe, in press).
To summarize, we believe that S&S have raised a number of
important issues related to the relationship between conscious-
ness and learning, issues that will both influence and be in-
formed by developmental research, but we find unconvincing
their arguments concerning the need for more than one learning
system and we believe that the resolution of this issue may not
be critical to understanding the role of consciousness in learn-
ing. It is our further contention that to understand the relation-
ship between consciousness and learning, the term "conscious-
ness" needs to be more precisely delineated.
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Human autonomic conditioning without
awareness
H. D. Kimmel
5813 Mira Serena, El Paso, TX 79912; dqOO@utep.bitnet
Shanks & St. John (S&S) find no credible evidence that auto-
nomic responses are conditionable in humans who are unaware
of the stimulus-reinforcement contingencies administered.
Conflicting evidence is either dismissed on methodological
grounds (e.g., their Sensitivity Criterion is not met) or simply
ignored. This commentary presents a few examples of the latter.
The role of awareness in human conditioning has a long
history. Almost thirty years ago, Grings (1965) reported that
nonverbal deaf children and severely mentally retarded, non-
verbal adolescents (mean IQ = 33) acquire classical autonomic
CRs as readily as college students. Grings concluded that
conditioning does not require awareness in the usual sense of
the word. S&S would probably argue that no adequate sensi-
tivity test was reported. True! No such test could even have
been administered to Grings' subjects. Grings also found that
subjects shocked for responding autonomically to a cue made
fewer responses to that cue, whereas subjects shocked for not
responding to the cue made more responses; when questioned
after three days of conditioning, these subjects revealed no
knowledge about stimulus relations. These early reports of
human conditioning without awareness are now forgotten relics
of the past. Also ignored are the many studies showing operant
autonomic conditioning in humans unable to identify what they
might have done to influence the reinforcer, even when told that
the reinforcement depended on something they did (summa-
rized in Kimmel 1974). Data from subjects who reported doing
(or thinking of) things to influence the reinforcement were
explicitly excluded from these reports.
Manifestations of aversive conditioning without awareness
may be quite diffuse. Kimmel et al (1983) found that illuminat-
ing a room with a colored floodlight (blue or yellow), in the
presence of which a few brief mild shocks had been adminis-
tered a few minutes earlier, influenced evoked and slow brain
potentials as well as cardiac and electrodermal reactions to an
auditory reaction time stimulus. No shocks were presented
during the reaction time task. These effects occurred as fre-
quently in subjects who could not state whether the shocks had
occurred during the blue or the yellow floodlight as in subjects
who accurately verbalized the color-shock relationship. S&S
might claim that the unaware subjects would have been found to
be aware if they had been interrogated more effectively (they
were university students who stated unhesitatingly that they
had seen both the blue and the yellow floodlights - the "un-
aware" ones were either unable to say which color was associated
with shock or said incorrectly that shock was associated with
both).
S&S prefer to distinguish between instance and rule learning
as opposed to learning with and without awareness. They ques-
tion whether subjects can learn implicit rules without aware-
ness, arguing that specific fragments or instances are what
subjects actually report. Lachnit and Kimmel (1993) found rule
learning in a Pavlovian procedure in which two CSs were each
separately paired with shock but were presented together with-
out shock (negative patterning), and two different CSs were
separately presented without shock but were paired with shock
when administered together (positive patterning). Subse-
quently, subjects were told that shock administration may have
followed a special "rule" and were asked if they had experienced
such a rule. Subjects who answered affirmatively were asked
what the rule was. Half of the subjects described specific
instances (e.g., which stimuli were paired with shock) rather
than stating abstract rules. In addition, ten subjects reported a
rule more or less accurately, while another ten neither stated a
rule nor gave specific instances. There was no difference be-
tween the latter two groups in acquisition of patterning or in
transferring the rule to new stimuli.
There is ample evidence that informing subjects about CS-
reinforcement relationships enhances subsequently observed
CRs, but these effects are not always unambiguously associative.
Giving other kinds of information about impending events, for
example, telling the subject about future tasks (Kimmel 1967) or
about an intelligence test that will be administered later (Kim-
mel & Bevill 1985) can produce similar effects. Even if instruc-
tions indeed influence human conditioning associatively, this
does not necessarily mean that only subjects who can describe
the conditioning contingency verbally can be conditioned. S&S
are not convinced that lack of verbal recall is a sufficiently
sensitive basis for concluding that conditioning without aware-
ness has occurred. We obviously disagree concerning the deter-
mination of awareness. The subjects in the foregoing studies
were questioned very closely, and the questioners were moti-
vated to detect any sign of awareness. At the very least, Shanks
& St. John should describe what they consider inadequate
interview procedures from studies claiming conditioning with-
out awareness, instead of rejecting them peremptorily or acting
as if they do not even exist.
Can procedural learning be equated with
unconscious learning or rule-based
learning?
Zoe Kourtzi,a Lindsay M. Oliver," and Mark A. Gluckb
"Department of Psychology; >>Center for Molecular and Behavioural
Neuroscience, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ 07102;
'kourtzi@draco.rutgers.edu, 'vliver@pavlov.rutgers.edu, and
"gluck@pavlov.rutgers.edu
The aim of Shanks & St. John's (S&S's) target article is to
determine whether or not two independent learning systems
exist, one based on declarative or explicit learning, the other
based on procedural or implicit learning. S&S approach the
question of independent learning systems in terms of two
distinctions: conscious versus unconscious learning, and
instance-based versus rule-based learning. We argue here that
these two distinctions do not capture the intentions of the
researchers originally making the differentiation between de-
clarative and procedural learning, or the implications of the data
that motivated this distinction. The distinction between declar-
ative and procedural learning can be better understood in terms
of stimulus recoding in learning. To this end we adopt a model of
hippocampal function (Gluck & Myers 1993) in animal learning
to restate the distinction between declarative and procedural
learning in terms of stimulus representation.
S&S define implicit or procedural learning as learning based
on unconscious rule induction. They evaluate evidence in favor
of implicit learning focusing primarily on studies of intact sub-
jects. They conclude that the existence of unconscious learning
has not been satisfactory established, but that both instance-
based and rule-based learning occur dependent on the type of
the stimuli and the nature of the task. The definition of implicit
learning as unconscious, rule-based learning, combined with
the lack of evidence for unconscious learning suggest that
implicit learning is learning based on conscious rule induction.
As noted by S&S, the distinction between declarative learning
and procedural learning was originally intended to refer to the
difference between the learning of facts and the learning of skills
and arose in part from the observation that amnesics are im-
paired in declarative learning but not in procedural learning
(Cohen & Squire 1980). The terms explicit and implicit were
used to replace declarative and procedural with the discovery
that amnesics are capable of more than skill-based learning
(e.g., Graf et al. 1984; Squire & McKee 1992). However, the
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notion of implicit learning as rule-based learning suggested in
the target article does not seem to capture the essence of the
kind of learning of which amnesics are capable. Here we de-
scribe a model of hippocampal function in animal learning. We
use this model to reframe the distinction between declarative
and procedural learning in terms of stimulus representations,
and give a beginning account of how the model might explain the
human data that first motivated the distinction.
Recently, Cluck and Myers (1993) proposed a theory of
cortico-hippocampal interaction in classical conditioning. The
theory allows for two kinds of learning, learning that depends on
stimulus recoding and learning that can proceed on the basis of
stimulus response associations alone. We believe that this dis-
tinction, as it is incorporated in the cortico-hippocampal model,
provides a better basis for reframing the original distinction
between declarative and procedural learning. The theory is
instantiated by a network model consisting of two modules, in
which the hippocampal module forms new stimulus representa-
tions that facilitate learning. The cortical module is incapable,
by itself, of forming novel stimulus-stimulus-based recodings
but uses the new hippocampal representations as a basis for
forming new stimulus-outcome representations. Within this
framework, a hippocampal lesion is characterized by removing
the hippocampal module. When the hippocampal module is
lesioned, the system learns associative stimulus-response rela-
tionships based on this fixed encoding of the stimulus inputs. In
comparison, the intact system learns the same stimulus-
response (S-R) relationships but does so based on a flexible and
distributed recoding of the stimulus inputs that reflect both
predictive S-R relationships as well as sensory-sensory
correlations.
The Gluck and Myers (1993) cortico-hippocampal model rests
on the assumption that the role of the hippocampus in associa-
tive learning is the development of new stimulus representa-
tions that facilitate learning. We propose that the hippocampus
may play a similar role in human learning, and that the deficits
seen in hippocampally damaged amnesics reflect an inability to
form new stimulus representations. The cortico-hippocampal
model predicts that the hippocampus is required for any learn-
ing in which stimulus recoding is necessary. Under the model,
failures in declarative learning can be understood in terms of
failures to combine in memory those elements of the environ-
ment that go together to form a specific declarative memory.
The elements of a declarative memory are in many cases en-
countered frequently in everyday life; it is the unique combina-
tion of those elements that makes the memory unique. The
inability to recode stimulus representations in a way that takes
into account configurations of stimulus elements precludes the
learning of declarative information.
The Gluck and Myers model could account for the fact that
amnesics are impaired in declarative learning, because declara-
tive learning requires stimulus recoding that depends on an
intact, functioning hippocampus. In contrast, learning for which
amnesics show little or no impairment would be best charac-
terized as being based on fixed associative S-R relationships and
therefore, can proceed without stimulus-stimulus (S-S) recod-
ing. The model predicts that hippocampally damaged amnesics
will be capable of just such tasks. For example, Knowlton et al.
(1993) found that amnesic subjects performed as well as normal
subjects early in training in a probabilistic categorization task.
Such a task can proceed on the basis of S-R associations and
hence the model predicts no impairment for amnesics. The term
procedural fails to characterize this kind of learning, because
certain tasks that are not skill based can be learned on the basis
of associative S-R relationships, without S-S recoding. For
example, the priming effects reviewed by S&S (Graf et al. 1984),
in which amnesics maintain the ability to complete word stems,
can be accounted for without reference to stimulus recoding,
and hence the model expects that amnesics will show no
impairment.
The above studies show the importance of distinguishing
between S-S representations and S-R associations. This distinc-
tion is not captured by the narrow definition of implicit learning
used in the target article. Gluck and Myers' model suggests that
there are two kinds of learning, hippocampus-mediated S-S
representational learning and hippocampus-independent S-R
associative learning, and animal lesion data support this distinc-
tion (Gluck & Myers 1993) in animal learning.
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Consciousness in natural language and
motor learning
Joel Lachter
Department of Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627;
lachter@psych.rochester.edu
In their target article, Shanks & St. John (S&S) propose that all
learning is conscious. This proposition raises some interesting
issues that the authors do not spell out. In this commentary, I
would like to raise such issues in two areas: natural language and
the development of motor skills.
In their introduction, S&S acknowledge the importance of
language as a prima facie argument against their claim that one
cannot learn unconscious rules. One presumes that they are
referring to the ubiquitous example of natural languages. Yet
they completely ignore natural language learning in the rest of
their paper, preferring to discuss artificial language learning.
There are at least two relevant differences between natural and
artificial language learning. First, the evidence for the use of
rules is much stronger in the case of natural language learning.
Children generally achieve much higher proficiency in their
natural language than is obtained in the artificial language
learning experiments cited by S&S. In addition, children make
spontaneous categorical judgments about the acceptability of
sentences (Lachter & Bever 1988; Slobin 1978). This makes a
strategy of applying memorized phrases unlikely. Second, chil-
dren generally learn natural languages, whereas the artificial
language experiments cited by S&S were all run on adults.
People's ability to learn natural languages drops sharply as they
grow older. Current research shows that, as the age of first
exposure increases, performance declines and appears to be
based on the probabilistic application of set patterns for both
first (Newport 1990) and second (Johnson & Newport 1989)
language learners. This sort of performance is similar to S&S's
description of artificial language learners.
There is much debate surrounding the need for explicit rules
in natural language and whether such rules are innate. In the
context of such debates it is easy to lose track of two simple but
widely agreed upon facts that, taken together, imply that chil-
dren can learn aspects of language of which they are not
conscious: people are not conscious of the reasons for their
grammatical intuitions and some of what underlies these gram-
matical intuitions is learned.
Even proficient language users are usually not aware of why
some sentences are grammatical and others are not. For exam-
ple, why should the sentence, "John was assigned the task that I
didn't know to whom they would entrust," be ungrammatical in
English, while the sentences, "John was assigned the task that I
didn't know they would entrust to him," and "I didn't know to
whom they would entrust the task," are acceptable. Of course, if
these judgments were based on innate knowledge it would not
be a problem for S&S's thesis. However, languages differ in
which constructions are allowed. For example, Tincarico che
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non sapevi a chi averebbero affidato," (the Italian equivalent of
"the task that I didn't know to whom they would entrust") is a
grammatical phrase in Italian (Sells 1985; Roberto Zamparelli,
personal communication 11/29/93). If the same construction is
grammatical in one language and ungrammatical in another,
children must learn this distinction. But what could they be
consciously aware of that would lead them to learn the English
rather than the Italian "rule"? Clearly, this thought experiment
will never pass S&S's Information Criterion because there will
always be information available that is correlated with what we
suppose the child to be learning. A child endowed with all the
possible human languages might be able to differentiate Italian
from English by the presence or absence of trilled Rs; something
children might be presumed conscious of. It is likely that one
can differentiate all human languages on such a basis. However,
although it is easy to find such correlates, it is hard to find ones
that make a plausible basis for how children actually learn
language. I believe the onus is on S&S to describe some form of
information that children might plausibly be conscious of, that
could give rise to linguistic intuitions.
Another issue raised by S&S's thesis concerns what people are
conscious of while learning. This issue may be clearest in the
case of the development of a motor skill. Think of learning to
drive a car, learning to play a musical instrument, or learning to
control a computer mouse. Typically, people receive instruction
on how to perform such a task. They then repeatedly attempt to
perform the task with increasing degrees of success. Thus, there
is a two-stage learning process: first, one learns explicit rules for
carrying out a task; then, one applies these rules as part of a
controlled process. With repeated application, performance of
the task becomes automatic, to the point where it can be done
without conscious monitoring or intervention (James 1890;
Schneider & Shiffrin 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider 1977). The
learning involved in the second stage of this process differs from
the first in that there is no conscious access to what is being
learned. Certainly, there is conscious access to the stimulus and
the response. But the learner knows what the appropriate
response to the stimulus is at the beginning of training. What is
learned is not the stimulus-response pairs but a new way of
generating the response from the stimulus, and there does not
appear to be conscious access to that new process (James 1890;
Shiffrin & Schneider 1977; Velmans 1991).
The problem with the Shanks & St. John thesis appears to be a
failure to appreciate the difference between the content of
conscious experience and the content of the memory traces left
by that experience. If one consciously attempts to remember
that Mary's phone number is 484-2100, but the memory trace
laid down by the experience is that Mary's phone number is
848-2100, it is the latter that one has learned. Of course, in the
normal case, what is learned is what the person is consciously
attempting to learn. What is interesting about natural language
and motor learning is that this does not appear to be the case.
Tacit knowledge and verbal report: On
sinking ships and saving babies
R. O. Lindsay3 and B. Gorayskab
"Psychology Unit, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford OX3 OBP, England;
bDepartment of Computer Science, City of Hong Kong Polytechnic,
Kowloon, Hong Kong; «rolindsay@uk.ac.oxford-brookes and
bsgoray@uk. cphk. cphkvx
The target article examines the proposal made by various au-
thors that two distinct learning systems exist, one responsible
for "explicit" learning, the other for "implicit" learning. Shanks
& St. John (S&S) suggest that this proposal confounds two
underlying dimensions: learning with and without awareness,
and learning based on rules as opposed to learning based on
instances. Relevant studies are carefully reviewed and it is
concluded that "unconscious learning has not been satisfactorily
established" and that "in tasks such as artificial grammar learn-
ing, where learning is frequently thought to involve rule ab-
straction, performance is most often based on the acquisition of
instances or fragments from the training stage."
The position from which S&S argue is oddly reminiscent of
that of beleaguered behaviourists, earnestly examining the
inside of their theoretical ship for the slightest sign of meta-
physical leakage. The difference is that S&S seem to fear an
ingress, not of consciousness but of unconsciousness. Our posi-
tion is quite the converse of that taken by S&S: tacit knowledge
which is unavailable to awareness is both more basic and more
frequently encountered in learning systems than explicit knowl-
edge; conscious, verbalizable knowledge is a special case. The
methodological caution that S&S evince and commend is highly
laudable, and we appreciate and accept the importance of
seeking to ensure in the case of particular claims of knowledge
without awareness that tests focus on relevant knowledge, and
that a reasonable case can be made for comparability of sensi-
tivity in awareness tests. There is a real danger, however, that
S&S have unwittingly allowed methodological rigour to slide
into logical scepticism. How is a proponent of learning without
awareness to demonstrate that no test exists which could - if
only it were relevant or sensitive enough - reveal awareness
after all?
This demand would be reasonable enough if criteria for
relevance were readily available, or if sensitivity scaling were a
trusted technology, but when neither of these things is true, the
position taken by S&S, no doubt in good faith, can easily become
perverted into a formula which justifies the automatic rejection
of all claims that unconscious learning occurs. Some might be
tempted to say that this would be no bad thing, and that indeed
the psychological ship can only be expected to founder if such
metaphysical substances as unconscious learning begin to seep
aboard. We believe that this scepticism is misguided, and that
learning without awareness is not a substance which undesirably
intrudes but is part of the stuff and fabric of which the vessel is
built.
S&S seek to drive a wedge between verbal reports and
awareness. They claim, for example, that "we have little reason
to believe that the verbal report test provides an exhaustive
index of conscious information, since there are other tests such
as recognition that manifestly detect information left unde-
tected by verbal report tests." This is clearly a non sequitur,
because although the recognition test establishes the presence
of information, it does nothing to establish that the subject is
conscious of it. Nor indeed is it clear that any criterion could
establish this, other than a verbal report, or a response to a
verbal instruction such as "only press the button if you are aware
that x." Accordingly, we continue to maintain the traditional
view that awareness can be established only via verbal reports.
S&S have provided no grounds for rejecting this criterion.
We can now ask the question "Are there grounds for believing
that learning occurs which a subject is unable to report?" The
answer is plain: all animal learning and all learning in prelinguis-
tic children falls into this category. We think there is abundant
evidence that awareness is associated with symbolic planning
processes which cannot become established without nonsym-
bolic learning, which is probably best described by connection-
ist models. Such learning is, of necessity, unavailable to aware-
ness at the time it occurs. As the mechanisms for nonsymbolic
learning presumably continue to exist even when the capability
for symbolic planning is fully established, there is every reason
to suppose that learning that is nonsymbolic and unavailable to
awareness can occur in adults.
A systematic defence of this position was outlined by MacKay
(1974), almost two decades ago. It is worth quoting MacKay at
some length, as the target article by S&S suggests that his
powerful insights are in danger of being forgotten:
410 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1994) 17:3
Commentary /Shanks & St. John: Dissociable learning systems
We must distinguish between what we can say we know and what a
suitably equipped observer could say we know. . . . It is scientifically
inappropriate to regard knowledge we can express in words as
paradigmatic, and tacit knowledge as a special case. What we need
from the outset is a methodology that can cope with tacit knowledge,
taking verbalizable knowledge as a special case. . . . Since the condi-
tional readiness of a physical information system can be modified by
essentially continuous and overtly undetectable changes in thresh-
olds or in coupling elements determining transition proba-
bilities . . . as well as by discrete changes in connectivity, the knowl-
edge represented by such modifications might well be unverbalizable
for a special reason; namely that it can manifest itself only when and if
an appropriate challenge "interrogates" the state of readiness. In
other words, much of the "stored information" in such a system can be
revealed only by the way it runs and is inaccessible to any other form
of inspection. It is thus doubly unverbalizable. (MacKay 1974, p. 94)
Our conclusion is that there are good reasons for believing
that knowledge without awareness is commonplace and inevita-
ble, and that in the absence of any contrary reasons, verbal
report should continue to be taken as criterial for awareness.
The emphasis which Shanks & St. John place upon methodologi-
cal caution in evaluating particular claims that implicit knowl-
edge exists is commendable, but can cause bathwater to become
confused with babies.
Implementations! constraints on human
learning and memory systems
Chad J. Marsolek
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721;
marsolek@convxl. ccit. arizona. edu
Shanks & St. John (S&S) argue that the distinction between
learning instances versus rules is a more useful way to character-
ize the architecture of human learning systems than the distinc-
tion between conscious and unconscious learning. They empha-
size that the content of the stored material illuminates these
systems more effectively than considerations of whether sub-
jects are aware of stored material. I applaud this emphasis and
agree with the conclusion that learning and memory systems
respect the instances-rules distinction. It appears, however,
that S&S do not consider a vitally important source of relevant
evidence. In theorizing about any systems, what is known about
their implementations serves to place strong constraints on
theory. For example, hemispheric specialization of cortical pro-
cessing systems places interesting limits on S&S's conclusions.
Recent work suggests that a specific-visual-form (SVF) system
operates relatively independently of an abstract-visual-form
(AVF) system to underlie visual memory (Marsolek, submitted;
Marsolek etal. 1992; Marsolek &Schacter, submitted; Marsolek
et al., submitted). These systems store information differing in
content. An SVF system effectively stores visual details (e.g.,
whether a Y or L vertex appears in the upper left of a form) in
order to distinguish specific instances of a type of form (e.g., p
vs. P). In contrast, an AVF system effectively stores invariant
features (e.g., the proposition that an enclosed space is upper-
left-connected-to a vertical line) in order to recognize types of
forms (e.g., a p/P regardless of letter case).
This theory is interesting in the context of S&S's target article,
because the former system stores specific instances whereas the
latter system stores abstract information similar to rules about
types of visual structures. As S&S discuss, cognitive research
supports both the view that specific instances are learned and
the view that abstract rules are learned in memory tasks. I
suggest that neuropsychological and neuroscientific evidence is
needed to supplement this picture.
Hemispheric asymmetries indicate that a SVF system oper-
ates more effectively in the right cerebral hemisphere (RH) than
in the left (LH), whereas an AVF system operates more effec-
tively in the LH than in the RH. After learning new types of
visual forms, subjects classify the previously unseen prototypes
of the newly learned types more effectively when they are
presented directly to the LH (in the right visual field) than to the
RH (in the left visual field). In contrast, they classify previously
seen exemplars more effectively when they are presented di-
rectly to the RH than to the LH. Prototype forms possess the
features that do not vary across the different instances in one
type of form, and these invariant features are valuable clues for
recognizing types of forms. The information that is found in
prototype forms and that is useful for recognizing types of forms
is therefore stored more effectively in the LH than in the RH
(Marsolek, submitted).
In addition, when subjects complete a word stem (e.g., "con")
to form the first word that comes to mind, they tend to produce a
completion that forms a word viewed earlier in the experiment.
This priming effect is greater when stems are presented in the
same letter case as previously presented completion words than
in the different case, but only when stems are presented directly
to the RH. Same-case priming is not greater than different-case
priming when stems are presented directly to the LH. Thus, the
visual details that distinguish specific instances of a type of form
(e. g., lower- vs. uppercase versions of the same word) are stored
more effectively in the RH than in the LH (Marsolek et al. 1992;
submitted). These findings are consistent with S&S's conclusion
that the instances-rules distinction helps to characterize disso-
ciable human learning and memory systems.
One reason why implementation-level constraints are vitally
important for further characterizing these systems is illumi-
nated by the following example. In additional word stem experi-
ments, subjects deliberately recollect words presented earlier
in the experiment to help them complete stems. In this situa-
tion, same-case memory is greater than different-case memory
when stems are presented directly to the LH, but not when
stems are presented directly to the RH. Thus, when cued recall
is measured, information about letter case is stored more effec-
tively in the LH than in the RH, contrasting with the results
obtained when priming is measured (Marsolek et al. 1992).
These results complicate the conclusion that a simple instances-
rules distinction is important when taxonomizing human
learning.
One might argue that these results support the hypothesis
that four systems underlie human learning and memory. Sub-
jects are not encouraged to recollect consciously information
from a previous learning episode when word-stem completion
priming is measured, although they are when word-stem cued
recall is measured. Thus, an unconscious instance-based system
(in the RH), an unconscious rule-based system (in the LH), a
conscious instance-based system (in the LH), and a conscious
rule-based system (in the RH) may operate to underlie the
results in these experiments. If so, it would appear that the
instance-rule distinction that S&S support is only half of the
story, and the unconscious-conscious distinction is needed to
complete the picture.
Alternatively, even without resorting to the very difficult task
of assessing whether word-stem completion priming can be
considered an example of unconscious learning (for research
related to this issue, see Bowers & Schacter 1990), further
implementational constraints help to clarify the situation. Re-
search examining functional anatomy through positron emission
tomography, impaired abilities following brain damage, and
other evidence indicates that relatively independent cortical
systems store perceptual versus conceptual information (see
Schacter 1990; 1992; Tulving & Schacter 1990). Furthermore,
additional studies of hemispheric specialization indicate that
precise and focused semantic information is processed more
effectively in the LH than in the RH, whereas diffuse and wide-
ranging semantic information is processed more effectively in
the RH than in the LH (see Beeman 1993; Burgess & Simpson
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1988; Chiarello 1988). With these further constraints, one can
focus on the content of the material stored in different systems
when characterizing them, as S&S attempt to do. Assuming that
conceptual knowledge about letter case information can be
stored in nonperceptual systems and that priming effectively
taps information stored in perceptual systems whereas cued
recall effectively taps information stored in conceptual systems,
perhaps the best conclusion to draw is the following. A specific
perceptual system (in the RH), an abstract perceptual system (in
the LH), a specific conceptual system (in the LH), and an
abstract conceptual system (in the RH) operate relatively inde-
pendently to underlie human learning and memory.
To the extent that this conclusion satisfies a large number of
constraints from neuropsychology and neuroscience as well as
from cognitive studies of learning and memory, it is preferable to
the alternative conclusion involving a conscious-unconscious
learning distinction. Implementational evidence appears to be
necessary to develop fully theory in human learning and
memory.
On the futility of attempting to demonstrate
null awareness
Philip M. Merikle
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario,
Canada N2L 3G1; pmerikle@watarts.uwaterloo.ca
The single most important message that can be taken from
Shanks & St. John's (S&S's) target article is that it is futile to try
to use single dissociations to demonstrate the existence of
implicit or unconscious learning. By and large, both the propo-
nents and the opponents of implicit learning accept the legit-
imacy of single dissociations as a means of deciding whether or
not learning can occur without concurrent conscious awareness.
However, there is a fatal flaw in the logic underlying this version
of the dissociation paradigm. Before it is possible to demonstrate
implicit learning, it is necessary to demonstrate that there is
absolutely no conscious awareness of task relevant information.
The obvious problem is: How can it ever be established that any
behavioral measure is a satisfactory exhaustive measure of all
potentially relevant conscious information (cf. Reingold & Mer-
ikle 1988)?
This weakness in the logic underlying studies of implicit
learning is a weakness that is shared with many other studies of
unconscious influences. In fact, for more than 100 years, the
predominant method for studying possible unconscious influ-
ences in perception, memory, or learning has been to establish
single dissociations between two different measures. In all of
these studies, one of the two measures is assumed to reflect the
influence of relevant conscious knowledge, while the second
measure is assumed to reflect perception, memory, or learning
independent of relevant conscious information. The experimen-
tal challenge has been to demonstrate that information is per-
ceived, remembered, or learned even when it is completely
unavailable to awareness, as indicated by the null sensitivity of a
measure assumed to index relevant conscious knowledge.
The reason that more than 100 years of research with the
dissociation paradigm has not led to definitive answers is that
any demonstration of null sensitivity for an assumed measure of
awareness can always be interpreted in a number of different
ways. The exhaustive nature of an assumed measure of aware-
ness can almost always be questioned, as it is difficult if not
impossible ever to justify completely that any particular mea-
sure is sensitive to all relevant conscious information. However,
the exhaustiveness assumption must be made before any simple
dissociation provides strong evidence for an unconscious influ-
ence. If the exhaustiveness assumption cannot be justified, a
dissociation between measures may simply indicate that the
measure of conscious knowledge was insensitive to at least some
potentially relevant conscious information.
Rather than seeing the exhaustiveness assumption as a barrier
to successful experiments, S&S embody it in their Information
and Sensitivity Criteria. Taken together, these two criteria state
that an adequate test of awareness must be sensitive to all
potentially relevant conscious knowledge. S&S imply that it
should be possible to satisfy the exhaustiveness assumption and
to conduct satisfactory studies. I disagree. I think the ex-
haustiveness assumption is difficult if not impossible to justify.
For this reason, a skeptic will probably always be able to argue
that the experimental manipulations in any particular experi-
ment failed to rule out awareness for at least some potentially
relevant conscious knowledge.
For evidence of the difficulty in ever satisfying the exhaustive-
ness assumption, one need only consider the conclusions
reached by S&S. After reviewing much of the relevant research
on implicit learning, they conclude that unconscious learning
has not been satisfactorily established. The primary basis for this
conclusion is that by and large most studies have failed to
demonstrate convincingly that null performance on an assumed
measure of conscious knowledge actually indicates null aware-
ness of all potentially relevant information.
Given the problematic nature of the exhaustiveness assump-
tion, I doubt that it will ever be possible to establish the
existence of an unconscious influence in learning, memory, or
perception simply by demonstrating a single dissociation be-
tween measures. I am confident that as long as a demonstration
of null awareness for all potentially relevant knowledge is a
prerequisite for a convincing demonstration of learning without
awareness, controversy will continue to characterize this area of
research. The large number of indecisive empirical studies
suggests that establishing single dissociations is not a very
productive research strategy. I am certain that continued at-
tempts to use single dissociations to document unconscious
influences will only serve to continue current controversies.
A better strategy than attempting to "prove" or "disprove" the
existence of learning without awareness is to assume that both
conscious and unconscious influences exist and then to develop
experimental techniques that can distinguish between these
two types of influences. This research strategy has proven
successful in studies of both perception and memory (cf. Jacoby
et al. 1992; Merikle 1992). To date, however, this research
strategy has not been adopted to any great extent in studies
directed at demonstrating implicit or unconscious learning. The
main advantage of attempting to distinguish conscious from
unconscious influences is that it directs research toward ques-
tions concerning how these two types of influences may differ. If
the distinction between implicit and explicit learning can be
shown to predict qualitatively different outcomes, then it is both
interesting and important. However, if the distinction only
predicts quantitative differences in performance, then there is
reason to question whether it helps to advance our understand-
ing of human cognition in any important way.
Faulty rationale for the two factors that
dissociate learning systems
Hiroshi Nagata
School of Health Sciences, Okayama University, Shikata, Okayama 700,
Japan
As Shanks & St. John (S&S) argue, "the aware/unaware and
rules/instances dimensions are logically distinct (sect. 1.1, para.
5)" and crossing the two dimensions produces four hypothetical
learning systems (see sect. 3, para. 1). Such argumentation is
reinforced when Reber (1989a, p. 219) characterizes implicit
learning as "the process by which knowledge about the rule-
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governed complexities of the stimulus environment is acquired
independently of conscious attempts to do so. ' However, I shall
claim that S&S's interpretation of Reber's arguments on the
findings in artificial grammar learning studies is flawed and that
their rationale for hypothesizing the two factors that dissociate
learning systems is not supported. This is particularly true for
the rules/instances dimension.
1. Rules versus Instances. S&S's instance-storage theory is
sufficient to account for performance in previous artificial gram-
mar learning studies only if the theory incorporates a process
that Brooks and Vokey (1991) call "abstract analogy." This ap-
pears to rule out an alternative rule-induction theory, but I do
not think that S&S are actually arguing about something that is
qualitatively different from Reber. This is because an ordered
set of bigrams is emphasized as an important cue when sorting
grammatical from ungrammatical strings (Reber & Allen 1978),
and because the functional mental representation of a finite-
state grammar is considered to involve not a formal Markovian
system as a target rule but the ordered set of bigrams and
trigrams (Reber 1989a, p. 226). Reber provides no specific
mention of a relationship between this ordered set of bigrams/
trigrams on the one hand, and what he often describes as
"invariance patterns of the stimulus environment' (p. 226) or
"structural patterns of relational invariances that the environ-
ment displays' (p. 229), on the other. However, it is safe to
presume that these refer to the same thing. Because Reber
regards rules as "complex interdependent covariations among
events" (p. 231), we must conclude that the ordered set of
bigrams/trigrams is exactly what he considers rules. For if rules
constitute the abstract knowledge acquired through implicit
learning, so does the ordered set of bigrams/trigrams.
S&S's instance-storage theory, too, gives a major role to
fragments in a grammaticality judgment task. It is evident,
further, that S&S attach more importance to fragments than to
instances as a successful cue for grammaticality judgments (see
sect. 2.5.1, para. 15; sect. 2.5.2, para. 3). Since for S&S subjects'
knowledge "consists of instances or fragments of the training
stimuli" (abstract), the critical issue we must examine is whether
S&S allow a certain type of order to relate the fragments to each
other. The target article is not at all clear on this point, namely,
whether or not order information is essential in the gram-
maticality judgments. To support their instance-storage theory,
S&S cite the Dienes et al. (1991) study, however, which demon-
strates subjects' sensitivity to illegal orders of legal pairs (bi-
grams). This suggests that S&S, too, regard order information as
no less important. It should also be noted that this information is
obviously indispensable if subjects are given, instead of a usual
classification task, a production task in which they are required
to produce whatever letter strings they think are legitimate.Y
Hence, S&S must include this order information in their
instance-storage theory to make it viable.
Thus, there is no substantial difference in the knowledge that
S&S and Reber believe subjects develop during a learning
phase. The only difference between them concerns which side
of the coin they put special emphasis on. S&S favor a more
specific side of the coin, attending to instance-based informa-
tion, while Reber favors a more general ("abstract" is his term)
side, attending to rule-based order information. The coin itself
consists of ordered sets of bigrams/trigrams. In this respect,
S&S are quite right. Yet the problem is whether the type of
knowledge acquired (rules vs. instances) constitutes a reason-
able dimension in hypothesizing separate learning systems.
2. Implicit versus explicit Reber's characterization of implicit
learning as an unconscious process hints that implicit and
explicit processes are mutually exclusive, comprising two
branches of a binary alternative. However, Reber (1989b, p. 243)
does not define a clear boundary between the two processes
when he remarks that his "subjects have some conscious aware-
ness of rules." He further adds that what he insists on is not that
a = 0 but that subjects' conscious knowledge is "insufficient to
account for their behavior; that is, e > a, even though a > 0"
(p. 243), where a is the knowledge available to consciousness
whereas € is that available to unconsciousness. This does not
imply, of course, that Reber views implicit and explicit learning
as having a single learning system in common. Quite the
contrary. He favors an implicit learning system that is cog-
nitively distinct from the explicit one.2
The studies S&S cover in the target article provide reasonable
support for their position that the implicit learning system has
not been satisfactorily established. Notice, however, that al-
though prior implicit learning evidence could be accounted for
without reliance on independent implicit processes, a substan-
tial amount of human knowledge and skill is acquired in an
incidental or unintentional manner. This state of affairs is partic-
ularly evident in language learning.3 We know how to under-
stand and produce sentences in our native language, even
though we may not be able to articulate explicitly the abstract
principles or rules (where it is reasonable to assume them4) used
to create or parse such sentences. Even linguists and psycho-
linguists are far from being able to do that. It is doubtful if every
domain of knowledge could be accounted for satisfactorily by
S&S's explicit learning system. Their system postulates, by
definition, that every aspect of knowledge is known to learners.
I would like to know whether S&S's conclusion remains
unchanged when we assume a single, instead of a dual, learning
system,5 for which the level of awareness ranges from explicit to
implicit states on a continuum. This learning system encodes,
stores, and represents a variety of objects and events including,
for example, their attributes, relations, and covariations. It is
accordingly devoted to encoding rule-like properties as well as
specific instances involved in a stimulus environment. Some
types of knowledge acquired by this system become known to
learners relatively explicitly (a > 0), while the other types of
knowledge remain less explicitly known (e > a). Even in a single
knowledge domain, there are varying gradations of awareness.
Thus we can offer unsophisticated but rather explicit explana-
tions for some portion of our knowledge, while we are entirely
unaware of other portions.
It is worth adding that the knowledge requiring the mecha-
nism of Brooks and Vokey's (1991) "abstract analogies," which
S&S defend, is evidently less explicit in awareness than the
knowledge not requiring that mechanism. This is typically
illustrated in the observation that generalization to same-set
(letters unchanged) items is greater than that to novel-set
(letters changed) items (e.g., Whittlesea & Dorken 1993).
3. Conclusions. Because there is no substantial difference
between S&S and Reber with respect to knowledge acquired,
S&S's attempt to make the rules versus instances difference an
independent dimension for hypothesizing dissociable learning
systems is invalidated. The implicit versus explicit dimension as
a state of awareness - as opposed to that of a learning system -
should not be dispensed with in accounting for the acquisition of
a range of knowledge and skills that is not covered by S&S.
NOTES
1. Note that studies are lacking which have used production as a
performance measure.
2. See Reber (1989a) and Reber et al. (1991) for a sketch of his
evolutionary model of implicit processes.
3. Recall that Reber (1967) started implicit learning studies in the
present style to elucidate the mechanism underlying language learning.
4. Whether native speakers know the principles or rules of their
language as espoused by generative theorists has not been empirically
established, I believe. See Nagata (1988; 1989a; 1989b; 1989c; 1992)
concerning the instability of linguistic intuition, and Nagata (submitted)
concerning native speakers' insensitivity to Chomsky's (1981) binding
principle.
5. Whether this learning system can be defined as exclusively explicit
or exclusively implicit cannot be determined.
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The intuitive mind
Geir Overskeid
Institute of Psychology, University of Oslo, 0317 Oslo, Norway;
geir.overskeid@psykologi.uio.no
Shanks & St. John (S&S) present solid arguments, as do Cleere-
mans (1993b) and others, in favor of the view that there are two
types of conscious learning. S&S are hard to follow, however,
when they claim that there is therefore no unconscious way of
learning.
Most people feel that their conscious decisions matter - and
conscious decisions probably often do, even though our deci-
sions in turn are determined by other events. When humans
act, however, it is not always because we (our conscious selves,
that is) have decided to act. There is much cited evidence
indicating that the decision may often be taken for us by our
brain, and that we jump on a running train believing we started
it - namely, the conscious "decision" to act comes after the act
has been initiated (Libet 1985). When we learn, decisions about
when to act are often crucial, whether learning is explicit or
implicit. In other words, we cannot even be sure that all explicit
learning is conscious.
If learning is a change that takes place in an organism so as to
enable it to solve new problems, then many parts of the organ-
ism learn. The immune system learns to recognize viruses,
muscles learn by getting stronger. Our immune system and
muscles hardly learn in a conscious way. Therefore, all learning
in humans is not conscious. When it comes to human learning
that strongly involves the nervous system, however, such as
instrumental or classical conditioning, S&S claim that every
aspect of learning is conscious. But what do people do when they
learn to play tennis?
When a slightly changed combination of power, body posi-
tion, and racket angle enables me to win more points, I have
learned, but I do not know how, though I sometimes talk to
myself when I play. Like most skills, playing tennis seems to
depend on a blend of high-level, conscious guidance, and
behavior of which I can become conscious only by self-
observation.
Perhaps I am fooling myself. Maybe I just think I am not
conscious of the way I learn to play. Well, there seems to be good
experimental evidence, too, that people can learn without
consciousness - evidence that S&S do not refer to. For example,
people can learn in their sleep.
In their conclusion to section 2.6.2, S&S state that "implicit
learning would be demonstrated if learning, as indexed by
changes in instrumental behavior, occurred in the absence of
awareness of the reinforcement contingencies." Instrumental
learning during sleep should be one of several cases to satisfy
that criterion: Granda and Hammack (1961) reported finding
avoidance learning in every sleep stage, including what has been
defined as "deep sleep" (stage 4).
S&S claim that classical and instrumental conditioning has not
been demonstrated in humans in the absence of consciousness.
That the two types of conditioning are very well-known phe-
nomena in most species of animals, including primates (Catania
1992) should mean either that animals have the kind of knowl-
edge that S&S would call conscious, or that all learning in
humans does not presuppose consciousness.
Consciousness is a key concept of S&S's target article, yet
they hardly discuss the meaning of this difficult word. In using
the word "consciousness," however, they consistently refer to
"reportable knowledge" (e.g., sect. 2.3.2; sect. 5, para. 2). So (1)
no animals or very few, have the kind of consciousness that S&S
discuss, and (2) if people who cannot speak or understand
speech can learn, their learning should be called "implicit."
Now, profoundly retarded people, with no vocabulary at all,
have been shown time and again to learn through operant
procedures (e.g., Barton et al. 1986; Mace & Knight 1986), as
have normal preverbal children (Bentall et al. 1985; Lowe et al.
1983). That the behavioral effects of instrumental conditioning
have been demonstrated in monkeys even after the spinal cord
has been isolated from supraspinal influence by transection
(Wolpaw & Carp 1990) should serve to cast further doubt upon
the necessary role of consciousness in instrumental learning.
One of the two criteria that S&S use in deciding whether
implicit learning has been demonstrated seems difficult to
handle, and has obviously contributed to the two authors' nega-
tive conclusion. In formulating the Sensitivity Criterion, they
write (sect. 2.3.2) that "we must be able to show that our test of
awareness is sensitive to all of the relevant conscious knowl-
edge." In section 2.7.2, S&S affirm that testing whether a
subject is able to predict the next element of a sequence is a
measure of awareness that satisfies the Sensitivity Criterion. It is
difficult to see, however, how the Sensitivity Criterion can ever
be satisfied. It is particularly troublesome to understand how
being able to predict something proves that conscious knowl-
edge was behind the prediction. A basic problem in designing
expert systems stems from the fact that human experts tend to
reach conclusions they "feel" to be correct, but are often unable
to state the premises on which a conclusion is based (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus 1986; Overskeid 1992). Johnson (1983) confronted a
physician with the fact that he did not seem to do diagnosis the
way he taught students to do it. And the doctor answered: "Oh, I
know that, but you see I don't know how I do diagnosis, and yet I
need things to teach students. I create what I think of as
plausible means for doing tasks and hope students will be able to
convert them into effective ones."
Many of Western culture's traditional assumptions turn out to
be wrong when scrutinized by science. However, the distinction
between conscious and unconscious learning and knowledge,
discussed by Socrates and Democritus around 400 B.C. (Over-
skeid, submitted), can still withstand attack and leave alive the
intuitive mind.
Dissociating multiple memory systems:
Don't forsake the brain
Mark G. Packard
Department of Psychology, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA
70148; mgpps@uno.edu
In their interesting article Shanks & St. John (S&S) challenge
the notion that a distinction between a conscious/explicit sys-
tem, and an unconscious/implicit system is meaningful in tax-
onomizing human learning. Although conceding the existence
of two learning systems that encode "different types of knowl-
edge," S&S propose that both systems acquire knowledge con-
sciously. Having consciously attended to the target article (even
considering it while driving, in which my learned behavior was
certainly being expressed unconsciously), I am neither con-
vinced that unconscious learning does not exist, nor that the
terms "instances" and "rules" are particularly useful operating
principles in distinguishing between multiple memory systems.
In failing to offer first their definition of consciousness, S&S
add to the difficulty of assessing their view that unconscious
learning does not exist. Nonetheless, the fundamental flaw in
the analysis of S&S can be summed up in their own words: "In
our evaluation of learning systems we have not considered at all
the evidence from patients suffering from the classic ante-
rograde amnesic syndrome." In formulating theories about the
operating principles that distinguish different types of memory,
the literature on learning and memory in animals and human
amnesics, and that on learning in normal humans should not be
considered in isolation. There are inherent limitations in the
interpretation of data from normal human subjects when argu-
ing for the existence of multiple memory systems. The first is
simply that without evidence of selective involvement of differ-
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ent brain structures in mediating different types of memory, one
could always argue that a single brain system exists to encode
knowledge (even possibly different types of knowledge), and
that the ultimate behavioral expression (which is used to infer
multiple systems) of such knowledge depends on the content of
the information processed. Second, even if it is assumed that
multiple memory systems exist, studying memory in normal
subjects in which one or more systems may be simultaneously
active limits the ability to dissociate them. Findings of brain
research suggest that multiple memory systems interact in the
intact brain, and at present we have little understanding of the
factors that determine the nature of that interaction. In normal
subjects in whom both systems are active, there is no a priori
reason to assume that a relatively more complex "conscious"
learning system could not also acquire simpler learning tasks
that may also be acquired by an "unconscious" system. There-
fore, the data from normal subjects cited by S&S pertaining to
Pavlovian conditioning and instrumental learning do not con-
clusively argue against the existence of unconscious learning.
Rather, the data may be interpreted to suggest that a conscious
form of learning is preferred by the brain when both systems are
active and the experimental situation permits conscious learn-
ing. Thus, because of their exclusive consideration of data
obtained from normal subjects, S&S cannot convincingly argue
for the existence of multiple memory systems, a necessary first
step in developing theories about the operating principles that
distinguish different forms of memory.
However, a consideration of the extensive literature bearing
on this question from research on animals and human amnesics
leads inevitably to the conclusion that multiple memory systems
do exist. Our own approach to the multiple systems hypothesis
has involved comparing the effects of both lesion damage and
posttraining stimulation of different brain structures in rodents
on the acquisition of pairs of tasks with similar motivational,
sensory, and motor characteristics, but with different mnemonic
requirements. This approach has led to the observation of
double dissociations in mnemonic function following manipula-
tions of different brain areas, in particular, the hippocampal
system and the caudate nucleus (Packard et al. 1989; Packard &
McGaugh 1992; Packard & White 1991). Other findings support
such an anatomical dissociation in monkeys, and recent evi-
dence suggests that the separable roles of the hippocampal
system and caudate nucleus in memory are also observable in
humans with specific neurological disorders that predominantly
compromise the hippocampus and caudate nucleus. Thus, a
close correspondence is beginning to emerge in studies examin-
ing the anatomical bases of multiple memory systems across
mammalian species. Considered together with S&S's sugges-
tion that all forms of learning are conscious, they must be willing
to concede animal consciousness (at least in mammalian spe-
cies). If not, how do they maintain their position and explain the
evidence indicating evolutionary conservation in mammals of
brain structures involved in different forms of memory?
An additional problem with the proposal of S&S concerns the
usefulness of "rules" as a meaningful term for defining a type of
learning. A rule is a guide or a principle for governing action. In
describing overt behavior, almost any task can be construed to
involve rule learning, which limits the development of tasks
designed to differentiate multiple memory systems. For exam-
ple, the acquisition of a win-stay simultaneous visual discrimina-
tion, in which animals learn to approach a specific stimulus (e.g.,
a white light) might be described as learning the rule "approach
the white light." Similarly, acquisition of a win-shift radial maze
task, which requires animals to avoid visiting maze arms in
which they have already obtained reward, might be described as
learning the rule "do not revisit previously entered maze arms."
However, despite the fact that it is relatively easy to describe
rules that may underlie task acquisition, lesions to different
brain areas produce a double dissociation in the acquisition of
these two tasks (Packard et al. 1989). Thus, the proposition that
the use of rules is a unique form of learning does not adequately
capture the essential difference in the two tasks. Instead, the
development of theories that focus on the content of information
in a particular task may prove more useful in defining the
operating principles that distinguish multiple memory systems.
Of course, no single perspective is likely to provide a com-
plete understanding of the complex issue concerning the nature
of multiple memory systems. Rather, thoughtful integration of
data obtained not only from normal human subjects (as aptly
reviewed by S&S) but also from human amnesics and other
mammalian species is undoubtedly the most promising
approach.
What about unconscious processing during
the test?
Pierre Perruchet3 and Jorge Gallego6
'LEAD, Faculty des sciences, Universit6 de Bourgogne, 21000 Dijon,
France; b Laboratoire de Physiologie, University de Paris XI, 94276 Le
Kemlin-Bic6tre Cedex, France; perruche@satie.u.bourgogne.fr
It may reasonably be anticipated that Shanks & St. John's
(S&S's) will be a landmark paper in the research on implicit rule
learning. Till now, unconscious rule induction seemed a well-
established phenomenon. S&S make clear that most of its
supporting evidence has recently been ruled out. As the authors
illustrate, subjects' performance in implicit learning settings is
essentially based upon the memory for specific events or frag-
ments of study items, instead of being guided by some abstract
form of knowledge. This renders ipso facto irrelevant all prior
evidence for unconscious rule learning from the implicit learn-
ing literature. S&S's provocative plea passes the ball to those
who advocate the reality of the phenomenon: it is now up to the
latter to collect new experimental evidence for their claim. S&S
provide clear criteria for them to meet.
It may be disputed, however, whether this line of reasoning
(that we fully endorse) alone justifies S&S's strong claim against
the existence of any sort of unconscious learning. First, a more
cautious conclusion about the unconscious registration of spe-
cific events during the training phase may be in order. S&S are
right to point out that specific knowledge of the study items has
been shown to be available to consciousness in virtually any
conventional implicit learning paradigm. But it is fair to ac-
knowledge that only a limited number of paradigms have been
explored; moreover, that these may have been far from optimal
for revealing unconscious detection of the events under study.
Indeed, because researchers basically intend to prevent sub-
jects from rule searching, they take no care to discourage
subjects, (and often even encourage them) to memorize their
specific experiences. Under these conditions, the actual find-
ings are not really surprising. Future work will have to make
more extensive use of specially devised methods, such as dual-
task conditions of learning, to give a real opportunity to subjects
to acquire specific information without consciousness.
There is a second, much more fundamental reason, for some
skepticism with regard to S&S's radical rejection of any inter-
vention of unconscious processes during learning. This reason is
rooted in the fact that their paper, mirroring the available
literature, passes silently over one major component of the
learning process. As evidenced in their Figure 1, S&S confine
the occurrence of learning to time tlt that is, during the study
episode. The only objective of the test tasks provided at t2 is to
reveal what has been acquired at tv We believe that this widely
held conception is undermined by a serious flaw. What needs to
be explained in the end by a learning theory is the improved
performance of subjects in their natural environment. This
requires including, as part of learning, the processes occurring
during what is artificially isolated, in most laboratory situations,
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as the test or transfer phase. This aspect can of course, be
disregarded without detrimental consequences insofar as one
conceives that the study session triggers the elaboration of a
ready-to-use set of general purpose rules, whose application in
subsequent situations is somewhat trivial. In this perspective,
the test phase of a learning session may be conveniently viewed
as a window opening on the subjects' mind, which does not elicit
specific adaptive mechanisms per se. However, if, as S&S
themselves contend, people memorize piecemeal information
in incidental learning conditions, then their performance during
a subsequent test no longer proceeds from the straightforward
application of ready-to-use knowledge. Performance can no
longer be accounted for by a simple "retrieval" process, as
claimed by S&S. One must now account for how a large amount
of specific, fragmentary knowledge influences the processing of
a subsequent situation. We still do not know most of the
presumably complex mechanisms involved in this "on-line com-
putation " (to borrow the terms of Smith [1989]).
The failure to consider the processes involved in the test
phase of a learning session may have contrasting (although not
mutually exclusive) consequences, as a function of the postu-
lated nature of these processes. Because the knowledge base
that subjects use during the test is available to conscious aware-
ness (insofar as the current experimental evidence has demon-
strated), it makes sense to assume that subjects engage in
controlled forms of analytic reasoning to process this informa-
tion. Disregarding this possibility may lead to an overestimation
of the sophistication of the (presumably unconscious) processes
engaged during the study phase. For example, in dealing with
transfer to a new letter-set paradigm in artificial grammar
settings, S&S concede that according to available data, some
sort of abstract knowledge has been gained during the study
episode, under incidental conditions. Transfer may instead be
due to the abstracting operations that subjects deliberately
engage in at test time to deal with the test items, on the basis of
specific recollected information (see Perruchet & Pacteau 1991,
for more detailed arguments).
That an amount of knowledge sufficient to account for im-
proved performance is amenable to consciousness under direct,
explicit requests, however, in no way implies that this knowl-
edge is consciously retrieved and processed when subjects are
faced with a test situation. Although direct experimental evi-
dence is sparse, there are some hints that the use of knowledge
to perform adaptively in a new situation may proceed without
intention or concurrent awareness even though this knowledge
can be made explicit if necessary (see Perruchet, in press for
arguments). If this is correct, S&S's rejection of an independent
unconscious learning system may be unwarranted, although this
system would differ radically from the hypothetical unconscious
rule-induction mechanism imagined until now. Rather than
being aimed at the elaboration of an abstract knowledge base
applicable to a large range of future, virtual situations, uncon-
scious processes should be engaged when subjects use their
prior experience to respond to the immediate adaptive pres-
sures of their environment.
On the representational/computational
properties of multiple memory systems
Russell A. Poldrack and Neal J. Cohen
Beckman Institute and Department of Psychology, University of Illinois,
Urbana IL 61801; poldrac@s.psych.uiuc.edu and
ncohen@s.psych.uiuc.edu
The literature on "implicit learning," as cogently reviewed by
Shanks & St. John (S&S), revolves around the two issues of
whether such learning occurs unconsciously, namely, without
the subject's awareness, and whether it entails the abstraction of
rules rather than the storage of specific instances or fragments of
the stimulus materials. We argue here that attempting to charac-
terize or distinguish among different "learning systems" on the
basis of such characteristics is less productive than exploring
distinctions based on the representational and computational
properties of different underlying memory systems. Also mis-
guided, we believe, is the decision to exclude from serious
consideration the remarkable pattern of sparing and loss of
memory abilities in amnesia, which, as described by Eichen-
baum et al. (this volume), has suggested the existence of multi-
ple memory systems based specifically on distinct representa-
tional/computational properties.
1. Representational characteristics rather than qualitative
properties of learning systems. The lack of progress on the
question of awareness is striking: today's results may differ, but
the arguments are basically the same ones that were debated
without clear resolution in the literature on learning without
awareness more than thirty years ago. Without a theory that
explains the functional role of awareness in learning, the impor-
tance of the question for the study of learning systems is unclear.
Similar problems obtain for the debate over abstraction. As
Barsalou (1990) has shown, arguments in favor of abstract versus
exemplar representations of experience are basically undecid-
able from the empirical data; these schemes cannot be tested
without also specifying the nature of processing of the represen-
tations. With the appropriate processing assumptions, the pre-
dictions of any abstractionist model can be mimicked by, and
hence these models are empirically indistinguishable from,
exemplar models, and vice versa.
Contrast this approach to the connectionist models of "im-
plicit learning" by Cleeremans (1993b) and Dienes (1992), which
have little to say about the question of awareness. Rather, they
offer a computational approach that attempts to clarify the
nature of the information processing required to perform a given
task and the nature of the experience-mediated representations
that support it.
Also contrast this approach to the multiple memory systems
view offered by Cohen and Squire (1980), and more recently
updated, elaborated, and extended by Cohen and Eichenbaum
(1993). This view, summarized by Eichenbaum et al. (this
volume), has distinguished between functionally separate pro-
cedural and declarative memory systems, which are differenti-
ated by their representational properties and computational
characteristics: declarative memory supports relational, compo-
sitional representations capable of mediating the flexible use of
memory in novel contexts, whereas procedural memory sup-
ports representations that are fundamentally individual (non-
relational) and inflexible, mediating the acquisition and expres-
sion of skilled performance in repeated contexts. Articulated in
this way, the theory cannot only guide computational modeling
efforts, but it can also be applied to studies of memory in animals
arid can be examined with an eye toward the neural basis of
memory. Eichenbaum et al. have taken this a step further,
attempting to articulate how the different anatomical compo-
nents of the hippocampal system (damaged in certain forms of
amnesia) give rise to the functional properties of declarative
memory.
2. Amnesia and multiple memory systems. S&S largely ignore
the ideas about multiple memory systems in amnesia and the
preserved versus impaired learning and memory phenomena on
which such theoretical interpretations are based, on the prem-
ise that these data do not speak to the issue of awareness in
learning. Yet it has been well documented that amnesic patients
can exhibit normal learning of (motor, perceptual, and cogni-
tive) skills, and can do so in the absence of the ability to recollect
the learning experiences, to remember explicitly the specific
contents of their learning experiences, or to have insight into the
nature of what was learned (see Cohen & Eichenbaum 1993).
These preserved skill-learning phenomena are just as robust
and reliable as the more widely studied preserved repetition
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priming (i.e., preserved memory) effects, and just as indepen-
dent of conscious recollection or explicit remembering. And it is
precisely the discrepancy between the ability of amnesic pa-
tients to acquire and express skilled performance and their
failure to show any conscious recollection or awareness of their
learning or of the determinants of their increasingly skilled
performances (even while generating those performances)
that fueled multiple-memory-system accounts such as the
procedural-declarative distinction.
In the procedural-declarative theory, the amnesic patients'
deficits in conscious recollection of their learning experiences,
explicit remembering of the contents of their learning experi-
ences, and awareness of the nature of their enhanced skills are
tied together in each, requiring the representational flexibility
that only declarative memory can provide. In the absence of
declarative memory following damage to the hippocampal sys-
tem, there are only the inflexible representations supported by
procedural memory, that, although fully capable of mediating
the acquisition and expression of skilled performance in re-
peated contexts, are completely incapable of permitting con-
scious introspection.
Returning now to the implicit learning literature, we are
forced to conclude that by failing to note the importance of the
representational characteristics of the memory systems support-
ing particular performances, and by restricting its focus to more
qualitative properties of putative learning systems, the field
seems clearly limited in its ability to develop mature, computa-
tional theories of learning and memory.
Learning without awareness: What counts as
an appropriate test of learning and of
awareness
Sam S. Rakover
Department of Psychology, Haifa University. Haifa 31905, Israel; rsps
742@haifauvm.bitnet
In a thorough and critical review of recent experiments in
learning without awareness or implicit learning, Shanks & St.
John (S&S) conclude that learning without awareness has not
been established empirically. The main reason for this inference
is that tests of awareness used in these experiments did not meet
the Information Criterion and the Sensitivity Criterion.
History repeats itself, however. About forty years ago, a
research program in verbal learning without awareness reached
the conclusion that learning without awareness had been estab-
lished empirically (e.g., Krasner 1958). However, improve-
ments in the methods of assessing awareness (i.e., meeting the
Sensitivity Criterion better) and use of the method of "corre-
lated hypotheses" (i.e., use of the Information Criterion), led
researchers to the opposite conclusion: that learning cannot
occur without awareness (e.g., Brewer 1974; Dulany 1968;
Spielberger & DeNike 1966).
Similarly, research on implicit learning first established em-
pirically that learning does occur without awareness. However, a
subsequent wave of experiments, taking into consideration the
above two criteria, has shaken that conclusion and proposed that
learning without awareness has not been found.
I propose that this historical repetition is not haphazard;
rather, it indicates that there are profound problems and ambi-
guities with regard to the two questions: what constitutes a
suitable test of awareness, and what counts as an appropriate
task of learning without awareness?
Tests of awareness. S&S proposed that although prediction
and recognition tasks generate good indices of awareness, be-
cause they address the Sensitivity Criterion by reproducing the
context of learning, verbal reports of awareness are likely to be
insensitive. I propose the opposite. The first thing to notice is
that recognition is not always more sensitive than recall. Under
certain conditions subjects recall material that they cannot
recognize (e.g., Flexser & Tulving 1978).
Prediction and recognition, as well as relearning and reaction
time, are no more than performance indices of newly acquired
information, and as such they provide us with only part of what
has been learned. In contrast, verbal report, by its very nature,
can furnish us with all the information that has been acquired
(e.g., as in the case where a subject describes in full the rule
constituting a task). There is a profound conceptual difference
between self-reports, in which subjects access their cognitive
states directly, and other performance tests, in which awareness
is inferred indirectly from the subject's behavior. Note that in
making this distinction I am not committing myself to the thesis
that introspection is incorrigible and infallible. I am simply
stressing that verbal reports furnish the only method by which
one can communicate one's subjective private experience re-
garding the rule of a task.
If awareness of acquired knowledge is inferred from perfor-
mance in indirect tests then one can legitimately ask whether or
not subjects were aware of the knowledge, and whether or not
they were aware of the effects of that knowledge on their
performance. The answers to these questions cannot be based
on the use of a new set of indirect tests, since these questions can
be repeated with respect to the new set of tests as well. This
infinite regress has to be stopped by using self-report. In other
words, although it is legitimate to ask whether or not a certain
performance was acquired consciously, a correct self-report of
ah acquired new rule does not arouse such a question.
Finally, I propose that the measurement of awareness by, for
example, a prediction task, gives rise to the "assessment of
awareness" paradox in implicit rule-learning research: consider
Stadler's (1989) experiment, in which learning was measured
by reaction time and awareness by a prediction task, where
a subject was required to predict the position of the target
stimulus. As Stadler mentions, the major difference between
these two tasks is the response: reaction time versus choice.
Apart from this, there is nothing conceptually special in the
prediction task to qualify it as a procedure for assessing aware-
ness. Thus, if my argument is correct, we merely have here
two performance indices that provide us with certain infer-
ential information. Hence, if the prediction task is a procedure
for measuring awareness, reaction time must also be a proce-
dure for measuring awareness, because both tasks are concep-
tually equivalent. And if this is so, then we do not need a
special test for awareness, because reaction time would suffice.
The upshot of this argument is that an indication of learning by
any performance test is at the same time an indication of
awareness.
Tests of learning without awareness. I have proposed that
certain learning tasks may not be susceptible to introspective
awareness and to awareness effects (Rakover 1993). According to
the criterion for task susceptibility to introspective awareness, a
given task is not susceptible to awareness if a subject, after
having been provided with all the information concerning the
rule of that task, apart from the specific content of the rule itself,
is nevertheless unable to discover even a part of the content of
the rule. According to the criterion for task susceptibility to
awareness effects, a given task is not susceptible to awareness
effects if, after having been provided with all the information
concerning the rule constituting a task, as well as with the
appropriate conditions for performing the task, the subject's
performance of the task remains unaffected. These criteria
determine (through their experimental utilization) whether a
given task is susceptible to introspective awareness and aware-
ness effects, independently of the research attempting to dis-
cover how explicitly/implicitly acquired knowledge transfers to
subsequent tests. These two criteria generate four types of tasks:
aware/aware, aware/unaware, unaware/aware, and unaware/
unaware.
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Hence, the question of learning without awareness should be
divided into several subquestions. One interesting question is
whether or not a given unsusceptible task can be learned at all.
In order to answer, one must first establish the susceptibilities of
a given task by performing an experiment, followed by a new
experiment to find out whether or not the task can be learned.
As an example, consider the experiment performed by Lewicki
et al. (1987). They carried out a pilot study in which subjects
were informed about the structure of the rules constituting the
task, without being told what the specific content of these rules
was. The subjects were also encouraged (by a high cash reward
of $100) to specify at least part of the rules. None of the subjects
came even close to describing the correct rules. This task,
therefore, can be classified as unaware/aware, because it is not
susceptible to introspective awareness, although the subjects
would probably have changed the performance in the task had
they been informed of the specific rules of the task. Hence,
Lewicki et al.'s experiment provides us with a positive answer to
the above question. Note that if a given task is not susceptible, it
cannot be used to decide empirically the question regarding
learning without awareness. In nonsusceptible tasks, by defini-
tion, if learning does occur, it occurs unconsciously.
If these two points are correct, then Shanks & St. John's
general conclusion about learning without awareness is called
into question.
What manner of mind is this?
Arthur S. Reber and Bill Winter
Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center of
CUNY, Brooklyn, NY 11210; artreber@bklyn.bitnet and
wiwbc@cunyvm.cuny.edu
Our general reaction to Shanks & St. John's (S&S) target article is
that it reinforces something we have long believed; in fields such
as the cognitive sciences the truth lies not in "mere" experimenta-
tion but rather in the wise interpretation of the evidence as a
whole. Not surprisingly, we put a rather different gloss on the
evidence and have a different framework within which to view it
than that presented in the target article. There are many points of
disagreement; we shall focus on the most poignant ones.
Put starkly, S&S's conclusion that "human learning is almost
invariably accompanied by conscious awareness' (sect. 5, last
para.) must be wrong. It is as simple as that. If complex and
abstract representations cannot be acquired largely indepen-
dent of awareness of both the process and the products of
acquisition then just how do children acquire natural language,
how do we all come to be imbued with the social mores of our
societies, how do we induce the complex arrays of categories and
concepts with which we parse our environment? Indeed, the
evidence of an implicit mode of acquisition of complex knowl-
edge is to be found in virtually every dimension of human
perceptual and cognitive activity. Any careful assessment of
human action provides rich testimony to the manner in which
behaviors, feelings, actions, and modes of reaction were learned
without recourse to processes that played themselves out within
the spotlight of a top-down, modulating consciousness.
Moreover, S&S's perspective entails a rather odd model of
mind. If they are right that all learning in adult members of our
species takes place within consciousness then we are going to
need to rethink virtually everything we know about the phylo-
and ontogenetic processes that lie at the core of evolutionary
biology and, by extension, the psychological processes that rely
upon them. To put it simply, because nonhuman species show
clear evidence of the acquisition of rule-governed knowledge
independently of conscious awareness (see any of the contribu-
tions to: Ristau 1991; Weiskrantz 1985), and because infants and
very young children acquire complex, rule-governed knowledge
(Haith & McCarty 1990; Rovee-Collier 1990), S&S seem stuck
with the odd conclusion that somehow something happens to
members of our species somewhere before puberty such that all
learning suddenly shifts from being synergistically modulated
by both implicit and explicit systems to being entirely in the
domain of the explicit. We note with interest that S&S neglect
the literature on learning in animals and young children, an
omission that we feel seriously weakens their argument. We
suggest that a framework that is more coherent from an evolu-
tionary biological point of view should recognize that conscious-
ness is a late arrival on the evolutionary scene and was preceded
by systems that enabled organisms to acquire complex knowl-
edge about their environment independent of a modulating,
self-reflexive consciousness (Reber 1993).
That aside, we certainly acknowledge that reasonable people
can dispute over the message contained in the existing literature
and, as noted above, wise interpretation is what is needed here.
Implicit learning is a complex process and one that is not easy to
capture in a controlled laboratory setting, but the conclusion
that it cannot be dissociated from an explicit process is simply
not supported by the existing literature. In what follows we
would like to point briefly to various places where our reading of
the literature differs from that presented in the target article.
1. In their discussion of Pavlovian and instrumental condition-
ing S&S leave out, as noted, the work on animals and infants.
That normal adults may be aware of CS-UCS relationships does
not mean that all conditioning takes place within conscious
awareness. Aplysia is surely not conscious of the CS-UCS
pairing (at least in the same sense and quality as adult aware-
ness), yet this humble slug is even capable of differential condi-
tioning (Carew et al. 1983). Infants as young as three months old
learn to anticipate the location of a face that systematically
moves from place to place (Haith & McCarty 1990) and to
control aspects of their environment by simple motor responses
(Rovee-Collier 1990). A quick look at the classic literature in
kinesics (Birdwhistell 1970) shows that we acquire wonderfully
complex muscle movement patterns that shape our face, ges-
tures, and gait largely without awareness of the subtle interplay
between the muscle groups involved and the manner in which
their actions are shaped by the environment. Do S&S wish to
suggest that the principles underlying Pavlovian and instrumen-
tal conditioning change with the number of neurons an organism
has or the point in its development when the data are collected,
or, that conditioning without awareness is possible but only in
other species or in the earlier stages of ontogeny in ours? None
of this is open to introspection; none of these behaviors are
acquired with guidance from consciousness.
Part of the difficulty here is that in laboratory settings Pavlo-
vian and simple instrumental conditioning involve relatively
simple patterns of covariation that are easily noticed by nonim-
paired adult humans; that is, these experiments tend to use
stimulus materials whose structure is highly penetrable cog-
nitively, leading to misrepresentation of the true roles that
Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning play in "the real
world." In any event, if the findings S&S cite to support the role
of awareness in conditioning are robust (e. g., Grings et al. 1973),
why can't clinicians eliminate phobias simply by making the
client aware that the UCS is no longer going to occur?
2. S&S's juxtaposition of the encoding of instances and the
abstraction of rules is an unfortunate one, because it sidesteps
the deep issues of representation. Rules can, indeed must, be
the result of abstractions across instances. The manner in which
such abstractions are induced, moreover, can easily be thought
of as beginning with the encoding of the fragmentary elements
that made up the initial instances. As far back as the 1970s
(Reber & Allen 1978; Reber & Lewis 1977) the case has been
argued that implicit learning of artificial grammars results in an
abstract representation, but the abstract representation itself is
founded upon two- and three-letter chunks that are present in
the learning array. As Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) have
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shown, the nature of the memorial representation that subjects
develop in implicit learning experiments is functionally deter-
mined by the conditions of learning and testing. The "either-or'
nature of the issue that S&S present misrepresents matters. But
the most interesting point, the one that S&S never come to grips
with satisfactorily, is that the memorial representation must be
of a form that permits for generalization or transfer to novel
stimulus displays with different physical instantiations. Altmann
et al. (in press), Brooks and Vokey (1991), Manza and Reber
(1992b), Mathews et al. (1989), and Reber (1969) have all shown
that knowledge acquired with stimuli instantiated in one physi-
cal form can be used to make decisions about stimuli instantiated
in a different physical form, even to the point of using a different
modality (Altmann et al., in press; Manza & Reber 1992b) -
provided, of course, that the underlying structural regularities
remain the same. Abstract memorial representations are re-
quired for such transfer.
3. S&S argue at length that in many of the studies on implicit
learning the measures used to assess awareness were not suffi-
ciently sensitive. In many cases, this is indeed correct and their
point is well taken. However, two additional points need to be
recognized. First, most of the measures that S&S suggest do not
tap a naturally occurring awareness of knowledge held but rather
specifically refocus the subjects' cognitive processes so that they
"squeeze" metaknowledge out of them. Second, no one is
arguing that tacit knowledge is totally opaque to consciousness;
the point is that having conscious awareness of either the process
or the products of implicit learning is not the natural state of
affairs. The fact that labored and intensive quizzing and probing
of subjects who have completed implicit learning experiments
can occasionally get them to provide a verbal report of what they
learned misses the point. The process of making implicit knowl-
edge conscious is a post hoc, top-down, secondary process
whereby individuals laboriously struggle to gain metaknowl-
edge. It is, moreover, typical of the kinds of functions we expect
from the operations of a human consciousness - top-down,
modulating, probing attempts at self-reflection and the building
of the metaknowledge base for self-awareness. Metaknowledge
can be achieved, but it is a struggle. This pattern is shown clearly
in the work of Mathews and his colleagues (Mathews et al. 1989;
Stanley et al. 1989), where subjects' capacity to utilize implicit
knowledge peaks rather quickly although their ability to expli-
cate to others what they know takes much more experience and
practice before it becomes efficient. Perhaps the best essays on
this discoordination between the implicit and explicit were writ-
ten years ago by the physician-chemist-philosopher Michael
Polanyi (1966), who argued that the essential feature of complex
knowledge systems was that we typically "know more than we
can say."
4. S&S also maintain that there has been little or no work
showing qualitative differences between implicit and explicit
learning. This is true, but what has been done clearly points to a
dissociation. Both Reber et al. (1991) and Aaronson and Scar-
borough (1977) found dramatically smaller individual differ-
ences between subjects when working in an implicit mode
rather than an explicit one. Reber et al. (1992) also found that
implicit learning, unlike explicit learning, was largely uncorre-
lated with IQ. Abrams and Reber (1988) found that psychotic
and nonamnesic alcoholics differ dramatically in their capacity
to function in implicit and explicit modes of acquisition, appear-
ing normal when engaged in implicit learning but showing
severely impaired explicit problem-solving ability. Rathus et al
(in press) report a similar pattern of dissociations when working
with a group of highly anxious subjects. In all these cases, clear
qualitative differences emerge between implicit and explicit
modes of cognitive function.
5. Finally, S&S make scant reference to the amnesia litera-
ture. This is a serious error of omission; some of the most
important findings relevant to the issue of implicit learning have
emerged from that source. S&S suggest that amnesia studies
cannot be applied to the question of unconscious learning,
because the possibility that subjects learn explicitly about stim-
ulus relationships at the time of study cannot be ruled out. This
comment reveals a basic misunderstanding about amnesic func-
tioning and its importance to cognitive research. Although it is
certainly true that amnesics are capable of explicit cognitive
analysis at the time of study, the resulting information is, given
any appreciable delay, lost to them by the time of testing. The
extreme volatility of newly encountered explicit information in
amnesia is one of the most robust and reliable findings in
psychology, documented by literally scores of studies. The fact
that amnesics nevertheless show normal implicit learning across
delays indicates that the information necessary for successful
performance can be acquired without the participation of ex-
plicit learning mechanisms.
This point is made a fortiori by Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
artificial grammar learning study, where implicit knowledge is
tapped with a standard well-formedness task and explicit knowl-
edge by a recognition test for the studied materials. The amne-
sics showed impaired recognition for the same stimulus items
that, under the implicit task instructions, produced behavior
indistinguishable from normal controls. That amnesics show
consistent and severe impairments on tests of recall or recogni-
tion for items presented just a few minutes before testing
strongly suggests that they have not, in any meaningful way,
explicitly learned the material in the first place. It also supports
the notion of a neuroanatomical dissociation between the two
modes of cognitive functioning.
Moreover, the differences in implicit and explicit learning in
amnesics have been demonstrated experimentally in nonhuman
mammals. Briefly, animals whose experimentally induced brain
lesions are designed to replicate those typically found in human
amnesia demonstrate analogous patterns of impaired and pre-
served functioning (Mahut & Moss 1984; Mishkin 1982; Zola-
Morgan & Squire 1986). The degree of correspondence in the
behavioral findings from the human and animal literatures has
only recently become appreciated (Squire 1992); the evidence
appears to weigh in favor of separate implicit and explicit
cognitive processes that are based in distinct neurological sys-
tems. We fully expect that research on the physiological and
neuropsychological domains will continue to provide major
advances in the understanding of the brain structures and
systems that differentially support explicit versus implicit cogni-
tive functioning.
New evidence for unconscious sequence
learning
Jonathan Reed and Peder Johnson
Department of Psychology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM
87131; plohnson@bootes.unm.edu
Our comments on the Shanks & St. John (S&S) target article will
concentrate primarily on the topic of implicit sequence learn-
ing. S&S have provided an excellent review of this literature;
their evaluation of the relevant studies in regard to the Informa-
tion and Sensitivity Criteria point out two of the most fundamen-
tal problems one encounters in attempting to interpret the
results of these studies. S&S conclude that none of the reviewed
studies meet both of these criteria, and, therefore, that no
convincing evidence exists for implicit sequence learning. In
addition, they describe a study (Shanks et al. 1994) showing
that when these criteria were not met, results suggested that
implicit sequence learning occurred but that when the criteria
were met there was no evidence of implicit sequence learning.
We have, however, recently reported evidence of implicit se-
quence learning (Reed & Johnson 1994), using procedures that
we believe meet the Information and Sensitivity Criteria pro-
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posed by S&S. For this reason, our commentary will provide a
rather detailed description of our methods and findings, so that
the reader can decide whether we have adequately addressed
these issues.
Whenever a specific sequence is repeated, it introduces
constraints on a variety of simple event frequencies. Learning
any or all of these simple event frequencies may be sufficient to
produce an indirect effect without the subjects actually learning
the precise structure of the repeated sequence. This potential
confound can only be eliminated if performance with a repeated
sequence is compared to reaction times (RTs) associated with
trials that maintain the same simple event frequencies as the
repeated sequence.
In the Reed and Johnson (1994) study, subjects performed
a serial reaction-time (SRT) task during which they were ex-
posed to a repeating second order conditional (SOC) sequence
(121342314324, where each digit refers to one of four horizon-
tally displayed locations). The SOC structure refers to the fact
that any pair of consecutive target locations predicts the exact
location that follows, whereas a single target location does not.
After training, subjects performed the SRT task for one block of
trials with a new repeating SOC sequence (123413214243). This
transfer sequence was selected because it matches exactly the
training sequence in relation to simple event frequencies, but it
is completely different from the training sequence in relation to
SOC structure (e.g., 12 is followed by 1 in training and by 3
during transfer trials). With the introduction of the transfer
trials, RTs slowed significantly. Because the training and transfer
sequences were identical in relation to SOC structure, we felt
that the indirect measure of learning met the Information
Criterion, and we were hence justified in concluding that
subjects had learned the SOC sequence structure (i.e., the
index of learning was not confounded with the learning of other
types of sequence structure).
Assuming that this observation constitutes indirect evidence
of SOC learning, the question turns to whether the learning
occurred without awareness. The Sensitivity Criterion proposed
by S&S requires that the test for awareness be at least as
sensitive as the indirect test in terms of its ability to detect
relevant conscious information. This, they assert, can be accom-
plished by making the direct and indirect test as similar as
possible in terms of retrieval cues and differing only in task
instructions.
To determine whether learning of the SOC structure oc-
curred without conscious awareness, Reed and Johnson (1994)
used a recognition test of awareness. During the recognition
test, subjects responded to a series of three target locations in
the same manner as during training. After performing the SRT
task for the three trials, subjects indicated whether or not the
sequence of targets was part of the training sequence. Subjects
performed this task 24 times; 12 times with training-consistent
target triads, and 12 times with training-inconsistent triads.
They performed at a chance level of accuracy, and we concluded
that learning of the SOC structure had occurred without con-
scious awareness.
Because the results of Reed and Johnson (1994) and those
of Shanks et al. (1994) are in opposition, a comparison
between the two studies is warranted. Based on the brief
description S&S provided of the Shanks et al. study, we are
obviously limited in the analysis of the possible factors underly-
ing the differences in findings. Three differences of potential
relevance concern the type of indirect test and learning condi-
tions used. Shanks et al. compared learning slopes of subjects
trained with a repeating sequence to those of subjects who
encountered a series of nonrepeating trials that were matched
with repeating trials in relation to simple event frequencies. In
contrast, Reed and Johnson used disruptions in RTs with the
introduction of the new sequence as the indirect measure of
learning. Given that we found that the magnitude for the
disruption effects were not correlated with slope (r = .0263), it is
not clear that the two indices of learning are sensitive to the
same factors.
A second difference between the two studies is that in the
Reed and Johnson study subjects performed a secondary, tone-
counting task (see Cohen et al. 1990) simultaneously with the
SRT task, whereas subjects in the Shanks et al. study did not.
Because subjects' incidental explicit learning of sequence struc-
ture has been found to be greater under single-task conditions
than under dual-task conditions (Cohen et al. 1990), this differ-
ence in experimental procedure could account for the finding
that subjects demonstrated explicit knowledge of the training
sequence in the Shanks et al. study.
A third difference between the studies is the amount of
sequence training that subjects received. In the Reed and
Johnson study, subjects were exposed to the repeated sequence
136 times, whereas in the Shanks et al. study subjects were only
exposed to 40 repetitions of the sequence during SRT training.
Thus, subjects in the Shanks et al. experiment may not have
been given enough opportunity to learn implicitly the sequence
structure.
To summarize, we generally agree with the evaluation of the
research on implicit sequence learning that S&S review, and, in
particular, we concur with their notion that studies attempting
to demonstrate unconscious learning need to meet the Informa-
tion and Sensitivity Criteria they propose. However, because
the study that we have described (Reed & Johnson 1994)
appears to meet both of these criteria, we suggest that positive
evidence for unconscious sequence learning does exist.
Learning strategies and situated knowledge
Antonio Rizzoa and Oronzo Parlangeli"
"Consiglio Nazionale Ricerche-lstituto di Psicologia-Universita di Siena,
53100 Siena; "Dipartimento di Psicologia, University di Padova, 35139
Padua, Italy; rizzo@kant.im\kant.m\.cnr.it and psico04@ipdunivx.unipd.it
Shanks & St. John (S&S) argue that there is little evidence for
the existence of separate learning systems along the con-
scious/unconscious dimension. Instead, they claim, there is
substantial evidence for more than one conscious learning
strategy. Their argument first shows that there is no convincing
evidence from experiinental paradigms adopted in the im-
plicit/explicit literature; then follows a review of results, mainly
from concept-learning tasks, corroborating the thesis of two
separate learning strategies: genuine rule learning and instance
learning.
Here we would like to provide (1) further evidence from one
of the same experimental paradigms adopted for claiming a
dissociation between implicit and explicit learning (i.e., com-
plex instrumental control tasks); (2) some implications of such
evidence for clarifying the factors that are conducive to rule
learning and instance learning.
(1) Studies on complex instrumental learning have often
adopted different scenarios (e.g., city transportation, person
interaction, sugar production, etc.) functioning according to an
underlying rule. However, the kind of knowledge that subjects
use under these circumstances has not received the attention it
deserves.
Our approach (Cambiganu et al. 1993; Rizzo et al. 1993;) to
the issue of learning to control the dynamic systems devised by
Berry and Broadbent (1984) focused on the role of situated
knowledge, namely, how knowledge transformation is con-
strained by content. According to the situated knowledge view
(e.g., Light & Butterworth 1992), it is possible to predict that the
cognitive difficulty in learning to control a system is not directly
related to the underlying formal structure of the system but to
the recruitment of schemata that can be properly adopted and
modified. The dynamic systems used in the implicit/explicit
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literature were not analyzed in this sense, though there have
been several pieces of evidence for content effect (e.g., Berry &
Broadbent 1984; Stanley et al. 1989). We have adopted four
scenarios, the two scenarios originally devised by Berry and
Broadbent (sugar production; person interaction) and two new
ones (slope: positioning and keeping a trolley in a given state
along a slope; tank: filling and keeping a given level in a tank).
The rule governing the functioning of these four scenarios was
the same. The two additional scenarios were designed with the
aim of varying the congruence between the presumably avail-
able schemata of knowledge related to the scenario and the
systems' behavior. The "slope' scenario tried to maximize the
match whereas the "tank" scenario had the opposite purpose.
The results showed different performances as a function of
different scenarios despite the formal equivalence of the under-
lying rule governing the scenarios. Moreover, the knowledge
content influenced the learning processes. Two results are of
particular interest here.
First, in the tank scenario, subjects did not exhibit any
improvement in performance. This is strong evidence against
the thesis of two independent learning systems along the con-
scious/unconscious dimension. The constraint imposed by
knowledge content on learning could in itself hardly be compati-
ble with the occurrence of implicit learning, because implicit
learning should involve the acquisition of abstract rules from S-R
pairs. However, the lack of performance improvement exhibited
by subjects in the tank scenario is not compatible with the thesis
that implicit learning is driving the subjects' behavior, because
the actual information available to the subjects was the same for
three scenarios (slope, tank, sugar) and only superficially differ-
ent for "person." If the existence of an implicit learning system is
maintained, it would be difficult to explain why the tank sce-
nario alone blocked not only an implicit induction of the under-
lying rule but even an implicit abstraction of any useful input-
output regularity. On the contrary, these results are compatible
with a situated knowledge approach, which has shown, in
reasoning tasks, that if the content triggers knowledge that
overrides the stated premises, the application of the inference
rule may be blocked (subjects first need to decontextualize
information). We accordingly found a performance improve-
ment for the tank scenario when the subjects were provided
with verbal instructions (Cambiganu et al. 1993)
Second, we obtained a high correlation between performance
and relative verbalization scores in the four scenarios. Also, in
the free text reports, the explanations advanced by the subjects
were in keeping with the characteristics of the scenarios, even if
not with the underlying rule. They could provide explanations
such as, "Since the trolley was very high and in a steep position I
had to apply a stronger force" in the slope scenario; or, "Clegg is
spoiled and touchy so to keep him friendly I have to follow his
moods" in the person scenario. Our conclusion was that situated
knowledge explains the otherwise bizarre behavior of the sys-
tem under control. The subjects' behavior (performance and
verbalization) seems to vary according to the suggested mental
model (see also Sanderson 1989).
(2) Considering the situated knowledge view and our results,
we suggest that, at least for complex instrumental control tasks,
rule learning is predominant with respect to instance learning.
Instance learning would mainly take place when no clear con-
tent addressable schemata are available. Most of the evidence
obtained in category learning also supports this view (i.e.,
instance learning is induced by unusual content, speeded or
secondary tasks). Finally, if the context does not activate well-
fitted schemata, a combination of micro-rules and instances is
the knowledge pattern more likely to be involved in learning.
Criteria for implicit learning: Deemphasize
conscious access, emphasize amnesia
Carol Augart Seger
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los
Angeles, CA 90024-1563; seger@cognet.ucla.edu
Shanks & St. John (S&S) point out that implicit learning experi-
ments often cannot meet strict criteria for the learning to be
considered unconscious. This problem may be inherent in the
tasks that illustrate implicit learning; they may involve evalua-
tion of knowledge that is on the fringe of consciousness (Mangun
1993), and the supposedly explicit tasks they are compared to
may also be sensitive to this fringe knowledge. Even if we do
accept that consciousness is a difficult criterion, it does not make
sense to drop it and simply lump all the tasks together as explicit
instance learning tasks, as S&S suggest, because the tasks share
other commonalities. Most important, they are preserved in
amnesia, and therefore depend on brain structures other than
the hippocampal system on which explicit memory is
dependent.
Should we follow S&S's suggestion and not use consciousness
as a criterion for differentiating learning processes? Conscious-
ness certainly is problematic, for two related reasons. First, it is
difficult to devise a measure of implicit learning that taps only
unconscious knowledge. The different tasks used in implicit
learning research use different dependent measures of learning,
which I call response modalities (Seger 1994); at least two of
these response modalities require subjects to make conscious
decisions. In the conceptual fluency response modality (e.g.,
grammaticality judgments in artificial grammar studies) subjects
make decisions concerning the rule-governedness of stimuli by a
process of evaluating their subjective feelings of knowing, flu-
ency, and familiarity. In prediction and control (e.g., the dy-
namic systems research of Berry & Broadbent, 1984; 1988,
classified by S&S as complex instrumental learning), subjects
demonstrate learning by their increased ability to predict or
control the value of certain variables by manipulating values of
other variables. These measures appear to tap into what Man-
gun (1993), extending the idea of William James, called the
fringe of consciousness: afield of relatively unarticulated, vague
experience, neither fully accessible to consciousness, nor fully
separate. It is not surprising that if tested in the right ways,
subjects can be led to make responses indicating that they have
more consciously available knowledge than they show in free
report measures.
The third response modality, efficiency, in which subjects
show increased speed or accuracy in processing stimuli, is less
susceptible to arguments that it reflects conscious knowledge,
because subjects are not aware that they are making responses
that reflect learning and do not have to make judgments and
decisions based on fluency or feeling of knowing. It is in regard
to sequence-learning studies that use this response modality
that S&S's claims that implicit learning is not unconscious are
the weakest. They merely note that the measure of awareness in
contingent response tasks (complex sequence-learning tasks of
the sort performed by Lewicki and colleagues: Lewicki et al.
1987; Lewicki et al. 1988) does not meet the Sensitivity Crite-
rion, and that the selection of the random stimuli on which
performance was compared to that of the serially structured
stimuli in the serial reaction-time task was inappropriate (S&S
report that in Shanks et al.'s [1994] study using pseudoran-
dom stimuli that followed the first order frequencies of the
sequence, subjects did not show learning when their perfor-
mance on sequence and pseudorandom blocks was compared;
however, other recent studies have found learning in using
comparison stimuli with first order frequencies identical to
those in the stimulus pattern; Frensch et al. 1994; Reed &
Johnson 1994.)
The second reason that consciousness as a criterion for im-
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plicit learning is problematic is that it is difficult to come up with
a measure of explicit knowledge that is independent of implicit
learning. S&S argue that prediction and recognition tests dis-
play subject's explicit knowledge of the pattern; however, in
many other contexts these sorts of tasks are used as demonstra-
tions of implicit learning. Within the conceptual fluency re-
sponse modality there is evidence that subjects can make many
different kinds of judgments based on implicitly learned knowl-
edge (such as judgments of liking of a stimuli; Gordon & Holyoak
1983). Recognition judgments can be made on the basis of
implicit conceptual fluency also, if subjects are willing to make
these judgments on the basis of feelings of familiarity or fluency
rather than explicit episodic recall (Hirst et al. 1988; Jacoby &
Dallas 1981; Johnson et al. 1991; see Seger, 1994, for a more
extensive treatment). Prediction tasks are used in contingent
response tasks as a measure of implicit learning (Kushner et al.
1991) and are similar to controlling variables in dynamic systems
tasks.
Given these problems, perhaps it is wisest not to make
consciousness a primary criterion for implicit learning. Al-
though it is true that the different implicit learning tasks on the
whole lead to remarkably little verbalizable conscious knowl-
edge, certainly much less than learning by explicit conscious
hypothesis testing, it appears that (except for experiments that
use the efficiency response modality) learning is at least some-
what penetrable by conscious processes. However, deem-
phasizing the definitional role of consciousness does not mean
that the tasks falling in the field known as implicit learning do
not form a type of learning that is meaningfully different from
explicit learning. The empirical evidence for dissociations be-
tween implicit and explicit tasks is stronger than that for which
S&S give it credit. It is true that there is a paucity of cases in
which each type of learning is affected in opposite ways by an
experimental manipulation, perhaps because implicit learning
is a very robust phenomenon with which it is difficult to
interfere. However, a number of situations have been identified
in which variables affect explicit learning without affecting
implicit learning (Abrams & Reber 1988; Howard & Howard
1989; Masters 1992; Reber et al. 1980; Reber et al. 1991).
S&S suggest that implicit learning be considered merely
explicit instance learning. This proposal ignores research indi-
cating that implicit learning can sometimes be remarkably
abstract (as in artificial grammar and contingent response task
studies showing transfer between different letter sets and differ-
ent sensory modalities; Lewicki et al. 1992; Reber 1969; Manza
& Reber 1992a). In addition, implicit learning tasks share other
common features indicating that they form a meaningful cogni-
tive category: low individual differences (Reber 1992a) and,
most important, preservation in cases of amnesia. Artificial
grammars, other visual patterns, sequences, covariations, and
dynamic systems, despite the differences of response modality
and types of stimuli used, are learned normally by amnesic
patients (Knowlton et al. 1992; Knowlton & Squire 1992; Musen
& Squire 1993; Nissen et al. 1989; Squire & Frambach 1990).
Preservation in amnesia strongly suggests that implicit learning
tasks are dependent on neural systems other than the
hippocampal-diencephalic episodic memory system that is com-
promised in amnesia (Squire 1992). S&S argue that the results of
studies with amnesics are tangential, because amnesics may
well be aware of learning. However, this is missing an important
point: preservation under amnesia itself is a good criterion for
classifying learning as implicit.
Dissociable learning and memory systems of
the brain
Larry R. Squire,8 Stephan Hamann,b and Barbara
Knowlton0
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Departments of Psychiatry and
Neurosciences; ^Department of Psychiatry, University of California at San
Diego, San Diego, CA 92161; "lsquire@ucsd.edu
In their target article, Shanks & St. John (S&S) undertake a
heroic review of human learning, drawing from many domains
of evidence based on normal subjects, in order to ask whether
there exist independent and dissociable human learning sys-
tems. The review proceeds by considering two dimensions on
which separable learning systems have been purported to differ:
awareness versus unawareness of what is being learned, and
learning by acquiring rules versus learning by memorizing
instances. At the end of their review, the authors conclude that
the first distinction (awareness vs. unawareness) has not been
established as a useful way to classify learning systems, whereas
the second distinction (rule learning vs. instance memorization)
provides a useful basis for classification.
There are two difficulties. First, in separating the topics of
learning and memory, and focusing on learning, the target
article has a peculiar emphasis and largely neglects the interest-
ing distinction between explicit (declarative) memory and im-
plicit (nondeclarative) memory. Second, despite the admirable
scope of the review, had the authors cast a still wider net for
relevant data across the whole discipline of cognitive neuro-
science, including research with amnesic patients, studies of
experimental animals, and consideration of the anatomy and
function of brain systems, they might have reached different
conclusions. The perspective presented here is that implicit
learning leads to implicit memory, and evidence for dissocia-
tions within memory are relevant to the nature of learning as
well.
To begin, we suggest that the distinction between explicit and
implicit (declarative and nondeclarative) forms of learning and
memory rests on several kinds of evidence. The distinction does
not stand or fall according to the status of aware versus unaware
learning. For example, explicit and implicit forms of learning
and memory depend on the integrity of specific brain systems.
Note also that implicit learning is not the single thing depicted
in the target article, but a collection of separable abilities (skill
and habit learning, priming, emotional conditioning, skeletal
muscle conditioning, and nonassociative forms of learning such
as habituation and sensitization), each dependent on particular
brain systems (the neostriatum, the neocortex, the amygdaloid
complex, the cerebellum, and specific reflex pathways). Many of
the details of how these systems support, and otherwise contrib-
ute to, explicit and implicit memory remain unknown, but the
biological facts are important for how the relationship between
explicit and implicit memory should be understood.
Another differentiating feature of these forms of memory is
that explicit memory is flexible and available to multiple re-
sponse systems, whereas implicit memory tends to be less
flexible and limited by the context in which the original learning
occurred. These conclusions come from important animal
studies, which show that animals with lesions of the hippocam-
pal system who succeed at learning a task learn qualitatively
different information from normal animals (Eichenbaum et al.
1988; Saunders & Weiskrantz 1989). Finally, a growing body of
work with experimental animals has invoked the same or a
similar distinction (e.g., declarative vs. procedural) to under-
stand the neural and functional organization of memory. Such a
distinction was needed to understand the data, without any
recourse to issues of awareness and unawareness (Eichenbaum
et al. 1992; Mishkin et al. 1984; Packard et al. 1989; Sutherland
& Rudy 1989; Zola-Morgan & Squire 1984).
Quite apart from the work with animals, awareness and
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unawareness are important properties of explicit and implicit
learning in humans. Consider the domain of perceptual prim-
ing, namely, the improved ability to detect or identify recently
presented stimuli (Schacter et al. 1993; Tulving & Schacter
1990). Priming is intact in amnesia. Subjects are conscious and
aware of the stimulus presentations, to be sure, but they are not
aware that their perceptual apparatus is being altered so that
later they will better perceive the stimuli. Indeed, the concept
of priming is absent from their mental lexicons. S&S state in the
target article, "to infer unconscious learning from implicit re-
trieval, the subject must be unaware of the relevant relationship
that occurred in the study episode, in addition to being unaware
of the episode itself." In the case of priming, normal subjects are
unaware in the first sense, and amnesic patients are unaware in
both senses. How can subjects be aware of the "relevant rela-
tionship" if subjects have no concept that a relationship exists
between stimulus exposure and later perceptual speed? Prim-
ing is manifest through performance (at which point some
subjects may notice that some items are easier to see), but the
memory content (increased fluency) is not otherwise accessible
to conscious recollection. During initial presentation of stimuli,
subjects are aware only of perceiving the items, not of learning
to perceive them more efficiently.
Similarly, it is difficult to imagine what normal or amnesic
subjects are aware of when they improve their ability to read
mirror-reversed text (Cohen & Squire 1980). Perhaps subjects
become aware that tney are improving a little, but what is it that
they know about how this is happening? Such facilitation is
probably specific to the instances that have been practiced, not a
reflection of rule learning (Musen etal. 1990); but the distinction
between instance memorization and rule learning is orthogonal
to the distinction between explicit and implicit learning.
Early exposure to speech leads to stored representations that
reflect the properties of the native language and that guide
speecli perception and production. By the age of 12 months,
changes have occurred that are unique to each language envi-
ronment. For example, experience during the first year deter-
mines which phonetic boundaries can be heard and which
cannot. These changes are longlasting, resistant to modification,
and nonconscious. They are expressed through performance
because they reflect changes in the perceptual apparatus. They
are not available as recollections and do not have the quality of
"pastness" that is an attribute of explicit forms of memory.
Consider also the case of the classically conditioned eyeblink
response (Thompson 1990). Regions of cerebellum and related
circuitry in the brainstem are essential for the acquisition,
storage, and expression of the conditioned response. In rabbits
and cats, transection of the brainstem just rostral to the pons
spares both the acquisition and the retention of the conditioned
response (Mauk & Thompson 1987; Norman et al. 1977). This
transection eliminates input from the forebrain to the cerebel-
lum and brainstem. If the entire forebrain (including the neo-
cortex, striatum, basal forebrain, hippocampus, amygdala, and
thalamus) is not needed for conditioning, then it is difficult to
imagine how conscious knowledge of CS-US associations plays a
role in the learning. It seems more likely that the development
of awareness about the contingencies in human conditioning
experiments is epiphenomenal and not necessary for the condi-
tioning to occur.
Finally, consider the case of habituation, sensitization, and
classical conditioning in the invertebrate Aplysia, where the
neurobiology and behavior have been studied in considerable
detail (Hawkins et al. 1993). These examples of learning surely
proceed without awareness of any cumulating memory content.
In the course of vertebrate evolution, we suppose that phy-
logenetically early kinds of learning and memory remained, and
a new kind of learning system developed, one with new proper-
ties that included the capacity to acquire information that is
available to conscious recollection (see also, Sherry & Schacter
1987).
Learning and memory systems are thought to operate in
parallel, just as the sensory systems do. In the case of vision, one
processing stream proceeds ventrally, culminates in area TE in
the inferotemporal region, and is concerned with object percep-
tion. Another processing stream proceeds dorsally, culminates
in area PG in the parietal lobe, and is concerned with visuospa-
tial information (Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982; Goodale 1993).
Perception of an object in space involves concurrent activity in
areas TE and PG, as well as in other areas. Consider what
happens to this neural account of perception when one applies
the approach taken in the target article, namely, that the term
"implicit" properly refers to a particular kind of retrieval from a
common knowledge base. This view is akin to supposing, in the
case of perception, that some area (or system) other than areas
TE and PG is actually more fundamental to visual perception,
and areas TE and PG are simply retrieval routes by which
different aspects of a percept (object identity or visuospatial
information) are expressed. The idea that there is only one
knowledge base and that explicit and implicit memory phenom-
ena reflect dissociations of retrieval ignores biology. The learn-
ing and memory systems of the brain are separable and parallel.
One system supports the acquisition, storage, and retrieval of
conscious knowledge. Other systems support nonconscious
learning and its various products: the dispositions, preferences,
skills, and habits that are expressible through performance, but
accessible to awareness only to the extent that subjects can
(epiphenomenally) observe and monitor what they do.
Whither learning, whither memory?
Michael A. Stadler and Peter A. Frensch
Department of Psychology, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, MO
65211; psymike@mizzoul.missouri.edu; and
psypeter@mizzoul.missouri.edu
Often, the devil is in the details, but on the details we generally
agree with Shanks & St. John (S&S). Instead, the devil may be in
one of S&S's main points, namely, the assumption that "in order
for us to infer unconscious learning from implicit retrieval, the
subject must be unaware of the relevant relationship that oc-
curred in the study episode, in addition to being unaware of the
episode itself" (sect. 2.3.1) and that "such inferences will have to
be accepted if unconscious learning is to be established" (sect.
2.3, para. 5). S&S's definition of learning relies on the nature of
learning's result rather than on the learning process itself. We
believe it is necessary to distinguish between the learning
process, which may be implicit or explicit, and the result of that
process, memory, which may be accessed implicitly or
explicitly.
Learning is implicit when it is unaffected by intention (Reber
1989a). Likewise, memory is implicit when retrieval is uninten-
tional (Graf & Komatsu, in press).l In our view, the implicit or
explicit nature of learning and memory are functionally inde-
pendent; therefore, any combination of learning and memory
orientations is logically possible. Both learning and memory
retrieval may be implicit, or both may be explicit. If explicit
memory is poor, the former condition meets S&S's criteria for
implicit learning; the latter is typically called remembering
(Tulving 1985) and is exemplified by students studying for and
taking exams.
There are also circumstances, however, where learning is
explicit and memory is implicit. Here, the relevant stimuli or
stimulus relations are explicitly encoded but they later affect
behavior implicitly, with no intentional memory retrieval. Dur-
ing the development of automaticity for example, performance
is ponderous, as subjects intentionally begin learning a task, but
it becomes efficient with practice. Performance may reach the
point where previous experiences have their effects without
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explicit retrieval of those memories (cf., Logan 1988). When a
subject's explicit memory for those experiences is poor, this case
would be called implicit learning under S&S's definition, even
though learning was intentional.
It is also possible for learning to be implicit with an explicit,
intentionally retrievable memory as a result. For example, in
the serial reaction-time studies of implicit learning, learning
may proceed implicitly, yet subjects may over time become
more and more aware of, and able to remember explicitly, some
of what was learned. Even though the critical information was
initially encoded implicitly, S&S's criteria would indicate that
learning was explicit.
From the above examples, it should be clear that the learning
process and the subsequent retrieval of learned information
must be distinguished. Although learning and memory are very
closely related, they are logically independent constructs and
must be treated as such, else we risk calling explicit learning
implicit, and implicit learning explicit.
In line with our definition of implicit learning, we prefer a
research strategy based on comparisons of learning under im-
plicit and explicit orientations (i.e., instructions). Ultimately,
the best evidence for the distinction between implicit and
explicit learning would be to find qualitatively different results
under the implicit and explicit orientations. Whether subjects
are or are not aware that they have learned something is not the
most compelling theoretical issue. More important is the ques-
tion of whether learning proceeds differently under implicit and
explicit orientations and, if so, how (cf., Cheesman & Merikle
1986).
As a postscript, we note that S&S have suggested (sect. 2.7.2,
para. 17) that Stadler's (1989) test of subjects' awareness, on
which the subjects performed at chance, might have been
flawed. The subjects were trained extensively on 24, seven-trial
patterns in a visual search task where the patterns determined
target location. In the test, they were asked to predict the
location of the target on the seventh trial after responding to the
first six. Patterns were ordered randomly and each appeared
twice during the test. S&S argue that during the test, inter-
ference might have caused the subjects to forget what had been
learned. They suggest testing this hypothesis by seeing whether
subjects performed better early in the test than late. As it turns
out, each subject's correct responses were distributed evenly
over the course of the test, with no evidence of a preponderance
of correct responses in the early trials. No subject was correct
more than twice in the first eight trials (chance was two correct),
and none was correct more than five times in the first 16 (chance
was four). There is, therefore, no evidence to support Shanks &
St. John's forgetting hypothesis.
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NOTE
1. Graf and Komatsu point out that awareness need not be preceded
by intention. That is, people might be aware of unintentionally retrieved
memories. We will not consider the issue in this limited space, because
it does not alter our main point. For the sake of argument, we shall treat
unintentionally retrieved memories as if people are unaware of them.
Is awareness necessary for operant
conditioning?
Frode Svartdal
Department of Psychology, University of Tromse, 9037 Tromse, Norway;
frodes@psyk.uit.no
This commentary addresses the main question raised by the
authors ("Can learning occur without awareness?') by focusing
on the awareness issue in human operant or instrumental
conditioning. Shanks & St. John (S&S) examine only a very
limited set of studies on instrumental conditioning, and some
findings taken as evidence against unconscious learning (sect.
2.6.1) are only tangential to the awareness issue. For example,
the general finding that performance and contingency verbaliza-
tions are often associated (e.g., Catania et al. 1989) provides no
answer to the question of whether human operant conditioning
can occur without contingency awareness; neither do demon-
strations that performance and judgment are related in simple
operant tasks (Shanks & Dickinson 1991).
Proper assessment of the awareness issue requires experi-
ments capable of testing the possibility of nonconscious contin-
gency processing. As indicated in the target article, such experi-
ments are problematic, for several reasons. One not discussed
by S&S is the strong effect explicit rules have on performance
and the interaction of such rules with implicit contingencies.
Many experimental designs have functioned much like guessing
games in that ambiguities of the experimental situation encour-
age active hypothesis generation, thus promoting verbal control
of performance. For example, Hefferline et al. (1959) arranged
operant contingencies requiring very small muscular move-
ments outside voluntary control, but artifacts from gross volun-
tary responses associated with subject hypotheses excluded a
convincing conclusion about nonconscious contingency control.
Another approach attempted to mimic contingency-shaping
(i.e., reduce verbal control) by minimizing experimental in-
structions (Matthews et al. 1977). However, placing a subject in
an experimental situation without explicit instructions may
enhance rather than reduce verbal control through the develop-'
ment of self-instructions (e.g., Lowe 1979). The verbal condi-
tioning literature (see review by Brewer 1974) indicates similar
problems: exposing a subject to an ambiguous situation may
encourage the formulation of hypotheses about the experiment,
thus promoting explicit verbal control that may interact, often
favorably (Dulany 1961), with the hidden contingency.
A more refined solution would be to provide explicit instruc-
tions for one task, but expose attributes of responding under that
task to a concurrent, implicit operant contingency. Instructions
would then control one dimension of action, and the implicit
contingency would, if effective, control another dimension.
Through making the instructed task difficult, one might be
reasonably certain that subjects will allocate extensive atten-
tional resources to that task; and arranging the implicit contin-
gency for a different (but not incompatible) dimension of behav-
ior, renders any shift in attention from the instructed dimension
to the noninstructed one unlikely. Note that this strategy is
somewhat different from comparable studies of implicit learning
in process control (e.g., Hayes & Broadbent 1988) and sequence
learning (e.g., Lewicki et al. 1987), since the implicit and
explicit (instructed) contingencies in such tasks are for the same
response dimension; in the design outlined, instructions and
reinforcement contingencies operate on different dimensions.
In line with this reasoning, Svartdal (1992) exposed subjects
to rather difficult tasks and provided feedback for "correct"
answers. Instructions required one left or right button press per
trial in response to a discrimination task, and feedback was
delivered following correct answers. Unknown to subjects, at a
predefined point in the experimental session the feedback
criterion changed from position (left, right) to force: different
groups of subjects were now reinforced for pressing with in-
creased or decreased force compared to individually calculated
baseline forces. Results from several experiments using this
dual-task design demonstrate behavioral sensitivity to the im-
plicit operant contingencies in that pressing force increased or
decreased as required (Svartdal 1992; Svartdal & Mortensen
1993). No indication of verbal control of the relevant force
dimension was detected in subsequent questionnaires and in-
terviews. One can be reasonably sure, therefore, that the
observed force changes were generated by mechanisms outside
conscious control.
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Interestingly, making the primary instructed discrimination
task more difficult did not seem to have a negative effect or
adaptation to the implicit contingency; on the contrary, adapta-
tion tended to be reliable in the high-difficulty condition but
unreliable in the easy condition (Svartdal 1992). Thus, because
only marginal attentional resources could be allocated to the
hidden contingency under the difficult instructed task, this
result lends further support to the hypothesis that the force
changes were generated by nonconscious mechanisms.
As noted by S&S (sect. 2.6.1), the Information Criterion may
be difficult to satisfy in operant tasks, one reason being that free
operant experiments allow little control over the subject's be-
havior. Note, however, that in these experiments response rate
was under instructional control: all subjects emitted a fixed
number of responses, one per trial. A second threat to the
Information Criterion is the possibility of correlated hypotheses
(Dulany 1961). In their discussion of another set of experiments
(Svartdal 1989; 1991), S&S suggest that systematic tempo
changes could be induced by specific response strategies (e.g.,
subjects resting their hand in certain positions). This is a valid
threat to the Information Criterion only insofar as these particu-
lar hand positions were under conscious control. There are no
indications in our data of the use of such conscious strategies.
For example, following the experimental session, we asked
subjects to formulate advice to another hypothetical person on
how to master the task. Answers were typically very general
(e.g., "stay attentive") or irrelevant to the contingency.
The Sensitivity Criterion, if taken literally, may be harder to
satisfy. Tests of awareness during conditioning are likely to
interact with task performance, sometimes to make the implicit
contingency more salient to subjects. For this reason, postex-
perimental interviews and questionnaires may be preferable in
situations where the salience of the contingency must remain
low. As argued by S&S, this strategy may render awareness tests
less sensitive. However, the sensitivity of an awareness test
cannot be evaluated out of context; in general, it should be
evaluated relative to performance. If behavioral sensitivity to
the contingency is high, contingency awareness can be sus-
pected; in contrast, if behavioral sensitivity is low, awareness of
the contingency should be low. In our studies we generally find
relatively low, though significant, effects on the performance
measure. Low behavioral sensitivity to an implicit contingency
may occur for two reasons, however; because that contingency is
difficult to process (as, for example, in some serial-learning
tasks), or because awareness is not involved in contingency
processing. Force and tempo contingencies of the sort we have
arranged are easily processed if detected. Relatively low behav-
ioral sensitivity to such contingencies may therefore be taken as
evidence that they are not consciously detected, that is, that
learning occurs with no or low contingency awareness.
The idea of nonconscious processing of operant and other
learning contingencies may be controversial, but the view,
favored by Shanks & St. John, that assumes conscious process-
ing of all action-relevant information, is also controversial and
fails to capture important and intriguing aspects of human
behavioral regulation. Their view is falsified by one good dem-
onstration of nonconscious learning. The task then becomes that
of assessing the relative contributions of conscious and noncon-
scious processes in action control (cf., Shanks & Dickinson 1991,
p. 360).
Are infants human?
H. S. Terrace
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027;
terrace@columbia. edu
Does learning occur without awareness? Shanks & St. John
(S&S) claim it does not. In their selective review of the litera-
ture, they find "little actual support for unconscious rule induc-
tion . . . or for the unconscious learning of any other type of
information." S&S qualify their claim by limiting their focus to
human learning. That dubious restriction does not, however,
salvage a futile exercise in armchair psychology, in which intro-
spection is given special status as a source of hypotheses about
learning.
S&S's view that the contents of consciousness are crucial to
our understanding of learning or memory is shared by many
cognitive psychologists. That makes it all the more important to
show why the contents of consciousness cannot serve as an
adequate explanation of any psychological phenomenon. That is
not to deny that consciousness is a valid subject of inquiry. It is;
and because it is such a difficult topic, it will continue to attract a
wide variety of investigators for the forseeable future. At issue is
whether anything is gained by regarding consciousness as an
independent, as opposed to a dependent, variable.
From the outset S&S take the position that learning with
consciousness (or awareness, a term they use interchangeably
with consciousness) is the norm. They deny the existence of "a
quite separate system that operates independently of aware-
ness," on the grounds that tests for consciousness are not
"sufficiently sensitive to detect exhaustively all conscious infor-
mation" (italics added).
S&S insist that two criteria must be satisfied to show that
learning occurs without awareness. An Information Criterion
assesses what the subject can report about the learning task.
Before concluding that subjects are unaware of the information
relevant to the learning task (/), the experimenter must show
that the information about which the subject is queried "is
indeed the information responsible for performance changes."
The subject may, for example, have learned /*, a derivative of/,
instead of/. If the subject is aware of/*, but not /, an experimen-
ter who only tests for knowledge of / would conclude erro-
neously that subjects did not acquire any information about the
nature of the learning task (7). A Sensitivity Criterion must also
be satisfied to show that the test for information is sensitive to all
relevant sources of conscious knowledge.
Much of S&S's article is devoted to showing that studies
claiming learning to have occurred without awareness are un-
able to satisfy at least one of their criteria. S&S's criticisms are
unconvincing, because there is no principled way to constrain
the number of ways in which /* or some undetected aspect of
consciousness can manifest itself. Space limitations prevent me
from commenting on other aspects of S&S's cavalier dismissal of
such studies. Instead, I will address what I regard as a more
basic issue that follows from their preoccupation with adult
human subjects who can introspect. How do human infants
learn?
Consider an experiment of the type performed by Rovee-
Collier and her colleagues on infants as young as 2-3 months
(Rovee-Collier 1990; Rovee-Collier et al. 1985). The infant lies
comfortably in her crib and can gaze at a mobile suspended
above her head. With little effort, she learns to make the mobile
turn by pulling a string with her foot. By altering either the
order of the items hanging from the mobile or the context in
which the infant is tested, Rovee-Collier provides extensive
evidence that infants develop expectancies regarding the ap-
pearance of particular items and, in general, that they learn and
remember many specific features of the mobile and its sur-
round. In this and other studies of infant learning there is no
basis for applying either of S&S's criteria for conscious learning.
Whether infants are aware of their expectations is entirely a
matter of speculation. Since consciousness in infants cannot be
subjected to empirical study, there is no basis for assuming that
infants are conscious of what they learn.
The literature on animal learning, of which S&S make no
mention, raises problems similar to those encountered in
studies of learning in infants. S&S go to considerable lengths to
argue that awareness is necessary for the occurrence of Pavlovian
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and operant conditioning in human subjects. Curiously, they say
nothing about the implications of that view for theories of animal
conditioning. Are we to assume that different sets of principles
are needed to account for conditioning in animals and in human
subjects, and that the difference stems from the fact that, in
some instances, adult humans can describe the contingencies
used by the experimenter?
Instead of framing hypotheses of learning around the intro-
spective reports of adult human subjects, I recommend the
generally accepted scientific strategy of working from the simple
to the complex. A good place to start is to recognize the
compelling evidence of learning without consciousness in in-
fants and animals. Another simplification follows from the fact
that animals and infants lack language. During the normal
course of events, infants acquire language. Animals do not. In
both instances, however, there is abundant evidence of thinking
without language. It should be possible, at least in principle, to
study simple and complex learning in subjects who lack con-
sciousness and language and thereby to evaluate the contribu-
tions of both factors in a developmental perspective (Terrace
1985).
Little is known about the processes that enable a child to
attend to the contents of consciousness and to relate them to
what the child learns: the covariation of environmental events.
There are theories available, however, formulated by behavioral
and cognitive psychologists, about the development of con-
sciousness (Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Skinner 1945). These theo-
ries, which suggest the kind of research needed to evaluate
properly the role of consciousness in learning and other cogni-
tive processes, assume that infants develop sustained conscious-
ness of their experiences ever so slowly under the tutelage of
their parents, siblings, friends, teachers, and so on.
Because learning in infants is initially unconscious, it is much
more difficult to study in infants than in adult human subjects,
who can introspect and report the contents of their conscious-
ness. That is a defensible rationale for studying learning in adult
human subjects. It is unlikely, however, that such research will
provide a basis for formulating basic principles of learning; at
least not until it is recognized that learning with consciousness
presupposes the much more pervasive and fundamental ability
to learn without consciousness.
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On the creation of classification systems of
memory
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Shanks & St. John (S&S) set out to convince the reader that their
classification system (CS) of memory (fragment based/rule
based) is superior to another CS (implicit/explicit). I see two
difficulties with their argument. Both are best understood in the
context of the creation of CSs.
A CS is a method of classifying objects - or, in this case,
memories - as similar or dissimilar to one another. Creating a
CS requires selecting attributes of memories that are used to
divide memories into classes. How are the attributes selected?
One can construct a phenetic CS, which entails listing many
attributes of memories and conducting a cluster analysis (e.g.,
Sokal & Sneath 1963) to both derive the classes and identify
which attributes are important. Phenetic taxonomy is rarely
used today, because selecting the attributes to include, the way
to measure them, and the clustering metric are inherently
subjective processes (Fleishman & Quaintance 1984).
The preferred method entails three steps. First, a theoretical
principle is selected. The theoretical principle describes some
property of nature that the CS is to describe and it also dictates
which attributes of an object will be used to distinguish classes
(Ridley 1986). For example, the theoretical principle of most
CSs of species is phylogeny; they describe the branching of the
evolutionary tree. Within memory research, two theoretical
principles have been used: neurobiology, and information
processing.
Second, attributes of objects are selected that will distinguish
classes. The attributes selected depend on the theoretical prin-
ciple. If the theoretical principle is neurobiology, a relevant
attribute might be the contribution of a neurotransmitter to
encoding the memory (e.g., level of acetylcholine (ACh) in the
basal forebrain). If the theoretical principle is information pro-
cessing, a relevant attribute might be the dependence on a
hypothetical representation or process (e.g., use of an induced
rule).
Third, the values of the attributes for class inclusion are
selected. For example, if the theoretical principle is neurobiol-
ogy and the attribute is the effect of the level of ACh in the basal
forebrain, one determines the levels of ACh that describe
memory classes. For example, there might be two classes:
memories impaired by low levels of ACh, and memories not
impaired.
S&S have overlooked the role of selecting a theoretical princi-
ple, and they have, in my view, erred in their interpretation of
how attribute values may be selected.
S&S's failure to appreciate the role of a theoretical principle is
revealed in their treatment of the amnesic data. They rightly
point out that normal learning by amnesic patients does not bear
on whether patients were aware of the contingency at the time of
learning. However, S&S fail to recognize and articulate the two
theoretical principles (neurobiological and information process-
ing) embedded in their criticism, and thus overlook the real
reason the amnesic data are important; namely, because these
data yield a neurobiologically based CS of memory that parallels
an information-processing-based CS of memory. Paradigms that
S&S cite as potential examples of unconscious learning (which
therefore fall into the same class in an information-processing-
based CS) elicit normal performance in amnesia (and therefore
fall into the same class in a neurobiological CS): classical condi-
tioning (Weiskrantz & Warrington 1979), artificial grammar
learning (Knowlton et al. 1992), instrumental control tasks
(Squire & Frambach 1990), and serial response-time tasks
(Nissen & Bullemer 1987). In addition, a variety of semantic and
repetition priming effects (see Shimamura, 1986, for a review)
fall into the same class by an information-processing principle
(they are dissociable from awareness in control subjects) and by a
neurobiological principle (they are preserved in amnesia).
This concordance is important, as most researchers would
agree that there is a correspondence between neuroanatomic
structure and cognitive representation; these two theoretical
principles should lead to the same CS, and they do.
The fragment-based/rule-based CS does not account for data
from amnesic patients. S&S point out that intact learning in
amnesia is almost always fragment based, but amnesic patients
are impaired in learning situations that would be classified as
fragment based (e.g., a list-learning task).
The third step in CS development bears on S&S's chief
argument against the implicit/explicit distinction. Given that an
attribute for classification is to be consciousness of the contin-
gency at learning, one must select a value of this attribute to
distinguish classes of memories. S&S argue that the attribute is
irrelevant because there is insufficient reason to believe that any
learning is unconscious. They argue, in effect, that the attribute
has no variance and so cannot be used to differentiate memories.
I disagree with the contention that unconscious learning has
not been demonstrated. One must bear in mind that any
putative demonstration of unconscious learning entails accep-
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tance of the null hypothesis. One can always argue that the test
of awareness was insensitive, did not match the conditions
present at encoding, or was unreliable. Caution is appropriate in
calling subjects unaware, but one must ask how an experimenter
can be any more certain that subjects do not have explicit
knowledge when subjects repeatedly deny noticing a sequence,
make errors when forced to guess about its characteristics, and
fail to recognize it (Willingham et al. 1993).
Even if unconscious learning has not been satisfactorily dem-
onstrated, consciousness may still be an important attribute in
CSs of memory. S&S take the position that consciousness can
only take on two values (conscious or unconscious) as an attri-
bute in a CS. A complete lack of awareness may be one end of a
spectrum of states of awareness of the contingency at learning; if
unconscious learning cannot take place, that does not mean that
the rest of the spectrum is irrelevant.
In sum, the implicit/explicit CS appears preferable to the
fragment-based/rule-based CS because: (1) the latter is discor-
dant with the amnesic data, whereas the former fits those data
and shows that two different theoretical principles - information
processing and neurobiology - lead to the same CS; and (2) the
chief argument against the implicit/explicit CS (that learning is
never unconscious) is difficult to falsify, because one who be-
lieves the testing of awareness was not adequate can raise
objections that cannot be discounted. Furthermore, if uncon-
scious learning did not exist, it would not sound a death knell for
the implicit/explicit CS. For this CS to have validity, there need
only be variability in the attribute of consciousness, and predic-
tive power in that variability.
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The commentators on our target article have raised a very
broad range of issues, and in our response we will attempt
to answer as many of the key points as possible. We thank
the commentators for the careful consideration they have
given to our arguments. We should say at the outset,
however, that although our arguments have been chal-
lenged at a number of places, we have not been led to
abandon our view of the implicit learning literature. We
continue to believe that although the instance/rule dis-
tinction provides a meaningful characterization of human
learning, it remains highly questionable whether uncon-
scious learning has been adequately demonstrated.
The organization of our response is shown in Table Rl.
Our plan is first to say something about the appeal of
implicit learning, and then to consider the question of
unconscious learning: whether our Information and Sen-
sitivity Criteria are appropriate, how consciousness and
learning should be defined, what the role of conscious-
ness in learning might be, and whether the further
evidence for unconscious learning that commentators
discuss warrants a revision of our conclusions. Following
these sections, we will consider other dimensions for
characterizing distinct learning systems. Is the frag-
ment/instance memorization versus rule-induction dis-
tinction a useful and valid one? And finally, can we refine
and further specify what is learned and later used by the
fragment/instance system?
R1. The appeal of implicit learning
Carlson points out that the idea of implicit learning has an
appeal that defies dismissal. Part of this appeal might
simply be the cachet of a mysterious process. But more
seriously, there clearly is something to implicit learning.
Most, if not all, of the commentators agree that there is a
real phenomenon, one characterized by Holyoak &
Cattis as "(a) knowledge about covariations in the environ-
ment, (b) learned by exposure to stimuli exhibiting the
covariations . . . (e) [knowledge that] is not fully verbaliz-
able and ( /) [knowledge that] is not manipulable in the
sense that it cannot be re-represented explicitly to serve
as input to other procedures." We agree; the task at hand
is to further analyze this phenomenon. One question is
whether the implicit learning process and the resulting
information are unconscious. The other question con-
cerns what this knowledge is like and what sort of learning
process acquires it.
Several commentators (Berry, Lindsay & Corayska,
Reber & Winter) have challenged an important aspect of
the overall logic of the target article. We have assumed
that the sensible approach is to be skeptical about uncon-
scious learning until it is demonstrated, but these com-
mentators argue that exactly the opposite assumption
should be adopted, namely, that unconscious processes
have some sort of priority over conscious ones. For exam-
ple, Berry says that we "adopt the position that unless
researchers can prove conclusively that learning is uncon-
scious then we should assume that it is conscious," but we
"never justify why conscious processing should be the
default assumption." Our argument is simply that explicit
learning is the agreed starting point, since no one doubts
that learning is at least some of the time accompanied by
awareness of what is being learned. What remains to be
shown is whether unconscious learning is also feasible.
The position advocated by Berry, Lindsay & Gorayska,
and Reber & Winter is tantamount to holding that uncon-
scious learning does not need to be demonstrated in the
laboratory. But no amount of a priori argumentation is
going to demonstrate its existence: what is needed is clear
experimental evidence. If we do not know in a certain task
whether knowledge is conscious or unconscious, it is
surely foolhardy to assume the latter.
R2. Criteria for establishing unconscious
learning
Before discussing potential problems with our conceptu-
alization of implicit and explicit learning, we would like to
mention briefly a very interesting article published after
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Table Rl. Organization of the authors' response to specific commentaries
Topics Commentators
Rl. The appeal of implicit learning
R2. Criteria for establishing unconscious learning
R2.1. The Sensitivity and Information Criteria
R2.2. Defining consciousness and learning
R2.3. Measuring consciousness
R2.4. Defining explicit learning and consciousness
by verbal report
R2.5. Do prediction and recognition tasks measure
conscious or unconscious knowledge?
R2.6. The possible causal role of awareness
R3. Further evidence for implicit learning
R3.1. The mere exposure effect
R3.2. Conditioning
R3.3. Instrumental learning
R3.4. Sequence learning
R3.5. Amnesia
R3.6. Language learning
R4. How should implicit learning be characterized?
R4.1. Consciousness and models of implicit learn-
ing
R4.2. The fragment/instance memorizer
R4.3. The relationship between memorization and
rule induction
Berry, Carlson, Holyoak & Gattis, Lindsay & Gorayska, Re-
ber & Winter
Berry, Brody & Crowley, Carlson, Catania, Dienes & Per-
ner, Holyoak & Gattis, Lindsay & Gorayska, Merikle, Over-
skeid, Perruchet & Gallego, Rakover, Reed & Johnson,
Stadler & Frensch, Svartdal
Baeyens et al., Catania, Howe & Rabinowitz, Overskeid,
Packard
Andrade, Baeyens et al., Catania, Dienes & Perner, Ennen,
Nagata, Overskeid, Reber & Winter, Stadler & Frensch,
Squire et al., Terrace
Catania, Cleeremans, Dienes & Perner, Lindsay & Gorayska,
Merikle, Overskeid, Rakover, Terrace, Willingham
Cleeremans, Dienes & Perner, Rakover, Seger
Catania, Poldrack & Cohen, Squire et al., Svartdal
Overskeid
Bornstein, Brody & Crowley
Baeyens et al., Kimmel
Andrade, Berry, Overskeid, Rizzo & Parlangeli, Svartdal
Cleeremans, Reed & Johnson, Stadler & Frensch
Cleeremans, Holyoak & Gattis, Kourtzi et al., Packard, Pol-
drack & Cohen, Reber & Winter, Seger, Squire et al.,
Willingham
Goldstone & Kruschke, Lachter, Nagata, Reber & Winter
Holyoak & Gattis, Kourtzi et al., Merikle, Nagata
Cleeremans
Cleeremans, Kimmel, Marsolek, Perruchet & Gallego, Seger
Goldstone & Kruschke, Howe & Rabinowitz, Nagata, Pack-
ard, Poldrack & Cohen, Reber & Winter
the target article was completed and which, we believe,
provides overwhelming justification for our strict criteria.
Farah et al. (1993) were interested in the relationship
between implicit (or "covert") and explicit ("overt") pro-
cessing in prosopagnosics, patients who, as a result of
brain damage, have difficulty recognizing faces. The typi-
cal pattern of findings is that whereas prosopagnosics may
not be able to name a familiar, visually presented face,
they will nevertheless process that face faster than an
unfamiliar face during the course of a task, thus suggest-
ing that some face knowledge is preserved. For example,
less time is taken to judge a pair of familiar faces the same
than to judge a pair of unfamiliar ones the same. Just
as with implicit learning, the suggestion is that the
person may have knowledge that is not available to con-
sciousness.
Farah et al., however, have provided compelling evi-
dence that the dissociation between implicit and explicit
processing in prosopagnosia is attributable to differential
test sensitivity. They constructed a parallel distributed
processing model which could be presented with coded
representations of faces. Two aspects of the network's
performance were monitored: overt recognition and
speed of processing. When Farah et al. lesioned their
network, they were able to reproduce all of the major
dissociations of implicit and explicit performance seen in
prosopagnosics, but these dissociations came from a sys-
tem that has a single (albeit distributed) knowledge
source. Thus it follows that the dissociations must have
arisen because the implicit tests were better able than the
explicit ones to detect small amounts of residual knowl-
edge in the system. [See also Farah: "Neuropsychological
Inference with an Interactive Brain: A Critique of the
'Locality' Assumption" BBS 17(1) 1994.]
This conclusion is, of course, exactly parallel to our
argument that many examples of apparent implicit learn-
ing can be explained by the fact that the explicit test does
not meet our Sensitivity Criterion. Below, we describe
some analogous simulations we have conducted of im-
plicit learning in amnesia.
R2.1. The Sensitivity and Information Criteria. Several
commentators endorsed the Sensitivity and Information
Criteria (Berry, Brody & Crowley, Carlson, Perruchet &
Gallego, Reed & Johnson, Svartdal), whereas others
raised concerns over them. Dienes & Perner, Holyoak &
Gattis, Lindsay & Gorayska, and Overskeid all argue that
our criteria are too stringent and make it very difficult, in
principle, to dissociate learning and awareness. Dienes
and Perner, for example, propose a thought-experiment
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in which a subject has instance-based, but unconscious,
knowledge of a grammar; they argue that if the perfor-
mance and awareness tests are made sufficiently similar to
meet our criteria then it is very difficult to imagine a
mechanism that would apply the knowledge in one case
but not in the other.
We have two responses to this. The first is that there are
many people who believe that there are studies that meet
these conditions, in which one test does reveal knowledge
whereas another very similar one does not (see commen-
taries by Reed & Johnson, Stadler & Frensch). The
second is that if the criteria are relaxed, then although the
likelihood of observing dissociations between our two
tasks increases, so does the danger that the dissociation is
due to differential sensitivity or a mismatch in the type of
information examined by the two tests. We believe that if
it is difficult to demonstrate unconscious learning, that is
all the more reason to be cautious about its existence.
Catania, Holyoak & Cattis, and Lindsay & Corayska
go further and argue that we have effectively equated
learning and awareness, with the consequence that we
have (in Catania's words) "designed a set of conditions
such that learning cannot occur without awareness." But
this represents a gross misunderstanding of our position.
We have suggested that there are two types of measures.
Some, (conditioned responses, sequential reaction times,
grammaticality judgments) provide indices of learning.
Others (recognition, prediction, verbal reports) may pro-
vide useful evidence concerning the content of conscious-
ness. Although it would be very controversial to claim that
the learning tests provide pure (or even partial) assess-
ments of awareness, we have shown that when the results
of these two sorts of tests are compared, it turns out as a
plain empirical fact that learning and awareness are typ-
ically associated.
Merikle elaborates some of the issues raised in the
target article concerning the logic of single dissociations,
arguing strongly that this logic will always founder on the
impossibility of demonstrating beyond doubt that a given
test of awareness is exhaustive. We are probably not quite
as skeptical as Merikle about the possibility of establishing
unconscious learning in experiments using the single
dissociation logic, but we agree wholeheartedly that his
concerns should be addressed more adequately by de-
fenders of implicit learning. Merikle, Perruchet & Gal-
lego, and Svartdal all advocate the exploration of alterna-
tive strategies, an idea we fully support.
Perruchet & Callego and Brody & Crowley raise the
very interesting but thorny issue of learning during the
test. Perruchet & Gallego refer, for example, to evidence
that above-chance performance in a grammaticality judg-
ment test may be due to learning taking place in the test
rather than to the retrieval of information from an earlier
study phase. As evidence of this, Perruchet (1994) reports
performance significantly above chance in subjects not
given a study phase. A related effect, noted in the target
article, is that subjects may observe their performance
during testing and thereby become aware of their implicit
knowledge. These possibilities are worrisome, because
they challenge the idea that tests (either implicit or
explicit) may reveal whether prior learning was conscious
or unconscious. Rather than providing evidence about'
earlier processing, performance on the test is under the
control of events happening during the test itself. We fully
agree with Perruchet & Gallego and Brody & Crowley
that this is a real possibility that requires much further
investigation.
Rakover offers an entirely new method of determining
whether a task can be learned without awareness, but we
believe his procedure is flawed. He proposes that a task is
"not susceptible to introspective awareness" if the sub-
ject, having been told the rule governing the task but not
the specific content of the rule, is unable to discover even
a part of the content of the rule. As an example, he cites
data reported in the Lewicki et al. (1987) study, which was
extensively discussed in the target article. In a pilot study,
Lewicki et al. informed subjects that there were rules
governing the position of the target on complex trials and
offered them $100 for finding any parts of the rules. None
was able to do so, from which Rakover concludes that the
task is not susceptible to introspective awareness. He
then suggests that if such an unsusceptible task is learn-
able, it follows that the learning must be unconscious.
Because Lewicki et al. obtained reaction time (RT) speed-
up when subjects were exposed to the RT version of the
task, Rakover's analysis suggests that learning was uncon-
scious. The structure of the task could not be determined
by conscious analysis but could be learned implicitly.
The problem with such an account, however, is that it is
left up to experimenters to specify in the susceptibility
test the "rule" they think is relevant. But if this rule is not
what is responsible for learning in the later performance
test, the experimenter will erroneously conclude that
learning was unconscious when it may well have been
conscious. As we argued, the RT speed-up in Lewicki et
al.'s experiments was almost certainly not due to knowl-
edge of the rules that were required in the susceptibility
test. In sum, Rakover's account falls foul of the conse-
quences of not adopting the Information Criterion.
None of the commentators seems to question the status
of the Information Criterion. We all appear to be in
agreement that the test of awareness must focus on the
same information that underlies successful task perfor-
mance. One point made by Carlson, which we readily
accept, is that it is not merely stimulus-specific informa-
tion that is relevant but also self-specific information
about such things as intentions. All of the information that
plays a role in task performance - including such things as
goals and intentions — must be known before we can judge
whether an awareness test meets the criterion.
R2.2. Defining consciousness and learning. Several com-
mentators (Baeyens et al., Catania, Overskeid, Packard)
wondered why we had failed to define learning and
awareness, but we regard doing so as a futile exercise.
Surely the past thirty years of research on human concept
learning should have taught us that some concepts are
simply ill defined and fuzzy? And surely everybody real-
ises that any definitions of these terms we offer would
immediately be challenged? Readers of Dennett (1991)
will search the book in vain for a "definition" of conscious-
ness, but just because a concept cannot be given an
analytic definition, does not mean it is outside the scope of
scientific investigation. [See also Dennett & Kinsbburne:
"Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Con-
sciousness in the Brain" BBS 15(2)1992.]
With respect to learning, Roediger (1993) offers a clear
illustration of the difficulty in finding a suitable definition.
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He reports that the average duration of labor in giving
birth to first-born babies is 9.5 hours, whereas with later-
born babies it is 6.6 hours. Clearly, with second and third
children the amount of time the mother spends in labor is
much less than with first children. Does this mean that
something has been learned which explains the speed up?
On the one hand, it could be argued that if repetition
priming is an example of learning (as indexed, say, by
latency of tachistoscopic identification), then so should
this "priming" effect in childbirth. On the other hand, it
seems strange to say that the female reproductive system
is capable of "learning" and "remembering." We suggest
that borderline cases such as this and the ones cited by
Overskeid (e.g., the immune system "learning" to recog-
nise viruses) illustrate the futility of trying to define
learning.
Baeyens et al. claim we are arguing that "any verbal or
nonverbal behavior which might reasonably be thought of
as reflecting a judgment based on a belief-that-x should be
treated as an index of awareness-of-x," but we certainly
never argue for this in the target article. Apart from
anything else, such a definition would probably make
unconscious learning a logical impossibility. Our ap-
proach is wholly pragmatic - we offer no hard and fast
criteria as to what counts as a test of awareness. However,
we do believe that if a subject has an expectancy of a future
event and is able to project that expectancy into a truly
instrumental action (as opposed to a reflex), then the
expectancy is almost certainly conscious. At present, it is
fair to say that we do not know for certain whether
responses in a prediction task are instrumental acts or
reflexes (see Dickinson 1988 and Jacoby et al. 1993, for
possible ways of distinguishing between these). We dis-
cuss the prediction task further in section R2.5. In fact,
we are largely in agreement with Baeyens et al.'s criteria
for what counts as consciousness. Our only dispute would
be that it is a truism that "awareness-of-x is the pres-
ence . . . of a phenomenal state of having-the-subjective-
impression-to-consciously-know-that-x."
Howe & Rabinowitz take us to task for being unspecific
as to what it is that the subject needs to be aware (or
unaware) of. They point out that there are three ways in
which consciousness may be related to learning: "the
organism as conscious while learning, the organism as
being conscious of learning, and the organism being
conscious of what is being learned." We thought we had
been clear about this, but to reiterate, the question is
whether or not the subject is aware of the information that
is responsible for improved performance on the implicit
test (i.e., the third case above). Whether an organism is
aware in the general sense, or whether it is aware that it is
learning, is simply irrelevant to the issue of implicit
learning.
R2.3. Measuring consciousness. In their thoughtful com-
mentary, Dienes & Perner suggest that performance on,
for example, a prediction test measures the objective
rather than the subjective threshold of awareness. Sub-
jects may perform above chance on such a test despite
believing that they are guessing, in which case their
knowledge should be described as unconscious, and by
inference, their learning should be described as uncon-
scious as well.
We have two points to make about this. First, in the
sorts of studies reviewed in the target article, we do not
know whether this is what subjects believe - they may
well believe that their prediction performance is above
chance (though the unpublished study Dienes & Perner
cite, in which subjects reported that they were guessing,
sounds very promising). Second, and more important, the
problem with the subjective/objective threshold distinc-
tion is the way in which the subjective threshold is
assessed. Subjects are notoriously poor at knowing what
randomness is, so when asked whether or not they be-
lieve they are guessing, there is no reason to suppose that
a veridical answer concerning their state of awareness is
given. Moreover, the subjective threshold is often as-
sessed post hoc: at the end of a block of trials, subjects are
asked to evaluate their performance across that block. It
would hardly be surprising in the circumstances that very
ephemeral states of consciousness during the prediction
trials might be forgotten or discounted by the time of the
evaluation. The subjective threshold technique may yield
results different from the objective one only because the
testing conditions are different and the subjective test is
less sensitive. (This is much less of a problem in blind-
sight, of course, because the subjective judgment about
performance is made in the presence of the stimulus to
which the subject is responding. We certainly would not
want to dispute the importance of the subjective/
objective difference in such cases as blindsight).
In citing a test which they construe as measuring
unconscious learning but which we view as measuring
conscious knowledge, Baeyens et al. attempt to point out
the unacceptability of our methods of assessing aware-
ness. In the evaluative conditioning study they cite,
subjects were exposed in the learning phase to a relation-
ship between line thickness in a geometrical figure and
the valence of a subsequently presented picture (positive
or negative). In the critical test, subjects saw a geometri-
cal figure and were told that a positive or negative picture
would be presented subliminally immediately after it.
Subjects had to say whether they thought they had seen a
positive or negative picture, even though none was actu-
ally presented. Subjects performed above chance on this
test: they reported seeing a positive slide, for example, if
the geometrical figure had been paired in the study phase
with a positive slide.
Baeyens et al. want to offer this as a test of unconscious
knowledge, but we see no strong evidence supporting
that position. It is equally possible that the subjects, as a
result of the study phase, have a (very fragile) conscious
expectancy of a picture of a certain valence given a certain
geometrical figure. Their expectancy may then bias the
response they give, such that this forced-choice test can
be interpreted as assessing awareness. We believe the
burden of proof is on those who support the idea of
unconscious influences to demonstrate that their inter-
pretation is the only viable one. In this case, we suggest it
is not.
In support of unconscious processes in general, Over-
skeid claims there is much evidence that our decisions
may often be taken by our brains prior to any conscious
intention to act, and that we "jump on a running train
believing we started it." As evidence, he cites the well-
known experiments of Libet (1985), but these have been
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subjected to so much criticism (see Dennett 1991) that it
is highly premature to treat them as conclusive.
A number of commentators (Overskeid, Reber & Win-
ter, Squire et al., Terrace) draw strong inferences from
the fact that learning can occur in preverbal children and
in lowly organisms such as the invertebrate Aplysia. The
argument is that we are on the horns of a dilemma: either
our thesis forces us to conclude that such organisms are
conscious, or, if it is assumed that such organisms cannot
possibly be conscious, then the forms of learning they are
capable of must be unconscious. We believe that neither
of these arguments is valid. First, just because a regu-
larity occurs in humans does not mean it holds for other
species. No amount of argumentation from animal experi-
ments is going to alter the fact that a correlation between
awareness and learning exists in humans.
Second, it cannot simply be asserted that nonhuman
organisms are unconscious (see Dennett 1991; Griffin
1992, Nagel 1974). In fact, we believe that little produc-
tive purpose is to be gained in discussing animal con-
sciousness at all, since there is no agreed-upon means of
deciding what counts as consciousness in animals, and our
intuitions clearly differ from those of some commentators.
Reber & Winter are confident that animals are uncon-
scious, but they provide no reasons for their view. Sim-
ilarly, after describing evidence of learning in two- to
three-month-old infants, Terrace states (correctly, in our
view) that "whether infants are aware of their expectations
is entirely a matter of speculation," but then goes on to
conclude that "since consciousness in infants cannot be
subjected to empirical study, there is no basis for assum-
ing that infants are conscious of what they learn." But
equally, there is no basis for assuming that they are not
conscious. Terrace gives no rationale for his belief that
there is "compelling evidence of learning without con-
sciousness in infants and animals." To repeat, we doubt
that the matter is decidable, and in any case it has little
bearing on our conclusions. The target article, and the
experiments it reviewed, are about adult human learning.
Catania proposes a number of animal experiments
analogous to human implicit learning ones (see McLaren
et al., in press, for similar examples) to illustrate his belief
that it is only verbal reports, and not other forms of
behavior such as recognition or prediction, that are of
relevance to the concept of consciousness. [See also
Lubinski & Thompson: "Species and Individual Differ-
ences in Communication Based on Private States" BBS
16(4)1993.] For example, in a pigeon analogue of a se-
quential RT experiment, it would be possible to set up
both an RT measure and a prediction measure. Catania
suggests that if the pigeon's RT and prediction responses
correlated, such that RT improvements never occurred in
the absence of above-chance prediction responses, our
position would force us to conclude that the pigeon is
aware.
We went to some lengths to acknowledge that predic-
tion responses might be susceptible to unconscious influ-
ences (see below), so the conclusion that the pigeon is
conscious would not necessarily follow. But our main
response to Catania is to turn his question around: What
would he conclude from his pigeon experiment if the RT
and prediction measures dissociated? Would one not have
to conclude that there is a source of information that is
available to one response but not the other, and (if the
tasks are very similar) that what characterizes this infor-
mation is that it is unconscious? Surely, on his reasoning,
this would be even stronger evidence for conscious pro-
cesses (in the control of prediction responses) in nonver-
bal organisms. Of course, we doubt that such dissocia-
tions occur in humans so there is little reason to anticipate
them in other organisms, but that is no reason to believe
that consciousness is a logical impossibility in animals.
Ennen recalls the Rylean distinction drawn between
"learning-how" and "learning-that." She argues that
learning-how does not involve acquiring information so it
cannot be reported. Therefore, it must be learned implic-
itly. Unfortunately, although her argument seems sound,
(that is, although unconscious learning appears to be a
sound logical possibility), there does not appear to be any
clear evidence for it. Take conditioning, for example. This
is a perfect example of knowing-how, a form of learning
that can be characterized as "the incremental modifica-
tion of perceptual-motor connections over time such that
the agent acquires a neurophysiological disposition for
improved performance." Yet in humans, conditioning is
always accompanied by awareness. Thus Ennen's analysis
does nothing to challenge the claim that learning is always
accompanied by consciousness.
Stadler & Frensch and Nagata suggest that learning is
implicit when it is unaffected by intention. It is quite
reasonable to define theoretical terms as one wants, but
this creates an entity different from the "implicit" learning
that is the focus of the target article, because intention is
synonymous neither with awareness nor with abstraction.
These commentators are surely right that learning can be
either intentional or unintentional, but to focus on the
learning process rather than the learned information is
simply to change the subject. Remember that the thesis
we are assessing proposes that information can exist in
such a form as to be able to project itself onto behavior
without being represented in consciousness. This is a
thesis about information, not process.
Andrade points to a motivational issue in measuring
awareness among patients under general anesthesia. She
discusses the isolated forearm technique which reveals
high levels of awareness in anesthetized people, but, as
she notes, even this test is fallible, because of motiva-
tional changes in subjects. Not only is it the case, as we
argued in the target article, that evidence for learning and
memory during anesthesia is contradictory (see Merikle
& Rondi, 1993, for an even more skeptical review), it is
also doubtful that anesthetized subjects are always uncon-
scious of events happening around them.
R2.4. Defining explicit learning and consciousness by
verbal report. Some commentators (Catania, Dienes &
Perner, Lindsay & Gorayska, Overskeid, Rakover, Ter-
race) suggest that verbal report is the best place to draw
the line between explicit and implicit learning. Lindsay &
Gorayska argue that it may be more difficult than we
assumed to prove that another test is more sensitive or
exhaustive than is verbal report, and therefore only the
latter should be adopted as an index of consciousness. But
not only does this immediately rule out animals and
nonlinguistic humans as being conscious, it also makes
unconscious learning a logical necessity. Whereas we are
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accused of making unconscious learning a logical impos-
sibility, Lindsay & Gorayska appear to be doing the exact
opposite! We agree with Merikle that establishing a test as
exhaustive is likely to prove very difficult, and we doubt
that Lindsay & Gorayska have any case for establishing
this with respect to verbal report.
The view that there is something special about verbal
reports appears frequently in the commentaries, but we
see no basis for adopting this strong position. There is no
clear boundary between reports and other tests of aware-
ness; instead, we take verbal reports to be merely one of
several means of assessing awareness. For example, Mar-
cel (1993) has shown that subjects can be much better at
using responses other than verbal reports as indicators of
awareness. Marcel presented subjects with a brief light
close to the threshold of detection and instructed them to
report on each trial whether they saw the light by blink-
ing, pressing a button, and saying "yes." Subjects on the
same trial reported with their finger that they saw the
light while reporting orally that they did not, and vice
versa. Most interestingly, verbal reports did not turn out
to be the most sensitive index on detection: blinking,
under some conditions, was far more sensitive. In the face
of such findings, it is very difficult to assign a special role
to verbal reports.
Other commentators point out that there is a qualita-
tive difference between learning in subjects who can
retrospectively report and justify their performance and
subjects who deny having any knowledge of their perfor-
mance. However, both the Sensitivity and Information
Criteria suggest that verbal recall is a poor place to draw a
line between learning systems. Reportable knowledge
varies between subjects, their vocabularies, the retrieval
cues available, prompting, set, certainty of the knowl-
edge, and so on. We see little justification for a qualitative
difference at the point of spontaneous or prompted verbal
recall. We do see the level of verbal report as an interest-
ing and legitimate independent variable, but one with
quantitative rather than qualitative levels. And we agree
with Willingham that quantitative differences make for
poor taxonomies.
Two commentators (Cleeremans and Willingham)
make the related proposal that consciousness varies on a
continuum. As training continues, initially unconscious
knowledge becomes increasingly conscious. Changes in
the degree of consciousness would account for observed
changes in the amount of information reported verbally as
well as for changes in prediction accuracy and even
reaction time. However, we prefer the interpretation that
the information represented in consciousness increases in
amount and in strength (i.e., certainty). Our argument,
via the Sensitivity Criterion, is that verbal report places a
high threshold of certainty and retrievability, whereas
other tests, such as the prediction task, place a lower
threshold. The lower threshold allows less certain infor-
mation to be demonstrated.
Besides quantitative differences, of course, the content
of verbal reports may vary qualitatively. As we discuss in
the target article, learning (and testing) protocols may
demonstrate heavy reliance on memorization and in-
stance learning or they may demonstrate heavy use of
reasoning and problem-solving skills and hypotheses.
Note that although we believe that verbal reports should
be treated with care, it is not the case (as Catania
suggests) that we have ruled out verbal reports as relevant
to judging a learner's awareness. They are certainly rele-
vant; they may just not be exhaustive.
R2.5. Do prediction and recognition tasks measure con-
scious or unconscious knowledge? Several commenta-
tors (Cleeremans, Dienes & Perner, Rakover, Seger)
raise the issue, addressed at some length in the target
article, that prediction and recognition tests may not be
"process-pure," that is, they may not pr6vide pure indices
of conscious knowledge but may be contaminated by
unconscious knowledge. We reiterate that we believe this
is a perfectly valid objection which will only be resolved
by further investigation. At present we probably do not
have sufficient information to resolve the issue.
Dienes & Perner criticise prediction and recognition
tests, because such tests do not require subjects to de-
scribe the underlying basis of their responses: a subject
may make a correct prediction without being able to
justify that prediction. But this would only be relevant if
we thought that justification played a role in the perfor-
mance measure (e.g., RT). That is, if subjects only re-
sponded quickly in the RT phase when they could de-
scribe the basis of their expectation about where the next
signal would appear, then to meet the Information Crite-
rion, the awareness test would have to pick out only those
cases where justification was available. But in general we
have no reason to believe that justifications play a role in
performance tasks, in which case Dienes & Perner's
position has little direct support.
R2.6. The possible causal role of awareness. We made no
inferences concerning the possible causal role of aware-
ness. Our aim was merely to show that, as an empirical
fact, awareness is necessary for learning. Some commen-
tators (Catania, Poldrack & Cohen) wonder about the
specific role that consciousness plays in learning. The
view that awareness is necessary for learning could entail
a range of possibilities, with a causal role merely repre-
senting one extreme. At the other extreme, awareness
may have no causal role with respect to learning but may
be correlated with it via a third factor.
Far from being tangential to the question of implicit
learning, (as Svartdal claims) the correlation between
level of performance and verbal report demonstrates the
coupling between performance and consciousness. We
have no particular reason for favoring one interpretation
of the role of consciousness over any other. We note,
however, that subjects may consciously choose a learning
strategy, such as hypothesis testing or memorization, and
that this choice affects learning. In this sense, at least,
consciousness affects what is learned.
Squire et al. claim that in cases where the two are
correlated, consciousness is epiphenomenal to learning.
Thus, despite the fact that conditioning cannot be shown
to occur in the absence of awareness, the latter plays no
causal role and is merely a nonfunctional "shadow" that
accompanies learning. But, as Lovibond (1993) argues
eloquently, the correlation between conscious knowledge
and learning is incredibly close. The epiphenomenalist
position therefore looks decidedly strange, because if
consciousness is an epiphenomenon, it ought to be pos-
sible to dissociate it from learning. There is no evidence
that this is possible, however. (We argue below that
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amnesia does not represent a case in which awareness and
learning are uncoupled.)
R3. Further evidence for implicit learning
Inevitably, commentators have cited studies that we
failed to cover in the target article. We apologise if, by
wittingly or unwittingly excluding certain pieces of evi-
dence, we have reached erroneous conclusions.
Some commentators take us to task for considering
such a limited and artificial range of learning tasks and for
drawing more general conclusions about human learning
than is warranted by these studies. To an extent, we
cannot help but agree, but we also believe that complex
real-world learning is largely reducible to simpler learn-
ing. By considering such basic learning paradigms as
Pavlovian conditioning, we therefore hope to encompass
more complicated and realistic learning situations. Be-
sides, we know of no careful studies of the contents of
people's consciousness when they are learning to play
tennis (see Overskeid).
R3.1. The mere exposure effect. Bornstein maintains that
data from experiments on the mere exposure effect pro-
vide compelling evidence for unconscious learning. In
such experiments (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980),
subjects show an increased preference for stimuli which
have been repeatedly exposed for brief durations, but
they cannot recognise those stimuli. We have no dispute
over the robustness of such effects, but we do have strong
reservations about whether they demonstrate implicit
learning.
It is odd that Bornstein persistently refers to these
experiments as involving stimuli perceived without
awareness, because the evidence that the stimuli in most
of these experiments are subliminal is very weak. For
example, they are often presented unmasked, and a
forced-choice present/absent test is rarely included (see
Bornstein et al., 1987, for an exception). This is impor-
tant, because if the original stimuli were genuinely sub-
liminal, then any preference for them at test would have
to represent a role for unconscious information.
Be that as it may, dissociations clearly do emerge
between subsequent preference and recognition judg-
ments, whether the stimuli were consciously perceived at
study or not, and this finding may also provide evidence
(albeit less direct) of unconscious processes. In this case,
the idea would simply be that there is a source of informa-
tion available for making the preference but not the
recognition judgment, and this information may there-
fore be the end-product of an unconscious learning sys-
tem operating in tandem with the conscious system.
However, we pointed out that hypermnesia seems to
occur for recognition responses in these experiments
(Merikle & Reingold 1991), and we cited this as evidence
that in making recognition judgments, subjects may ini-
tially discount a source of conscious information such as
perceptual fluency (Brody & Crowley propose a similar
account in their commentary). Bornstein does not provide
an alternative explanation of the hypermnesia finding.
Moreover, it turns out that some very recent evidence
supports our position and directly refutes the view that
the preference and recognition judgments are based on
different sources of information. Whittlesea (1993) has
shown that the dissociation of affect and recognition can
occur even for items that did not appear in the study
phase. In his experiment, he required subjects to rate
words for pleasantness and also to judge whether they had
been recently presented; in fact, the critical words had
not been preexposed. Because of a manipulation of the
context in which the words appeared, some words were
processed more fluently than others, and this led them to
be rated as pleasant, but these same words were not called
"old." Thus the dissociation of affect and recognition
occurs even for novel items.
This result directly contradicts the idea that above-
chance affect judgments are based on unconscious infor-
mation encoded during the study phase. Instead, as
Whittlesea argues, the result must be attributable to the
different ways in which information (such as perceptual
fluency) concerning a test item may be interpreted in
affect and recognition tests.
R3.2. Conditioning. Our conclusion that awareness is
necessary for conditioning is disputed by Kimmel, who
cites as positive evidence a study by G rings (1965) in
which subjects acquired autonomic CRs but "when ques-
tioned after three days of conditioning . . . revealed no
knowledge about stimulus relations." Kimmel also cites a
study (Kimmel et al. 1983) in which subjects could be
shown to have learned about one of two coloured lights
that signalled shocks but were unable to report whether it
was the blue or yellow light, and another study (Lachnit &
Kimmel 1993) in which subjects apparently learned to
respond appropriately to CSs even if they were unaware
of the relevant reinforcement contingencies.
Kimmel seems to think that such results are persuasive
since "the subjects . . . were questioned very closely,
and the questioners were motivated to detect any sign of
awareness. At the very least, Shanks & St. John should
describe what they consider inadequate in interview
procedures from studies claiming conditioning without
awareness, instead of rejecting them peremptorily or
acting as if they do not even exist." We did not dismiss
these studies peremptorily; rather, we consider them to
have exactly the same flaws as other studies that we did
cite. These flaws include using an awareness index that
fails to provide the subject with the same quality of
retrieval cues as the conditioning measure.
It does not matter how closely the subjects are ques-
tioned or how motivated the questioners were. If the
subjects' knowledge is fairly ephemeral, then any decre-
ment in the conditions of testing between the implicit and
explicit tests will lead to less information being revealed.
We leave it as an exercise for the reader to decide whether
results such as those Kimmel cites provide conclusive
evidence of unconscious learning. Incidentally, we have
been unable to evaluate the Lachnit and Kimmel (1993)
study that Kimmel cites, because that report does not in
fact include any discussion or data concerning aware
versus unaware subjects.
We do not believe we have given an unfair description
of Baeyens et al.'s data. When subjects are given a
concurrent test of awareness (rather than just a postex-
perimental questionnaire), more of them appear to be
aware of the conditioning contingencies. Is this because
the concurrent measure is more sensitive, or because it
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actually creates awareness? Baeyens et al.'s belief in
unconscious learning requires them to exclude the former
possibility, but we see no reason (and they provide no
evidence) for such a conclusion. There are any number of
reasons why a concurrent test might be more sensitive
than a post hoc one. For further criticism of the data on
evaluative conditioning, see Davey (1994).
R3.3. Instrumental learning. We applaud Svartdal's use of
an interesting alternative to the standard logic of dissocia-
tion to demonstrate unconscious instrumental learning.
Svartdal recommends providing explicit instructions that
focus the subject's attention on one aspect of responding
(e.g., position), but arranging for reinforcement to be
under the control of variations in another dimension of
responding (e.g., force). With such a procedure, Svartdal
(1992) showed that variations in the dimension of re-
sponding that was in fact reinforced became larger and
larger, apparently without the subjects being aware of this
change.
As Svartdal notes, though, such an experiment is still
likely to be dogged by the problem of correlated hypoth-
eses. He dismisses the claim that correlated hypotheses
may have been the basis of his subjects' responding,
because when asked to formulate advice to another hypo-
thetical person on how to master the task, subjects typ-
ically gave very general answers and failed to verbalise
any such correlated hypotheses. But until we know what
the putative correlated hypothesis might be, it is very
difficult to know what we should be looking for in these
protocols. If the hypothesis is only partially used, or if
several different correlated hypotheses are used concur-
rently or on different trials, or if the hypothesis is very
complex, subjects' inability to give useful verbal reports
would hardly be surprising. Because there can be no
doubt that correlated hypotheses play a crucial role in
many instrumental tasks (Dulany 1961), we reiterate our
conclusion that the existence of such hypotheses makes it
very unlikely that clear evidence of unconscious learning
will emerge from instrumental tasks.
Berry rightly points out that we should have discussed
the study by Stanley et al. (1989), which used the yoking
procedure that we commended in the target article.
However, we believe that this study provides far from
convincing support for implicit learning. In their first
three experiments, Stanley et al. observed that verbal
protocols from subjects who have had extensive practice
at a control task (sugar production or person interaction)
could significantly improve the performance of naive
subjects, indicating that a good deal of knowledge was
available to verbal report.
In Experiment 4, Stanley et al. (1989) selected a sample
(12 out of 53 subjects) of people learning the control task
who had a clear transition point where their performance
showed a marked and relatively sudden improvement.
Stanley et al. found that yoked subjects given the pretran-
sition verbal protocols from these subjects showed just as
much benefit as yoked subjects given the posttransition
protocols. From this Stanley et al. concluded that a sharp
performance increase is not immediately accompanied by
an increase in the quality of verbal report, because other-
wise the yoked subjects given posttransition transcripts
should have shown a much greater benefit than those
given the pretransition transcripts.
Although this result is certainly interesting, we believe
that there are at least two problems with Stanley et al.'s
interpretation. First, a statistical artifact may have been
introduced by the procedure of selecting subjects who
showed a sudden transition in performance. Naturally,
random variation accounts for some of the fluctuations in
performance in these tasks, but if it is merely chance that
is responsible for the selected subjects' transitions, then
there is no reason to expect their accompanying verbal
protocols to show any marked improvement after the
transition.
Second, Stanley et al. found in Experiment 3 that naive
subjects given a simple rule did not perform at the
maximum level achievable with that rule. Subjects were
told to "select the response level half-way between the
current production level and the target level," which if
followed could lead to 83% responses on target. However,
subjects achieved only 50% correct responses. The ob-
vious conclusion is that even when subjects have access to
a useful rule, they will not always use it. Perhaps they are
not confident that a rule is correct until they have tested it
by comparing what happens when they do and do not
follow it. But if that is the case, then there is no justifica-
tion for supposing that the yoked subjects in Experiment
4 should have shown an immediate improvement in per-
formance when given the posttransition protocols. In
sum, the yoked design Stanley et al. used is very promis-
ing (and without question shows that subjects may have
access to far more knowledge than would be predicted by
other forms of questioning), but it has not established that
any significant amount of knowledge is unconscious.
Rizzo & Parlangeli argue that in complex control tasks
where some real-world schema is available to the subject,
subjects will use that schema as a basis for rule learning.
They report that in some circumstances a subject will be
unable to learn to control a system formally identical to
one they can learn to control if the former retrieves
schema-based knowledge that is incompatible with the
contingencies of the task. Rizzo & Parlangeli suggest that
this is inconsistent with the existence of an independent
implicit learning system, because such a system would be
unaffected by the specific content of the task. We are not
sure that this line of reasoning is watertight, but it is
certainly interesting that such differences can emerge.
Rizzo & Parlangeli also report obtaining strong correla-
tions between performance and verbal report.
Overskeid claims that instrumental learning is possible
during sleep, but we see no good reasons to assume that
people are completely unaware when they are asleep. If it
is difficult, as Andrade suggests, to prove beyond doubt
that people are unconscious when they are anesthetized,
then it will surely be a good deal harder to prove it when
they are asleep. Moreover, numerous well-controlled
studies have failed to reveal any signs of learning during
sleep (British Psychological Society 1992; Wood et al.
1992)
R3.4. Sequence learning. Our interpretation of Stadler's
(1989) study is very nicely refuted by Stadler & Frensch.
We argued that the failure of the prediction test to reveal
any savings (although the RT data indicated that learning
had occurred) may have been due to interference and
hence rapid forgetting during the test, which provided no
feedback to maintain accurate performance. Our hypoth-
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esis was that evidence of savings may have been present
on the earlier test trials but abolished on later trials as
interference built up. Stadler & Frensch report that
prediction performance was at chance even from trial 1.
Because we have argued that this study goes a good way
toward meeting the Sensitivity and Information Criteria,
we are happy to acknowledge that the results appear to
provide good evidence of unconscious learning. Our only
outstanding concerns would be (1) that the assessment of
awareness was based on a fraction of the number of
observations that were used to demonstrate RT speed-up,
introducing possible problems of statistical power, and (2)
that we continue to believe that withholding feedback in
the prediction test works against the possibility of finding
significant savings. But because the awareness test pro-
vided no hint of savings, the former concern is probably
unimportant, and the latter concern can easily be avoided
by providing feedback and comparing prediction perfor-
mance with that of a control group trained on random
patterns. Stadler's (1989) study clearly merits replication
and further exploration to reveal why this experiment
obtained evidence of a dissociation between RT speed-up
and prediction performance whereas so many others,
reviewed in the target article, have failed to do so.
Reed & Johnson also report a new experiment that
seems to meet our criteria while still obtaining a dissocia-
tion between performance and awareness. In that experi-
ment, subjects trained on the repeating reaction time
sequence 12134231432 were then tested on the sequence
123413214243, which is matched in terms of single-event
and pairwise frequencies. The increase in response laten-
cies that Reed & Johnson (1994) observed must therefore
be attributable to genuine sequence learning, involving at
least knowledge of second-order structure. That this
knowledge was implicit is suggested by the fact that
performance on generation and recognition tests was at
chance. In the generation test, for example, subjects saw
sequences of 2 target locations from the training phase
and they then generated the 10 locations they thought
had followed the target sequence in the training phase.
Reed & Johnson found that subjects were no more likely
to make a correct first response following the 2 targets
than were control subjects trained on a random sequence.
The recognition test also revealed no evidence of explicit
sequence knowledge.
We are somewhat less convinced than with Stadler's
(1989) experiment that this provides compelling evidence
of unconscious learning. First, with a relatively small
number of trials per subject, the generation and recogni-
tion tests may not have been powerful enough to detect
small savings from the training phase. Second, it is not at
all clear why Perruchet and Amorim's (1992) subjects
were able to perform above chance in generation and
recognition tests whereas Reed & Johnson's were not. It
is true that there are several procedural differences be-
tween the tasks, but the discrepancy remains trouble-
some. Third, and most important, we have found in a
replication of Reed & Johnson's experiment that subjects
can perform well above chance in a generation test. We
trained subjects on the same sequence and under the
same conditions Reed & Johnson used, but we then
required the subjects to predict target locations in a
standard prediction test containing 96 trials, with feed-
back about correct target location. On the first cycle of 12
trials, subjects made reliably more correct predictions
(45.2%) than would be expected if they only had knowl-
edge of first-order structure (33.3%). Our subjects, there-
fore, did appear to have access on the generation test to
second-order sequence knowledge. Of course, firm con-
clusions must await additional data.
Cleeremans suggests that "there is no evidence what-
soever that subjects have conscious access to . . . distri-
butional information about the stimulus material." We
disagree. Even if prediction performance is to some
extent contaminated by unconscious processes, the re-
sults (including those of Cleeremans & McClelland 1991,
but especially those of Perruchet & Amorirn 1992) suggest
that subjects have extensive conscious access to the rele-
vant distributional information. More important, there is
no evidence that they do not.
R3.5. Amnesia. Many of the commentators (Cleeremans,
Holyoak & Cattis, Kourtzi et al., Packard, Poldrack &
Cohen, Reber & Winter, Seger, Squire et al., Will-
ingham) were concerned by the lack of weight we gave to
data from memory-impaired patients. The argument for
the significance of such data is clearly stated by Poldrack
& Cohen. They claim that "it has been well documented
that amnesic patients can exhibit normal learning of
(motor, perceptual, and cognitive) skills, and can do so in
the absence of the ability to recollect the learning experi-
ences." If learned information can project itself onto
performance without being available to consciousness,
then surely we have prima facie evidence of implicit
learning.
We acknowledge that such results provide, at first
glance, an apparently strong case for an influence of
unconscious information. However, we believe that the
commentators have failed to give a fair or complete
picture of the data from patients with anterograde amne-
sia. We believe there are many places where their argu-
ment needs a substantial amount of extra work, and in the
present section we enumerate various reasons why amne-
sic data may be explained without appeal to implicit
learning.
As a preliminary consideration, it is important to note
that there are an enormous number of theories of amne-
sia, and how they bear on the issue of unconscious
learning varies. The view that what is impaired in amnesia
is the ability to have conscious declarative memory of
prior learning episodes is only one of many theories, and
it is by no means clear that this theory is correct (see
Mayes 1988). If amnesia in fact turns out to be a selective
deficit of contextual processing (Mayes 1988), orofconfig-
ural learning (Kourtzi et al.; Rudy & Sutherland 1992), or
of spatial learning (Hirst & Volpe 1984), or if it turns out to
be attributable to any of the huge number of other factors
that have been postulated, then its relevance to the issue
of unconscious learning will be very limited.
Another reason why data from amnesics may not pro-
vide additional illumination concerning implicit learning
is that the pattern of data seen in amnesics can readily be
obtained with normal subjects anyway. As mentioned in
the target article, memory-intact people can be induced
to perform at above-chance levels on indirect tests of
memory such as preference tests, while performing much
more poorly (and perhaps even at chance) on recognition
tests (e.g., Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980). As explained in
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the target article and in section R3.1, we see little reason
to regard such results as evidence of unconscious learn-
ing. Poor recognition memory may occur simply because
subjects discount a source of conscious information. But
perhaps evidence from amnesia is more compelling?
It may be helpful to consider a specific example that is
typical of the behavior of amnesics. Knowlton et al. (1992)
trained normal and amnesic subjects in the typical man-
ner of an artificial grammar study, and found that they
performed at approximately equivalent levels in classify-
ing test strings as grammatical or nongrammatical (nor-
mals = 66.9% correct, amnesics = 63.2% correct). How-
ever, on a recognition test in which old grammatical and
new nongrammatical strings were presented, the amne-
sics (62.0% correct) performed significantly worse than
the normal subjects (72.2% correct). Thus, on the test of
conscious knowledge of which strings were study items,
the amnesics were impaired, but this had no significant
effect on their ability to use those items to guide
classification.
Cleeremans, Holyoak & Cattis, Kourtzi et al., Pack-
ard, Poldrack & Cohen, Reber & Winter, Seger, Squire
et al., and Willingham all believe that results such as this
provide evidence of implicit learning. Yet the logic of the
argument for this conclusion is rarely spelt out (though
see Reingold & Merikle 1988 for an excellent discussion).
Presumably, when fleshed out it would run in one of two
ways, depending on the exact outcome of the recognition
test:
1. If the amnesics are at chance on the recognition test
but perform above chance on the implicit classification
test, that means there is information that is available to
the implicit but not to the explicit test. Subjects will be
strongly motivated to use all available conscious informa-
tion when performing the explicit recognition test,
hence, the information that is projected onto the implicit
but not the explicit test must be unconscious. And if
that information is unconscious at the time of retrieval,
then it is plausible to assume that it was registered
unconsciously.
2. If the recognition test reveals above-chance perfor-
mance, then the argument is slightly more complex and
presumably runs as follows. In Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
experiment, for example, it is no longer possible to say
straightaway that the amnesics had access to a source of
information on the implicit test that was not available to
them on the explicit test, because recognition and classifi-
cation are measured in quite different ways. What we can
say is that the normal subjects have access to more
information on the recognition test than do the amnesics.
Because this information is assumed to be conscious, the
only way the normals and amnesics could perform equally
well on the implicit test is if the test is unaffected by
conscious information (because normal subjects have
more conscious information but they do not perform any
better). Therefore above-chanpe performance on the im-
plicit test must be attributable to unconscious informa-
tion, and the argument proceeds as before.
With respect to the sorts of implicit learning experi-
ments that have been conducted with amnesics, it is the
second of the above arguments that is relevant rather than
the first. In these experiments (e.g., Knowlton et al.
1992), explicit and implicit memory are assessed in quite
different ways using different response scales, and recog-
nition is typically above chance. We know of no clear cases
where identical measures are used (e.g., forced-choice
recognition versus classification), and in any case our
reservations about the mere exposure effect in normals
would apply equally to such cases.
Thus we must evaluate the second of the above argu-
ments. There are many places in which it could be
challenged, but for present purposes it is vital to note that
the line of reasoning only works if performance is truly
equivalent in the amnesics and normals on the implicit
test. If the normal subjects perform even only marginally
better on that test, the argument will not go through,
because it is possible that the extra conscious knowledge
the normal subjects have (as indexed by superior perfor-
mance on the explicit test) is what explains their superior
performance on the implicit test.1 We would then be left
with no grounds for concluding that unconscious knowl-
edge is playing any role at all.
We will argue that the data do not in fact provide strong
support for the argument, because, contrary to what is
usually claimed, implicit tests of knowledge typically do
reveal impaired learning in amnesics (in situations where
their explicit knowledge is poor). It is simply not true that
amnesics perform normally on implicit learning tasks for
which their explicit memory is impaired: at most, what
can be said is that on some implicit tasks we do not know
for certain whether they are impaired or not, whereas on
others they are definitely impaired.
As the data cited above show, Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
amnesic subjects performed worse (albeit nonsignifi-
cantly) than their control subjects, and this is typical of
implicit learning studies with amnesics. For example,
Kolodny (1994) found that amnesics were worse than
normal subjects at learning to classify unfamiliar paint-
ings. Squire and Frambach (1990) found that although
amnesics were able to learn to control a complex task,
their performance was worse than that of normals. Knowl-
ton and Squire (1993) found that amnesics could correctly
categorize the unseen prototype pattern of random dot
stimuli, though at a numerically but nonsignificantly
lower level of accuracy than could normals. Nissen and
Bullemer (1987) observed that although amnesics could
improve their performance in a sequential reaction time
task, they learned less than normals, as indexed by the
fact that their RTs increased by a smaller amount when
they were transferred to a random sequence.
Similarly, Charness et al. (1988) found that amnesics
were impaired in learning patterns in the Hebb digits
task. Amnesics such as H. M. were impaired at learning
puzzles such as the Tower of Hanoi (Gabrieli et al. 1987).
Finally, despite repeated claims that conditioning occurs
at normal rates in amnesics, there is clear evidence of
impairments in conditional discrimination learning
(Daum et al. 1991) and simple operant conditioning
(Channon et al. 1993), if not in simple conditioning.
Note that we are not arguing that amnesics always show
impaired learning. Rather, we are claiming that in those
cases where their explicit memory for some information is
impaired, their implicit memory for that information will
be so as well. Thus the finding, cited by Squire et al., that
amnesics show normal speed-up in learning to read
mirror-reversed text is irrelevant unless it can be shown
that they have poorer explicit memory for the knowledge
responsible for their improved performance. That their
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memory for the content of the text they have read may be
poorer than that of normals is not sufficent to establish this
fact. Reading mirror-reversed text may be based on some-
thing totally unrelated to text memory, such as knowledge
of single mappings from reversed to normal letters.
Defenders of the view that amnesics show normal
implicit, but not explicit, learning would almost certainly
reply that, even granting the above cases, there are
numerous other implicit tasks, such as repetition prim-
ing, in which the performance of amnesics is unquestiona-
bly normal (although they have impaired explicit mem-
ory), and that these cases provide incontrovertible
evidence of implicit learning. For example, Squire et al.
assert that priming is intact in amnesia. Again we have to
disagree. The main problem is that amnesics almost
invariably perform at lower baseline levels than normals,
in which case it becomes very difficult to determine what
counts as "normal" learning. Numerous studies have
shown that, in absolute terms, the amount of repetition
priming observed in amnesics and normals is equivalent,
but Ostergaard (1994) pointed out that these amounts of
priming occur against a background of different overall
baselines. Because priming in normals is correlated with
baseline latency, and because amnesics have a slower
overall baseline, they need to show a larger absolute
priming effect to achieve the same relative effect as
normals. Amnesics show the same amount of priming in
absolute terms, however, despite their slower baseline;
hence, it follows that amnesics are impaired, not normal,
on these tasks.
Part of the difficulty here is that to claim that amnesics
learn normally in some tasks is to accept the null hypoth-
esis that a difference does not exist (e.g., Knowlton et al.'s
1992 experiment), but often it is questionable whether the
experiment had sufficient statistical power to reject the
null hypothesis. Of course, one simple way around the
problem would be to show that amnesics can perform
better than normals on some implicit task (e.g., as a result
of having been given more study trials or a shorter
retention interval), coupled with poorer explicit memory.
Our position seems to gain support from the fact that
there appear to be no published cases of this sort.
Granted, there are some studies in which amnesics have
been tested after a shorter retention interval than normals
such that performance on the implicit memory test is
equated, and where the amnesics still appear to show a
selective impairment of episodic memory (e.g., Schacter
et al. 1984), but these results have proven very difficult to
interpret, because the difference in performance on the
implicit and explicit tests may be a function of retention
interval (see Mayes 1992). A crossover interaction would
be much more persuasive.
We believe that impaired learning in amnesia, as in-
dexed by implicit tests, is the norm rather than the
exception. That being the case, the argument that amne-
sic data demonstrate implicit learning comes completely
unglued, because it is quite possible that the pattern of
impairment seen in amnesia can be interpreted in terms
of a single functional knowledge system: it is no longer
necessary to assume two distinct forms of knowledge
(conscious and unconscious) contributing to task
performance.
By analogy to Farah et al.'s (1993) model, we assume
that knowledge is represented in the weights of a parallel-
distributed memory system which can be probed both
implicitly and explicitly. When lesioned, such a system
would have sufficient knowledge to perform fairly well on
an implicit test that can benefit from small and fragmen-
tary amounts of knowledge, but the retained knowledge
may not be sufficient to allow for the complete trace
redintegration that is typically required in an explicit test.
This is tantamount to saying that the explicit tests used to
evaluate conscious knowledge in amnesics are generally
less sensitive to small amounts of residual information in
memory than the implicit tests used to measure
performance.
Whatever the merits of our argument, it may well be
objected that we have provided no direct evidence in
favor of it. We have therefore carried out some computer
simulations to try to reproduce Knowlton et al.'s (1992)
pattern of data in a single system. The first author, in
collaboration with N. Hursey, set up a standard back-
propagation network to classify strings as grammatical or
nongrammatical. The network was presented with gram-
matical and nongrammatical strings in the training phase
and learned to produce the correct classification decisions
across one set of output units. In addition to being taught
to classify the strings, the network was simultaneously
trained to reproduce the input string across a second set of
output units, as in an "encoder" network. After "lesioning"
(in fact involving the addition of random noise [mean =
0.0] to the weights) the network's classification and recog-
nition performance was evaluated. For recognition, we
measured the accuracy with which each input string was
reproduced across the relevant output units.
The critical result was that classification accuracy was
only mildly affected by the "lesion" but the network's
ability to recognize the training patterns correctly was
severely impaired, reproducing the exact pattern that
Knowlton et al. (1992) observed in their human subjects.
Such a result should not be surprising: it merely extends
to amnesia the results reported by Farah et al. (1993; see
sect. R2), and confirms the claim that recognition judg-
ments are less sensitive to partial information than are
grammaticality judgments. Our simulation also illustrates
why it is so important that amnesics are impaired, even if
only marginally, on implicit tests: it is because a connec-
tionist network would have great difficulty modelling a
case in which performance on only one type of test is
impaired.
On the hypothesis that there is a single source of
conscious information that is used on implicit and on
explicit tests, amnesics would be predicted to perform
worse on both; and this is exactly the pattern of results
that is observed. In sum, we believe that much of the data
from amnesic subjects performing implicit learning tasks
of the sort reviewed in the target article can be inter-
preted by means of a single functional system, with some
memory tests simply being more sensitive than others to
small amounts of fragmentary information in the system.
It is certainly possible that the behavior of amnesics is
relevant to the question of unconscious learning, but we
believe that advocates of that view will have to do a great
deal of work to establish it.
R3.6. Language learning. Language acquisition is fre-
quently cited as a prime example of unconscious rule
learning (e.g., see commentaries by Lachter, Nagata,
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Reber & Winter). Everything from spelling to grammar
appears to be rule governed, and even though native
speakers perform well on implicit tests of linguistic knowl-
edge (e.g., grammaticality judgments), they are rarely
able to report the relevant rules. Such a result is evidence
for implicit learning provided the Information Criterion is
met: as long as the rules identified by linguists are indeed
the basis of peoples' implicit linguistic competence, their
inability to report them suggests that the rules are repre-
sented in an unconscious form.
A number of researchers, however, have begun to
challenge the idea that linguistic knowledge is rule based;
they have shown instead that aspects of language may be
learned by distributed instance memory. For example,
Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) and Plunkett and
Marchman (1991) describe connectionist networks that
can learn to perform the mapping of English verbs from
their root forms to their past tense forms. Sejnowski and
Rosenberg (1987) and Seidenberg and McClelland (1989)
constructed networks that learn to transform written
words into spoken words, and Elman (1990) and St. John
and McClelland (1990) showed that networks can learn
simple aspects of English grammar and semantics (these
are representative examples among a host of others). All of
these network models learn by repeated exposure to
instances. Over time, regularities in the data are in-
corporated into the weights. This instance-based learn-
ing procedure is the same procedure that was used
by Dienes (1992) to model artificial grammar learning and
by Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) to model serial
reaction-time learning.
Lachter questions what children could be aware of that
would allow them to make grammaticality judgments
about intricately structured sentences. One might ask
whether there are any distributed processing network
models, such as those described in the target article, that
can perform sophisticated grammaticality judgments.
The current answer is no, but some network models are
beginning to approach this level of sophisticated sentence
processing. Elman (1993) described a network that accu-
rately processes center-embedded sentences, and St.
John (1994) found that a network can accurately process
sentences with subject- or object-relative clauses. These
networks could be modified to produce actual gram-
maticality judgments for artificial language strings.
Are these models focusing on the important structural
organization of the languages on which they are trained?
In analyses of the hidden unit representations that these
networks develop, Elman (1993) has found evidence that
they learn aspects of the phrase structure of the language.
Given that these networks are developing a sensitivity to
linguistic structure, the possibility that future distributed
instance/memorization models will attain a sophisticated
level of processing and be capable of making gram-
maticality judgments appears quite promising.
The research into network models of language learning
is controversial and far from complete. For example,
Pinker (1991) and Lachter and Bever (1988) argue that the
detailed phenomena of the regular verb past tense re-
quire a rule system (see Goldstone & Kruschke's com-
mentary). What we can conclude is that it has not been
shown beyond doubt that linguistic knowledge is in the
form of rules. That being the case, peoples' inability to
articulate such rules is neither here nor there. Time, and
further research, will tell what informational processes
underlie children's linguistic behavior and how far net-
work models can be taken to model aspects of language
learning without appealing to unconscious rule-learning
systems.
R4. How should implicit learning be
characterized?
Which dimensions make for sensible distinctions be-
tween learning systems? A common answer has been to
use the dimension of consciousness, but we have not
found a distinction between conscious and unconscious
learning to be warranted. We also discussed in section
R2.4 of this response the possibility that a distinction
between verbally reportable and unreportable knowl-
edge violates the Sensitivity and Information Criteria.
Instead, we propose that the distinction between verbally
reportable and unreportable knowledge is a useful,
though fallible, indicator of a real distinction between
rule learning and instance learning.
Several authors take issue with the rule/instance dis-
tinction or offer alternative ones. Nagata suggests that
our view of what is learned in artificial grammar experi-
ments does not differ markedly from Reber's. Whether or
not this is the case, the distinction between rules and
instances remains a valid one. Just because artificial
grammar experiments may not distinguish between rule
and instance learning, it does not follow that other experi-
ments, such as that of Regehr and Brooks (1993), do not.
Holyoak & Gattis suggest the additional criterion of
poor transferability and flexibility that, together with
instance-based knowledge and limited reportability,
seem to characterise what goes by the name "implicit
learning." This matrix of characteristics seems to fit with
and elaborate on the fragment/instance memorization
system. Somewhat similarly, Kourtzi et al. propose a
distinction between learning that depends on stimulus
recoding and learning of stimulus-response associations.
Direct S-R learning is assumed to be less flexible than
stimulus recoding. We are not sure whether these two
kinds of learning are meant to look different in on-line
protocols or are meant to be subject to different indepen-
dent variables, but in general we welcome the further
exploration of these alternative/additional distinctions
and their comparison to the instance memoriza-
tion/hypothesis testing distinction we proposed.
Merikle says that the attempt to (dis)prove any given
dissociation is doomed; simple dichotomies never seem to
get settled (cf., Newell's 1973 "You can't play 20 questions
with nature and win"). We feel that this position is too
strong, because researchers have gathered a huge amount
of data and learned a great deal about human learning
systems from considering simple dichotomies.
R4.1. Consciousness and models of implicit learning.
Our speculations about how to model awareness in a PDP
model are criticised by Cleeremans because such models
are not aware of the abstraction process across items.
Thus, assuming that the abstraction process in humans is
analogous to the learning processes in a PDP network,
this would appear to constitute a straightforward case of
learning without awareness. To be absolutely clear, we are
not proposing that networks are conscious. Rather, we are
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assuming that they provide models of human learning and
consciousness.
We agree wholeheartedly with Johnson-Laird's (1983,
p. 449) point that "like the weather, [consciousness] is
explicable by theories that can be simulated by computer
programs, but it can no more be embodied within a
computer than can an actual anti-cyclone: only organisms
with brains can be conscious." For reasons that no one
understands, some of the operations of the parallel net-
work that is the brain happen to be accompanied by
awareness of the content of what is being processed. We
suggest that artificial networks are capable of modelling,
albeit in a rudimentary way, the computational processes
of the brain, but that these processes are only accom-
panied by consciousness in real brains. Nonetheless, we
can quite happily hypothesise that it is a certain type of
processing operation (in brains or artificial networks) that
correlates with conscious experience.
We strongly disagree with Cleeremans's assertion that
"the very fact that obviously nonconscious and elemen-
tary networks are able to account for human perfor-
mance . . . has always struck me as evidence that aware-
ness is in fact ancillary in these tasks." It would be bizarre
to conclude that because a computer can simulate the
flight of a spaceship, therefore rocket fuel is unnecessary
for reaching the moon. For human learning, awareness
may be as necessary as rocket fuel is for space travel.
R4.2. The fragment/instance memorizer. We agree with a
number of commentators that rather than arguing about
consciousness, we ought to examine and characterise the
real differences between implicit and explicit learning. It
was in this spirit that we took up the question of what is
truly going on in implicit learning, namely, instance and
fragment memorization.
We believe that the available data are best explained in
terms of learning rules versus instances, and we are
impressed by the data Marsolek cites in favour of distinct
anatomical correlates of instance and rule learning. The
next big question is, what does the instance/fragment
memorization strategy look like, and how does it differ
from the rule-learning strategy? Cleeremans says we
need a process model, and we agree. But we feel that a
step along the way toward that goal is to examine the sorts
of information this system uses: what are instances and
fragments, and is this information sufficient to model
subjects' levels of performance? We reported several
studies (Cleeremans & McClelland 1991; Dienes 1992;
Perruchet & Pacteau 1990; Reber & Allen 1978; Servan-
Schreiber & Anderson 1990) that address this question.
Still, many commentators wonder what is learned in
implicit learning. What is this instance/fragment informa-
tion like? Is it an explicitly represented list of instances, or
is the representation less explicit, less individualised?
And how is it acquired? We have suggested that knowl-
edge of instances or fragments is represented across a
large number of weights in a parallel processor. This
distributed processor system is well characterized by
Dienes's and Cleeremans & McClelland's connectionist
models - as we point out in the target article. Still, it
seems from Cleeremans's comments as well as those of
others (Seger, Perruchet & Gallego) that we need further
exploration of how these distributed processors work and
how we can characterise their knowledge.
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Whether or not subjects are aware of the abstraction
process, they are plainly aware of the resulting knowledge
of fragments and fragment frequencies (Perruchet & Pao-
teau 1990; Reber & Allen 1978), and likely continuations
of strings and sequences (Dienes et al. 1991; Dulany etal.
1984). This information is available and even reportable at
test time.
If we accept the equation of consciousness with activa-
tion, then subjects can be aware of the level of activation
due to different frequencies and variabilities of fragments
during training. More frequent fragments will be en-
coded more often, their weights will grow stronger and
produce higher activation levels. As a result, these frag-
ments will seem familiar, both during training and at test
time. When new letters violate a common fragment or a
light violates a common sequence, the subject may "feel"
the violation as a mismatch between past predictions and
current encodings via a general reduction in the activa-
tion of the network. Either way, the activations of the
network provide information that the subject may report
as knowledge of the items. With learning, the weights
increase and therefore the activations increase. Should
we call this change an increase in awareness or an increase
in certainty of knowledge? We think the overwhelming
evidence falls on the side of interpreting this increase as a
change in certainty and quantity of knowledge.
We agree with Cleeremans that it is hard to imagine
how knowledge encoded in these weights could be in-
spected directly. But, as we tried to point out above, we do
not think direct inspection is necessary for the informa-
tion in the weights to be consciously available.
Such knowledge does not require an explicit and indi-
viduated encoding of each stimulus. Rather, we point to
Cleeremans's commentary as a good description of how a
distributed processor acquires the statistical regularities
of a corpus of stimuli and encodes that information in a
distributed format. Contrary to Kimmel's and Seger's
comments, distributed processors can perform a good
deal of abstraction from a corpus of instances. Maybe the
term "instance memorization" is not really adequate to
convey this automatic form of statistical abstraction. Per-
haps "distributed instance/fragment encoder" would bet-
ter designate the process we wish to consider.
R4.3. The relationship between memorization and rule
induction. A claim is made by Reber & Winter that our
account fails to come to grips with the requirement that
the memorial representation acquired in an artificial
grammar learning experiment must be of a form that
permits generalization and transfer to novel stimulus
items with different physical instantiations. We do not
disagree about the facts; even though we argued in the
target article that much of the data from such studies can
be understood simply in terms of instance or fragment
memory, we did conclude in sections R2.5.3and R3.2 that
transfer to novel items with different physical instantia-
tions is indeed possible (e.g., Altmann et al., in press).
However, contrary to what Reber & Winter argue, we
maintain that this presents no great difficulty for our
conception of implicit learning. In addition to memoriz-
ing fragments and instances of the study strings, subjects
also engage in a certain amount of hypothesis testing,
from which they induce abstract rules such as: "the first
two symbols of a string cannot be the same." Such rules
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allow them to perform slightly better than chance on a
grammaticality test with entirely different items such as
melodies. However, when tested on items in the same
format as the training items, both the induced rules and
the memorized fragments can contribute to the gram-
maticality judgement process, and hence performance is
better than in the changed-format condition.
Packard suggests that the notion of a "rule" is not useful
for characterizing types of learning, because a rule is
merely a guide or principle and "almost any task can be
construed to involve rule learning." Of course, as with the
terms "learning" and "consciousness," a great deal of
ambiguity is possible concerning what one means by the
term "rule," but we had a specific concept in mind in the
target article. A subject is responding on the basis of a rule
if performance to test items is uninfluenced by similarity
(e.g., to particular training items). Studies such as that of
Nosofsky et al. (1989) illustrate how formal rule models
can be constructed and how predictions based on instance
memorization and rule use can differ at the quantitative
level.
The relationship between distributed instance models
that can perform some abstraction on the one hand and
rule-learning systems on the other is a complex one.
Goldstone & Kruschke and Howe & Rabinowitz question
whether it is possible, given our present state of knowl-
edge, to conclude that memorization and rule induction
reflect the operations of distinct systems. We agree that
conclusions should be tentative. We also agree with Gold-
stone & Kruschke, Nagata, and Poldrack & Cohen that
there is enormous debate over what is an instance, what is
a rule, the extent to which they interact, and what
constitutes a model of either. But we doubt that memoriz-
ation and rule induction can be seen as the endpoints of a
continuum. Similarity either has a detectable effect or it
does not: this is not a continuum.
Our concern is to explain the differences in learning
and test behavior in experiments such as that of Reber et
al. (1980) where explicitly instructed subjects performed
quite differently from observation instructed subjects.
Though we are not aware of any studies in which on-line
protocols were taken from subjects in these conditions,
our prediction is that the two groups of subjects would
look radically different. A hypothesis-testing strategy is
quite different from the distributed encoding of instances.
It looks different in on-line protocols, as judged from
studies of hypothesis testing (Bruner et al. 1956; Klahr et
al. 1990), and a different set of variables affect behaviour
(Mathews et al. 1989; Reber et al. 1980).
For example, Reber et al. (1980) found that the order of
presentation of the stimuli only affected test performance
for the verbally instructed subjects. Of course, as Gold-
stone & Kruschke might agree, it is likely that even these
verbally instructed subjects, who were presumably fol-
lowing a hypothesis-testing strategy, would show some
influences of particular instances in their behavior, but we
would argue that these result from the influence of a
separate instance-encoding system.
Some commentators (Goldstone & Kruschke, Poldrack
& Cohen) cited Barsalou's (1990) claim to the effect that
abstraction and exemplar theories are logically indis-
tinguishable as evidence of the difficulty of maintaining a
contrast between inducing rules and memorizing exam-
ples. But although Barsalou's argument is interesting, his
conception of an abstraction is very different from our
notion of a rule, so we believe the relevance of his
argument is limited. For Barsalou, an abstraction is a
representation in which property information is central-
ised. For us, a rule does not encode information about
studied exemplars at all, but rather is a generalisation
about regularities in the exemplars.
To conclude, then, we agree that distributed instance
models produce a significant amount of abstraction and
therefore blur into what we think of as rules and rule-
formation models. However, there is strong evidence for
a very different strategy of hypothesis testing that looks
quite different from memorization.
We fully agree with the commentators who argue that
future research should take the direction of finding the
differences (and mechanisms) that distinguish implicit
from explicit learning. We think one profitable avenue
will be to investigate the sorts of factors that will differen-
tially influence a strategy of learning instances from one of
testing hypotheses.
NOTES
1. Nagata and Reber & Winter seem to believe that if only a
"small" amount of explicit knowledge is available, whereas a
"large" amount of implicit knowledge can be shown, then im-
plicit learning has been satisfactorily demonstrated. With re-
spect to amnesia, these commentators would presumably argue
that the small benefit the normal subjects show over amnesics in
the implicit test cannot explain the large discrepancy on the
explicit test, in which case argument 2 is still viable. Because the
normal subjects have far more explicit knowledge than the
amnesics, it follows that if the two tests relied on a common
source of knowledge, the normals would have to perform consid-
erably better than the amnesics on the implicit test. But their
excess explicit knowledge is unable to boost performance very
much on the implicit test. Hence the latter is principally
sensitive to unconscious information. We believe this view may
be quite widely held, but it is very important to emphasize that
it is entirely fallacious. The problem is that a difference of x%
correct on an implicit measure is as comparable with a difference
of (/% correct on an explicit measure as are apples with oranges.
Just because we may use a similar measure (e.g., percent
correct) in each case does not mean that they can be directly
compared, because the tests will differ in all sorts of other ways.
For example, the chance level of performance is often different
in the two tests. It is in general not possible to translate a
difference on a given response measure into information, and
hence inferences cannot be drawn about whether a subject has
"more" or "less" explicit than implicit knowledge. For the same
reason, Reber & Winter's claim that implicit learning is less
affected than explicit memory by such factors as individual
differences and IQ is completely unproven. In the Reber et al.
(1991) study, for example, IQ correlated less well with perfor-
mance on an implicit grammaticality judgment task than with
performance on a quite different series continuation task as-
sumed to require explicit processing. But there is no reason to
believe that the response scales for these two tasks are compara-
ble or that the difference between them is attributable to the
implicit-explicit dimension.
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